Betrayal or Realism? The Cuban Dilemma in Light of the Platt Amendment (Part I)

On June 12, 1901, Cuba faced one of the most difficult dilemmas in its republican history: should it approve the Platt Amendment or reject it?

The Constituent Assembly ultimately approved it by a vote of 16 to 11, while four members were absent. Among those who voted in favor were Domingo Méndez Capote, Enrique Villuendas, Leopoldo Berriel, Pedro Betancourt, Manuel Sanguily, José N. Ferrer, Eliseo Giberga, José Miguel Gómez, Martín Morúa Delgado, Emilio Núñez, Gonzalo de Quesada, Joaquín Quilez, Pedro González Llorente, Alejandro Rodríguez, Diego Tamayo, and others.

Among those who voted against were Alfredo Zayas, José Braulio Alemán, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Luis Fortún, Juan Gualberto Gómez, José Lacret, Rafael Portuondo, Rafael Manduley, Manuel R. Silva, Eudaldo Tamayo, and José Fernández de Castro.

Post-nationalist historiography often transformed this vote into a moral judgment: those who accepted the Amendment were associated with concession, while those who rejected it were elevated to the status of patriots without any nuance. However, the reality was much more complex.

The Amendment was not an agreement between equals. The United States had approved in March 1901 the conditions that would govern its future relations with Cuba and made it clear that the withdrawal of its troops was contingent upon the acceptance of those conditions. Secretary of War Elihu Root maintained that the text should be accepted without modifications.

The dilemma, therefore, was not simply  Amendment yes or Amendment no. It was also:  republic with limitations on sovereignty or prolongation of military occupation?

Those who voted against it had powerful reasons. The Amendment granted the United States a right of intervention in Cuba and conditioned fundamental aspects of foreign policy and national finances. For the independence fighters who had battled for decades for sovereignty, accepting this meant conceding to foreign tutelage, which was incompatible with the ideal for which they had fought.

However, those who voted in favor did not necessarily act out of a lack of patriotism. Some explained that they believed the capacity for Cuban resistance was exhausted and feared that rejecting it would mean indefinitely prolonging the occupation. Manuel Sanguily, for example, ended up voting in favor after having politically opposed the Amendment, arguing that resisting under those circumstances could be detrimental to Cuban aspirations.

Here lies the question I consider fundamental. Can we judge that decision solely based on the final outcome, or should we first understand the real alternatives that those men had before them?

The Platt Amendment was undoubtedly a limitation of Cuban sovereignty. However, it is also true that its acceptance allowed for the completion of the constitutional process and paved the way for the United States to transfer governance and control of the island to the new Cuban government on May 20, 1902.

Therefore, rather than distributing certificates of patriotism or treason, it is important to study the circumstances. Those who voted against defended one principle: sovereignty should not be negotiated. Those who voted in favor upheld another consideration: without accepting that condition, independence could be postponed.

Both positions made sense. Both carried risks. Both stemmed from the same concern: how to transform the victory over Spain into an effective Cuban Republic.

History, therefore, should not erase contradiction. It must preserve it. Because on that June 12, 1901, Cuba did not choose between freedom and freedom.

He chose between a limited independence under foreign tutelage and the uncertainty of continuing under occupation. Understanding that dilemma is far more useful than condemning some and glorifying others.