If the United States were to implement in Cuba a strategy equivalent to the one announced for Venezuela—consisting of three phases: stabilization, recovery, and a potential political transition— the internal dynamics and power structure on the Island could change drastically, for several profound reasons related to the current regime's structure.
The transition in Cuba would be controlled and under the leadership of the U.S. To begin with, in Cuba, it cannot start with elections or “pretty reforms.”
First, it is necessary to avert the humanitarian collapse and extinguish the fire left by the regime.
A first phase of stabilization
This stage would last up to 12 months and would aim for the country not to sink and for the people to survive.
Electricity would be an absolute priority. Without power, there is no water, food, hospitals, communications, or governance.
Immediate actions:
- Direct importation of fuel under U.S. control.
- Urgent repair of existing thermoelectric plants (even if they are old).
- Replacement of expensive diesel with fuel/crude oil where possible.
- Military-logistical control to prevent diversions (GAESA out).
Estimated cost for Basic Electricity 24/7: 2,500–3,000 million USD/year
Food and water. Immediate actions:
- Massive import of staple foods.
- Minimal reactivation of aqueducts and pumping.
- Community kitchens and direct rations (post-war model).
Cost: 1.5 to 2 billion USD/year.
Health and medications. Actions:
- Essential medicines.
- Guaranteed energy for hospitals.
- Direct payment to doctors and nurses (outside the corrupt state system).
Cost: 800–1,200 million USD per year. In total, the first phase would cost between 6,000–8,000 million USD.
This is not investment; it is humanitarian aid and social control to prevent the country from exploding.
Second phase, of recovery
It would take up to four years (from the second to the fourth year of transition), and its goal would be for Cuba to start to stand on its own.
To achieve a modern electrical system, several actions would be required:
- Gradual closure of unviable plants.
- Combined cycle gas-fuel.
- Solar and wind energy with thermal backup.
- New power grid (losses today >30%).
Cost: 8,000–12,000 million USD.
Agriculture and food, actions:
- Return lands.
- Private credit.
- Supplies without state monopoly.
- End of Collection.
Cost: 3,000–4,000 million USD.
Basic infrastructure. Actions:
- Ports
- roads
- telecommunications
- water and sanitation
Cost: 5,000–7,000 million USD. In total, Phase 2 would cost between 16,000–23,000 million USD.
Third phase, of political transition
It would cover the fourth to the tenth year. Its objective would be to achieve a functional democracy, not a symbolic one.
The actions would consist of holding elections when there is food, electricity, and real wages
- Transitional justice (without witch hunts).
- Integration into the international financial system.
- Massive private investment (tourism, agriculture, energy).
The expected investment would be an additional 20,000–30,000 million USD, mostly from private sources.
In summary, over a period of 10 years, the stabilization phase would require 6–8 billion; the recovery phase, 16–23 billion; and the transition phase, 20–30 billion.
In total, $42–61 billion would be needed.
Political key, the uncomfortable part
In a hypothetical scenario where a plan similar to that of Venezuela is applied, the United States would not rebuild Cuba to save the regime, but rather to prevent a larger collapse.
This would imply that GAESA could not exist as it does today, and that Raúl Castro and the leadership would not have the ability to control the process.
The initial control would be external precisely to avoid the most immediate risks: resource looting, corruption, a Haiti-like chaos, and mass migration to Florida.
The logic would be one of containment and order, not of preserving the status quo.
Direct conclusion
Yes, a U.S.-controlled transition would be viable under those premises. Yes, it would be costly, but much cheaper than chaos.
And no. Cuba cannot emerge alone from the disaster left by the regime.
The first year would not be ideological or political in the classical sense; it would be humanitarian and focused on order, aimed at stabilizing basic services, ensuring supply, and preventing a power vacuum with regional consequences.
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