The Cuban government has taken a new turn in its economic rhetoric by announcing the approval of a "Government Program to correct distortions and revitalize the economy in 2025."
A note published on the official site Cubadebate reported on the presentation of the program during the first meeting of the Council of Ministers in 2025, and echoed the remarks of Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, who stated that in the previous meeting, held in December, the proposals for objectives and projections, the working system, and the steps for the development of the program were presented and approved.
"The fact allows us to expand the scope of actions and transition from Government Projections to this Government Program, which consists of objectives, projections, actions, indicators, and goals, along with a timeline that includes deadlines and responsibilities," stated the prime minister, flanked by a distracted and exhausted Miguel Díaz-Canel, as captured by the cameras of NTV.
However, as economist Pedro Monreal pointed out in a sharp analysis on his X account, there is no detailed plan or concrete measures on the table. What were once mere "projections" have been rebranded as a "government program," but without the slightest structural change.
In his analysis, Monreal broke down the lack of substance in this announcement, pointing out that the press release about the supposed program only mentions general aspirations and details regarding education and artificial intelligence, without providing specific data, quantified objectives, or allocated resources.
The absence of a self-critical analysis and the omission of any reference to the failure of the "Tarea Ordenamiento"—which not only failed to resolve economic distortions but also created new ones, such as uncontrolled dollarization, inflation, and massive impoverishment—reveal the propagandistic nature of this initiative.
The great promise of the "Ordering Task" to generate "significant benefits for all" has been forgotten. There are no signs that the government intends to assess its mistakes or correct them effectively, nor that it has addressed the demands of the citizens who "demand results".
Instead, a hollow discourse persists, lacking verifiable information on how economic distortions will be corrected or how the economy will truly be revitalized in 2025.
In that regard, Monreal identified three key aspects that should be addressed in any serious economic program, which, however, are absent in this case:
1. Macroeconomic stabilization: The crisis continues to deepen, and although the regime insists that a recovery will be achieved by 2025, CEPAL estimates that the country will face a scenario of stagflation, meaning economic stagnation combined with high inflation.
2. Transformation of the economic model: To revitalize the economy, short-term measures are not enough. A structural transformation of the growth and development model is needed, something that the government does not address and for which it does not present any concrete strategy.
3. Welfare of Cuban households: Despite the widespread impoverishment and the rise in inequality, the government has chosen statistical silence, avoiding the publication of data on real income and the standard of living of the population. However, indirect indicators, such as the decline in workers' wages in relation to GDP, reveal a situation comparable to the most severe neoliberal adjustments.
Essentially, what the regime presents as a "program" is nothing more than a rebranding of what has already been known: an economy mired in crisis, without substantive reforms, and a government that continues to avoid any real structural transformation.
Instead of acknowledging the failure of its policies and proposing effective solutions, the government clings to propaganda, with speeches designed to create an illusion of control and planning, while in reality, the country continues to plunge uncontrollably.
As Monreal concluded in his analysis, this is not a public economic policy program, but rather "the gathering of a limited circle of politicians," disconnected from the real urgencies of the Cuban economy and the well-being of its people.
The evolution of the 2024 "projections"
To understand the scope of the Cuban regime's discursive strategy, it is essential to analyze how the so-called "projections" have evolved throughout 2024. Projections that Díaz-Canel presented at the end of January 2024 as the way to "move towards a better situation, and forge the definitive path to the prosperity and development this heroic people deserve.”
On various occasions, the government announced measures of "great scope" and "necessary adjustments", but in practice there were no substantial changes in economic policy, insisting on the centrality of the socialist state enterprise, while slowing down, pursuing, and controlling the activity and emergence of "new private economic actors".
The year began with the promise of correcting economic distortions with a focus on banking and controlling the exchange rate. However, in April, the government itself acknowledged the failure of banking, admitting that it did not achieve the expected effects on inflation or monetary stabilization.
At the same time, the uncontrolled rise in prices and the energy crisis generated more uncertainty, with measures that were rejected even by sectors supportive of the government.
Among the most controversial decisions of 2024 is the disproportionate increase in fuel prices, announced in January, with a rise of up to 500% in some cases. This measure led to increased costs in transportation and basic necessities, further exacerbating the economic crisis.
During the second half of the year, official speeches revolved around the supposed "effective implementation" of the announced measures, without providing concrete evidence of the touted "progress".
In September and October, senior officials insisted on the need for greater "preparation and demand" from leaders, a rhetoric that continues to blame intermediate managers without acknowledging the structural errors of economic policies.
"We're going to tackle the softness!", warned Marrero Cruz at the end of January 2024, thus outlining the "methodology" included as part of the Projections that are now becoming a "Government Program to correct distortions and revitalize the economy."
The partial dollarization of the economy: Is it something new?
Within the scope of the supposed "Government Program", the only measure that could be considered novel is the partial dollarization of the economy, although this trend has already been manifesting in practice.
At the end of 2024, the regime approved regulations that allow the use of the dollar in wholesale and retail transactions, as well as in certain sectors of foreign trade.
The government justifies this measure as an attempt to attract more foreign currency and stabilize the supply of essential goods, but in practice, it has exacerbated social inequality, as only those who have access to dollars can benefit.
To make matters worse, the decision contradicts past statements by Díaz-Canel, who in 2020 denied any attempts to dollarize the economy. But no one is held accountable in the Palace; the heirs of "continuity" make and retract their statements without consequences.
The impact of this partial dollarization has been the increase in the cost of goods and services in Cuban pesos, the expansion of the informal currency market, and the consolidation of a dual economy that benefits only an "elite" connected to power.
Instead of resolving the distortions, this policy deepens them, reinforcing an exclusive model and widening the gap between those who have access to dollars and those who depend on the miserable state salary.
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