A viewer from CiberCuba posed a question during a live connection that encapsulates the central contradiction of the Cuban economic model: “With that system, no Mipyme will ever be independent. You have to understand what the word dictatorship truly means.” She made this remark on the weekly program hosted by economist Elías Amor every Thursday at 11:00 AM in Miami on this platform. In response to this question, he provided an analysis in an interview with Tania Costa that, rather than avoiding the issue, confronts it with honesty.
Amor defines Mipymes as "private enterprises created by certain individuals in Cuba to carry out activities that either the State does not undertake or does poorly," and argues that their nature is essentially spontaneous. "The development of a Mipyme, I genuinely believe, is completely spontaneous, and we must allow them to operate to see where they position themselves and how far they can go."
However, the economist does not dismiss the argument of the listener (who says her name is Vivian). "The listener is right when she says that state intervention is indeed important," he acknowledges, before turning to a comparison that sheds light on the underlying dilemma.
To explain how private enterprise and a single party coexist, Amor points to the models of Vietnam and China: "In Vietnam and China, where there is a communist party that directs politics, companies are under the control of that communist party even if they are private. Their operational framework is that of a market economy, but monitored by the communist party."
The contrast with Western democracies is immediate. "In Spain, Germany, and France, there is no party that oversees companies." The implication is clear: in Cuba, as in those Asian models, the private enterprise can exist, "but it cannot be free in the full sense of the term."
The trajectory of Mipymes in Cuba from a historical perspective empirically supports this thesis. Officially authorized in September 2021 after decades of prohibition, they have operated in a constant tension between the regime's economic needs and its instinct for political control.
This tension has manifested in a series of successive restrictions. In August 2024, Decree 107 prohibited 125 activities in the private sector. A leaked audio in December of that year revealed the discontent of the private sector regarding attempts to install cells of the Communist Party within the very Mipymes. By the end of 2025, the government closed dozens of companies as part of a program for "correcting distortions."
The regime has fluctuated between tolerating and suffocating entrepreneurship. In September 2025, the Cuban regime considered private entrepreneurs a "necessary evil": useful for alleviating the crisis, but perceived as a threat to state control. Since then, we have seen the regime's elite label private entrepreneurship as a "cancer", and in that context, Amor's analysis takes on particular relevance.
The economist himself warned in July that the risks of Mipymes paying pensions represent a burden that belongs to the State, not to the emerging private sector, in yet another indication that the regime seeks to shift its responsibilities without relinquishing control.
Amor concludes that the success or failure of each Mipyme "will depend on their ability to connect with their customers and do so with good, competitive prices," but the political framework in which they operate is not neutral: it is that of a single-party dictatorship that, like in Vietnam or China, decides how far private enterprise can go.
Filed under: