The time for change has come

The capture of Nicolás Maduro was not just a warning for Cuba. It marked the dismantling of the last economic pillar supporting the Cuban regime and confirmed that Havana's scope for maneuver is narrowing every day.

What happened in Venezuela forces the Cuban elite to make a strategic decision that they have been postponing for years: to initiate a controlled transition now, or to wait for the transition to be imposed from outside, by circumstances, or directly through force.

Any of these pathways will lead to change in Cuba. The difference lies in who controls the process and at what personal cost those currently in power are willing to pay.

For the Cuban elite, the lesson should be clear: the transition is going to happen.

Venezuela: More Than a Mirror, the End of Subsidies

For more than two decades, Venezuela served as Cuba's economic lifeline. During the prosperous years of Chavismo, the flow of subsidized oil reached around 90,000 to 100,000 barrels per day, covering up to 90% of Cuba's energy consumption. Even when Venezuelan production collapsed and the country fell into free fall, the trickle continued: about 30,000 barrels per day remained vital for keeping power plants running and transportation functioning on the island.

With Maduro's downfall, this flow is at a terminal risk. No new actor in Caracas will assume the political and financial cost of continuing to subsidize Cuba under Washington's sanctions. And no alternative supplier will deliver crude on credit or accept the risk of facing the U.S. Treasury Department to keep the Cuban regime afloat.

The equation is simple: without Venezuelan oil, Cuba faces more blackouts, less electricity generation, reduced productive activity, and an accelerated deterioration of infrastructure that is already operating at its limits.

But the problem is not just energy-related. It is structural. The Cuban economy has been contracting for years: GDP has fallen by 11% since 2019, official inflation exceeds 15% annually (although the real cost of living has quadrupled since 2020), and more than 2.7 million Cubans — nearly a quarter of the population — have left the country since 2020.

Official projections for 2026 indicate a growth of 1%, a figure that does not even compensate for the accumulated decline and raises skepticism even within the island. In this context, losing Venezuelan support is not merely a setback: it is the blow that could hasten a definitive collapse.

Cuba Uncovered: From Peripheral Actor to Architect of Repression

The U.S. military operation against Maduro left another uncomfortable legacy for Havana: the public and documented confirmation of the structural role that Cuban intelligence and armed forces played in sustaining the Venezuelan regime.

For years, this role has been downplayed or ignored by major international media, which preferred to talk about Russia, China, or Iran as strategic allies of Caracas. However, the death of 37 Cuban agents during the operation in Venezuela, officially acknowledged by Díaz-Canel's government, forced a reconsideration of the narrative.

Journalistic investigations and United Nations missions have documented how two secret agreements signed in 2008 granted Cuba unprecedented access to Venezuelan armed forces and intelligence services.

Cuban advisors were integrated into the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), the Ministry of Defense, in ports, airports, and even in the national identification system.

His mission was not only to train or advise: it was to design and operate an internal surveillance architecture that ensured the loyalty of the troops and allowed for the repression of any dissent before it could become organized.

The UN mission that investigated crimes against humanity in Venezuela confirmed that Cuban operatives trained Venezuelan personnel in techniques of surveillance, infiltration, interrogation, and repression of political opponents. This network of control was crucial in the brutal responses to the protests of 2014 and 2017, which resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of arrests, and a systematic pattern of torture and enforced disappearances.

What matters is not just that this has happened. What is significant is that the world now knows about it, discusses it, and directly associates it with Cuba. Media outlets such as Fox News, CNN, Reuters, The New York Times, and Al Jazeera have dedicated extensive reports to explaining Cuban infiltration in Venezuela. Politicians, analysts, and international organizations have stopped viewing Cuba as a minor actor or a victim of sanctions and have begun to treat it as an active exporter of repression and a key pillar of regional dictatorships.

That narrative change has consequences. It hardens the diplomatic climate, reduces the margins for soft negotiations, and places Havana at the center of Washington’s confrontational rhetoric. Marco Rubio, a hardline Cuban-American Secretary of State, has been explicit: "If I lived in Havana and was part of the government, I would be concerned, at least a little." Donald Trump was even more direct: "Cuba seems ready to fall."

The negotiation window is closing

For the Cuban elite, the lesson should be clear: the transition is going to happen. That is no longer up for debate. What is at stake is how it will happen and at what cost. And the time to choose is now, while there is still room for negotiation.

A controlled transition, initiated from within and guided by strategic criteria, could include elements that protect the interests of those currently in power: selective amnesties for those who have not committed serious crimes, safe exits into exile with legal guarantees, preservation of a portion of accumulated assets, and even a supervised institutional role during a transition period. Studies on negotiated transitions show that when the elites of the old regime facilitate change rather than obstruct it, they manage to retain influence, avoid mass judicial persecution, and participate in the design of the new political order.

The model of negotiated transition requires, at a minimum, four steps: the release of all political prisoners (Cuba currently has 1,187, the highest number ever recorded); full legalization of opposition parties and organizations, which exist but are criminalized; a genuine economic opening that allows for private investment and productive reactivation; and a transparent electoral schedule, with international oversight, that enables Cubans to freely choose their future.

In return, those who facilitate this process could obtain legal protections, guarantees against extradition, access to foreign accounts, and the possibility of withdrawing from public life without facing trials or media lynchings. This is the difference between a negotiated exit and an imposed collapse: in the former, the actors still have the capacity to set conditions; in the latter, they are completely at the mercy of what others decide to do with them.

But that window has an expiration date. Each month that passes without signs of opening reduces the regime's negotiating capacity. The economy will continue to deteriorate, protests will continue to grow, emigration will keep draining the country of its active population, and international pressure will keep increasing. At some point, the accumulation of crises will cross a threshold where change will no longer be negotiable, but rather inevitable and chaotic.

The Armed Forces: A Key Player

In any transitional scenario in Cuba, the role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) will be decisive. The FAR is not just an army; it is the most powerful institution in the Cuban state, controlling nearly 60% of the active economy (especially in the sectors that generate foreign currency), having a territorial presence throughout the country, monopolizing the legitimate use of force, and enjoying a level of institutional prestige that far exceeds that of the Communist Party.

Historically, the FAR have demonstrated adaptability. They survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, transitioned to economic managers during the Special Period, and have been the main driving force behind gradual reforms over the past three decades. Specialist analysts agree that, in a transitional scenario, the FAR are more likely to survive than the party, and could play a key role as guarantors of order, facilitators of dialogue, and executors of a controlled opening process.

The question is whether the top leaders of the FAR recognize that their best strategic option is to facilitate an orderly transition rather than relying on repression and resistance. In the first scenario, they could preserve their institutional role, avoid a chaotic collapse that leaves them out of control, and negotiate guarantees for both themselves and the country. In the second scenario, they risk ending up like the Venezuelan military: demoralized, fragmented, and ultimately forced to surrender or flee when the pressure becomes unsustainable.

The Washington Calculation

Since the Trump administration, the approach towards Latin America has once again invoked the Monroe Doctrine, a 19th-century vision that views the Western Hemisphere as an area of exclusive U.S. influence. The operation against Maduro was explicitly framed within that context: Trump declared that "U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again."

Cuba fits perfectly into that narrative. Marco Rubio, the architect of Trump's Latin American policy, has made it clear that he holds Cuba responsible for supporting Maduro and views the fall of the Venezuelan regime as an opportunity to weaken Havana. Official rhetoric suggests that Washington has limited patience: if Cuba does not show signs of change, the pressure will increase. This pressure can take many forms: tightening sanctions, blocking remittances, interdicting energy supplies, supporting internal opposition groups, and even— in an extreme scenario— direct military intervention.

Trump has publicly suggested that he does not see an intervention in Cuba as necessary because "it seems to be falling on its own." However, this stance may change if the Cuban crisis leads to unintended consequences for the United States: a new wave of mass migration, a power vacuum that allows hostile actors (China, Russia) to enter, or an episode of internal violence that demands a humanitarian response.

The calculation for the Cuban elite should be obvious: the longer the delay in change, the greater the likelihood that such change will be imposed from outside, with all the implications this holds for those currently in power.

Three paths, one destination

Cuba is going to change. That's no longer up for discussion. What’s at stake is the how and at what cost. The three options on the table are:

First option: negotiated and controlled transition. Release of political prisoners, legalization of the opposition, gradual economic opening, supervised electoral calendar. In exchange: amnesties for those who did not commit serious crimes, safe exits, legal guarantees, partial preservation of assets. Result: the country progresses towards democracy with less trauma, the elites are protected, and Cuba has an opportunity for reconstruction without massive revenge.

Second option: collapse under internal and external pressure. The regime endures, the economy continues to decline, protests are escalating, repression is intensifying, Washington increases sanctions and eventually supports internal forces or intervenes indirectly. Outcome: inevitable change, but chaotic, with a high risk of violence, institutional fragmentation, and no capacity for the elite to negotiate protections.

Third option: direct military intervention. Scenario similar to Venezuela or Panama 1989: special forces operation, capture of key leaders, temporary occupation. Outcome: the country is liberated, but the regime’s leaders face courts in the United States, detention without guarantees, total confiscation of assets, and worldwide public exposure. Zero margin for negotiation, zero protections.

The three options lead to the same final destination: a Cuba without the current regime. The difference lies in the level of control that the Cuban elite retains over the process and in the personal cost they pay for having waited too long.

The moment is now

After Maduro's fall, after the public exposure of the Cuban role in Venezuela, after the loss of the oil subsidy, and after the explicit statements by Trump and Rubio, the room for maneuver has narrowed dramatically. Each passing month without signs of opening reduces options. Each week that goes by with more blackouts, more scarcity, and increasing repression heightens internal pressure. Each day that Havana insists on resisting increases the likelihood that the transition will be imposed under the least favorable terms possible for those currently in power.

Recent history is clear: leaders who bet on holding out until the end rarely achieve their goals, and when they fall, they do so without a safety net. Gaddafi ended up executed in a ditch. Milošević died in prison. Maduro is in a cell in New York awaiting trial. They all had opportunities to negotiate dignified exits. They all rejected them. They all paid the highest price.

Cuba can choose a different path. But only if it acts now, while it is still possible to sit down and negotiate. Because the time to change has come. And the only question that remains is whether that change will be controlled by those who still hold power, or imposed by those who are no longer willing to wait.