The debate over which foreign policy truly pressures the Cuban regime reignited this week in a discussion featuring exile activist Manuel Milanés and the associate researcher at Pan-American Strategic Advisors Alejandra Franganillo, who confronted two perspectives on the history of sanctions and concessions from Washington towards Havana.
Milanés was categorical when addressing the effectiveness of the sanctions: "If nothing has happened with the sanctions so far, why not consider something else? It's very dangerous."
Its central argument is that the concrete advancements experienced by Cubans in recent decades did not come about through dialogue, but rather through sanctions and during their enforcement. "At one point, they allowed the buying and selling of houses under sanctions. At one point, they allowed entry to hotels with sanctions. At one point, they allowed the circulation of the dollar under sanctions."
The main target of his criticism was the rapprochement policy promoted by the Obama administration between 2014 and 2017. According to Milanés, that period of cultural exchange and diplomatic thaw did not weaken the regime; rather, it strengthened it. "What has been achieved is precisely due to sanctions. We already know that the business-friendly, cultural exchange policy of the Obama era did not work. There were more political prisoners. They received more funding. They leveraged themselves, entrenched themselves, and everything turned out contrary to expectations. Repression increased."
This analysis aligns with the argument that Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly maintained in 2026: that if the Cuban regime were to make a genuine economic opening, it would "simply lose power," which is why it will never do so authentically.
Rubio has led the most aggressive tightening of sanctions in decades, with designations against GAESA, Díaz-Canel, and Cuban intelligence between May and June 2026. In fact, this Thursday the Trump Administration announced another package of sanctions that includes the Minister of Public Health, José Ángel Portal Miranda, and the entire institutional framework managing medical missions.
Franganillo, for his part, did not reject the sanctions, but he did draw a clear line regarding their scope. "I'm not saying that I am against sanctions. I support sanctions, but they should be direct, such as sanctions against high-ranking officials," he stated, warning that indiscriminate measures could affect the Cuban people before they impact the nomenclature of the Communist Party.
Regarding the possibility of a total blockade, Franganillo was straightforward: "To implement a total blockade... I wouldn't," arguing that without defensive capabilities for the population, such a measure could lead to serious and irresponsible humanitarian consequences.
In June 2026, the Cuban National Assembly approved 176 economic measures organized into 23 axes, interpreted by analysts as a controlled liberalization to gain some breathing room without relinquishing the party's political control, which some describe as a "forced hybridization."
The debate concluded with a question posed by a viewer: "You, Cuban, what are you going to do the day after what happens?" leaving the scenario open regarding what will happen to Cuba after the end of the dictatorship and who will be capable of rebuilding the country.
On July 11, Rubio urged Cuban leaders to commit to "real reforms, peace, and prosperity" before it is "too late," a sign that pressure from Washington shows no signs of easing.
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