The Metropolitan Bank of Cuba announced this Friday the establishment of banking channels for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (Mipymes), non-agricultural cooperatives, and other non-state economic actors to request the purchase of foreign currency, in accordance with the resolutions 127 and 128 of 2025 from the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC).
The measure, presented by the official press as part of the "implementation of changes in the currency market," formally expands access to foreign currency within the private sector. However, it does so under a scheme that is entirely controlled by the State, which retains the authority to decide who can purchase foreign currency, how much, and how often.
According to the information released by the National Television News (NTV), the operations must be conducted through bank transactions. Payments will be made in Cuban pesos from the applicant's tax account, and the amounts acquired will be credited to the economic actor's foreign currency account.
Before carrying out each operation, banks must verify the customer's identity, the legality of the accounts involved, and the traceability of the funds, in accordance with the control protocols established by the BCC.
The Metropolitan Bank specified that the sale of foreign currency will only take place once a month and under strict limits. The maximum permitted amount will be calculated as 50% of the average income in the fiscal account over the last three months, divided by the exchange rate of Segment III, the so-called "floating rate" of the official exchange system.
Requests must be processed exclusively through the digital platform Metropolitano en Línea. The bank may also reject or postpone operations based on "availabilities" or "economic priorities," a formula that leaves the final decision in the hands of the state apparatus.
Limits and calculations: A symbolic access to the currency
Although the Central Bank has presented the measure as a step towards the "normalization" of the currency market, the mechanism designed for Mipymes and other non-state actors reveals an extremely limited access.
The Metropolitan Bank itself specified that the sale of foreign currency will only take place once a month and under a maximum limit calculated based on a formula established by the Central Bank: 50% of the average income in the fiscal account over the last three months, divided by the exchange rate of Segment III, known as the “floating rate”.
According to the official rates announced by the BCC, on this January 13, 2026, the floating exchange rate is 413 Cuban pesos per dollar and 482.22 per euro.
To illustrate how this system works, let's assume that a private Mipyme reported average revenues of 300,000 CUP in the last three months. The calculation of the maximum allowed amount would be as follows:
- 50% of 300,000 CUP = 150,000 CUP
- 150,000 ÷ 413 = approximately 363 dollars
In the case of the euro, the figure would be even lower:
- 150,000 ÷ 482.22 = about 311 euros
In both cases, the company could access a maximum of between 300 and 400 dollars or euros per month, provided that the bank approves the application and there are available funds.
The example illustrates the symbolic nature of access: even businesses with medium or high incomes in national currency will receive amounts that barely suffice for minor operations, without a real possibility of financing imports or payments to international suppliers.
Far from stimulating productivity or autonomy in the private sector, the model imposes an artificial ceiling that subordinates the flow of foreign currency to the discretion of the state apparatus.
In practice, the scheme seems aimed at attracting liquidity in pesos and channeling operations under bank control, rather than promoting the growth of non-state enterprises.
A managed system, not a market
Although resolutions 127 and 128 refer to a "new design for the currency market," what has been established in practice is a managed system for allocating foreign currency, inspired by the concept of Currency Access Capacity Allocation (ACAD).
This mechanism grants state banks —and, by extension, the government— the authority to approve or deny each purchase, set maximum amounts, and apply additional commercial margins.
The scope of the measure is not limited to Mipymes. According to the regulations, non-agricultural cooperatives, self-employed workers, and other economic entities with non-state legal personality will also be able to access it, provided they have active tax accounts and meet the control requirements set by the Central Bank.
In contrast, state-owned enterprises, public or mixed capital micro, small, and medium enterprises, and state agricultural projects are expressly excluded from this framework. Individuals or informal businesses not registered with the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) will also be unable to participate.
Partial dollarization and financial control
The activation of these channels occurs just weeks after the implementation of Decree-Law 113/2025, which established a partially institutionalized dollarization of the Cuban economy.
This legal body officially recognized a multi-currency system and repealed the foundations of the failed Monetary Ordering of 2021, which had attempted to uphold the Cuban peso as the only legal tender.
With the new model, the regime does not liberalize access to foreign currency; rather, it manages it in a centralized manner through state banks and under the direct supervision of the BCC.
Instead of an open market, a financial control structure is established that segments economic actors between those who can operate in foreign currencies and those who remain confined to the Cuban peso circuit.
Economists consulted by CiberCuba indicate that this segmentation deepens inequality and concentrates opportunities in a small group of companies with favorable ties to the State or greater banking management capacity.
In parallel, the informal dollar market —where the rate is significantly higher than the official one— will continue to dictate the actual dynamics of prices and supply.
With this measure, the regime aims to regain some of the lost control over the foreign currencies circulating in the economy, while trying to curb the depreciation of the peso and the inflationary pressures affecting the population.
But the result, experts warn, will be an even more closed and unequal model, where access to hard currency will continue to be a privilege managed from the power.
Filed under: