Journalism is not betrayal: Debunking the criminalization of the free press in Cuba

In Cuba, informing has always been an act of resistance. For over six decades, the regime has turned the exercise of free journalism into a suspicious, if not criminal, activity.

Today, in the 21st century, the mechanisms have changed, but the objective remains the same: to silence the truth, intimidate those who speak it, and create enemies to justify censorship.

The current campaigns against elTOQUE, CiberCuba, CubaNet, Diario de Cuba, and other independent media are not isolated incidents or spontaneous occurrences. They are part of a coordinated offensive orchestrated by the ideological and repressive apparatus of the State, which has found in the digital realm a new way to pursue critical thought.

An old strategy with a new face

On November 26, 2025, Cubadebate published an article titled “X-ray of the far-right accounts operating against Cuba on X,” crafted by their so-called 'Media Observatory.'

Under the guise of a technical analysis, the text listed about thirty social media accounts—including those of journalists, economists, and activists—accusing them of leading an "information war" organized from abroad to "foster hatred against Cuba."

Two days later, Chancellor Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla amplified the accusation on his official X account, and what began as a propaganda text turned into state doctrine.

Immediately, Razones de Cuba, Granma, Prensa Latina, and the television spokesperson Humberto López resumed the narrative, particularly targeting the outlet elTOQUE, which they accused of "economic terrorism" and "mercenarism."

The sequence is well-known: first, the media demonization, followed by legal threats. The profiles with photographs and personal information of 18 alleged "executives of elTOQUE" — published by Cubadebate — confirm the pattern.

The accusations are serious: currency trafficking, tax evasion, conspiracy… The evidence is nonexistent. The method is the same as always: lynch first, justify later.

But the case of elTOQUE is just the most visible manifestation of a broader strategy: to criminalize free journalism to deter, ridicule, or destroy it.

Six decades of institutional censorship

The repression of press freedom is not a temporary mistake, but a foundational policy of the regime established in 1959.

As soon as the so-called "revolution" triumphed, the new power shut down the newspapers Prensa Libre and Diario de la Marina, confiscated the printing presses, and established the state media apparatus led by Granma and the ICRT.

Since then, the Communist Party has monopolized information under the principle that "the press is a weapon of the Revolution."

During the seventies and eighties, journalists and writers such as Carlos Franqui, Marta Frayde, Guillermo Cabrera Infante, and Reinaldo Arenas were silenced or expelled for not conforming to the official narrative.

In 2003, during the 'Black Spring', 27 independent journalists —including Raúl Rivero and Ricardo González Alfonso— were sentenced to lengthy prison terms for "mercenarism," a crime specifically designed to punish intellectual dissent.

The 21st century brought the internet and social networks, but it also introduced a digital version of the same control. Today, repression no longer requires visible prisons: it operates through smear campaigns, threats online, interrogations, hacking, website censorship, and economic persecution. Controlling the narrative remains central to the survival of power.

The crimes of those who ask and do not remain silent

The Cuban Penal Code, reformed in 2022, consolidated the criminalization of journalism through ambiguous criminal provisions that allow for the punishment of any form of critical expression. Among them:

Article 143 (Mercenarism): punishes with up to ten years in prison anyone who “receives, or intends to receive, material benefits from a foreign government to carry out acts against the Cuban State.” Its vagueness turns any journalist working with international funds into a presumed criminal.

Article 119 (Treason): includes penalties for "cooperating or providing information to the enemy," a broad category that the regime applies to anyone who collaborates with media based outside the island.

Articles 124 to 126 (Crimes against State Security): allow citizens to be prosecuted for "acts of enemy propaganda."

Article 370: penalizes the “dissemination of false news,” leaving the State with the monopoly on defining what is true and what is not.

In Cuba, the law does not protect the citizen from the power; rather, it protects the power from the citizen. These rules do not defend national security, but rather the immunity of the Party against criticism.

False Crimes: Deconstructing the Myths of the Regime

"Mercenarism": The government insists that independent media are "mercenaries" because some receive international funding. However, all funds for independent media are public, transparent, and audited.

Despite the regime's insistence on defaming CiberCuba as a recipient of these funds, this medium has made it clear on multiple occasions that it does not receive any financing and operates with its own funds generated from advertising and traffic.

However, the real problem for the regime is not the source of the money, but the destination of the information: it cannot be controlled.

Moreover, state media also receive external funding, albeit disguised as cooperation or state investment from allied countries. The difference is that they cater to political interests, while independent journalism is dedicated to the truth.

“Enemy propaganda”: If there is propaganda in Cuba, it is in the State media. Granma, Juventud Rebelde, or Cubadebate do not report: they repeat slogans. Free journalism, on the other hand, contrasts, verifies, and gives voice to those whom the power silences.

The regime fears independent media because it disrupts the narrative monopoly: it exposes poverty, blackouts, corruption, and human rights violations that the state-controlled press denies.

"Betrayal" and "State Security": A journalist's loyalty is not to the government, but to society. The regime deliberately confuses criticism of the Party with betrayal of the homeland. However, denouncing an authoritarian power is not betraying Cuba; it is defending her.

Identifying "Revolution = State = Homeland" is the greatest political subterfuge of Castrosim. Under this formula, the regime claims ownership of the country and turns any disagreement into a crime.

“Counter-revolution”: For decades, the term has been used to exclude and demonize those who do not conform to the official narrative. But in present-day Cuba, where the so-called “revolution” signifies permanence and repression, the true revolutionary is the one who demands change.

Being "counter-revolutionary" has become an honor for those who fight for rights, transparency, and freedom. Similarly, being a "hater" has turned into a distinction that those who despise the violence, repression, folly, manipulation, indoctrination, and corruption of a totalitarian regime proudly display.

The language war

The regime has refined its semantic arsenal. It no longer speaks only of “enemy propaganda” or “mercenaries,” but rather of “cognitive warfare,” a concept imported from the Russian military lexicon.

The idea is simple and dangerous: to present public debate as a war, criticism as an attack, and free thought as a weapon. By militarizing language, the state justifies its surveillance, censorship, and repression as national defense.

When power calls "war" the truth, it is because it no longer has arguments.

The role of independent journalism

Despite the persecution, free journalism in Cuba remains alive both inside and outside the country. Media outlets such as CiberCuba, elTOQUE, CubaNet, Diario de Cuba, 14ymedio, and ADN Cuba document what the State hides: poverty, mass migration, political prisoners, the collapse of the healthcare system, and the inequality generated by the "partial dollarization" of the system.

Their existence is not a crime, but a public service. They are the ones who keep Cuba connected to the truth, despite censorship, exile, and campaigns of hatred.

The real crime

The regime accuses those who report of treason, but the true traitors are those who lie in the name of Cuba. Those who use the flag to conceal repression, the word "homeland" to justify poverty, and "revolution" to perpetuate the power of an elite.

In Cuba, to inform is to resist. There is no greater crime for a dictatorship than to tell the truth. Independent Cuban journalists are not enemies of the homeland; they are dissenters against a dictatorship that uses state media as a tool of oppression. They are those who, as Martí said, “cannot live where tyrants command with just a little light on their forehead.”

And as long as those in power continue to confuse their permanence with the nation, it must be reminded that Cuba is not the Party, nor the Revolution, nor the Government: Cuba consists of the current victims of a dictatorship, but also the future citizens of a rule of law and a free and democratic homeland.