The time for change has come

The capture of Nicolás Maduro was not just a warning for Cuba. It was the dismantling of the last economic pillar supporting the Cuban regime and confirmation that Havana's maneuvering room is narrowing by the day.

What happened in Venezuela compels the Cuban elite to make a strategic decision they have been postponing for years: to initiate a controlled transition now, or to wait for the transition to be imposed from the outside, whether by circumstance or directly by force.

Any of these avenues will lead to change in Cuba. The difference lies in who controls the process and at what personal cost those currently in power will pay.

For the Cuban elite, the lesson should be clear: the transition is going to happen.

Venezuela: more than a mirror, the end of the subsidy

For more than two decades, Venezuela served as Cuba's economic lifeline. During the years of Chavista prosperity, the flow of subsidized oil reached around 90,000 to 100,000 barrels per day, covering up to 90% of Cuba's energy consumption. Even when Venezuelan production collapsed and the country entered free fall, the flow continued: about 30,000 barrels a day remained vital for keeping power plants running and transportation operational on the island.

With Maduro's fall, that flow is at terminal risk. No new actor in Caracas will take on the political and financial cost of continuing to subsidize Cuba under Washington's sanctions. And no alternative supplier will deliver crude oil on credit or accept the risk of facing the U.S. Treasury for keeping the Cuban regime afloat.

The equation is simple: without Venezuelan oil, Cuba faces more blackouts, reduced electricity generation, lower productive activity, and an accelerated deterioration of an infrastructure that is already operating at its limits.

But the problem is not just an energy one. It is structural. The Cuban economy has been contracting for years: GDP has fallen by 11% since 2019, official inflation exceeds 15% annually (although the actual cost of living has quadrupled since 2020), and more than 2.7 million Cubans—about a quarter of the population—have left the country since 2020.

Official projections for 2026 indicate a growth of 1%, a figure that does not even compensate for the accumulated decline and generates skepticism even within the island. In that context, losing Venezuelan support is not just a setback: it is the blow that could lead to a definitive collapse.

Cuba Exposed: From Peripheral Actor to Architect of Repression

The U.S. military operation against Maduro left another uncomfortable legacy for Havana: the public and documented confirmation of the structural role that Cuban intelligence and the armed forces played in sustaining the Venezuelan regime.

For years, this role was minimized or ignored by major international media, which preferred to speak of Russia, China, or Iran as strategic allies of Caracas. However, the death of 37 Cuban agents during the operation in Venezuela, officially acknowledged by the Díaz-Canel government, forced a re-evaluation of the narrative.

Journalistic investigations and United Nations missions have documented how two secret agreements signed in 2008 granted Cuba unprecedented access to the Venezuelan armed forces and intelligence services.

Cuban advisors were integrated into the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), the Ministry of Defense, in ports, airports, and even in the national identification system.

His mission was not only to train or advise: it was to devise and operate an internal surveillance architecture that ensured the loyalty of the troops and allowed for the suppression of any dissent before it could organize.

The UN mission that investigated crimes against humanity in Venezuela confirmed that Cuban operatives trained Venezuelan personnel in tracking techniques, infiltration, interrogation, and repression of political opponents. This control network was crucial in the brutal responses to the protests of 2014 and 2017, which resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of arrests, and a systematic pattern of torture and enforced disappearances.

The important thing is not just that this has happened. The significant aspect is that now the world knows, discusses it, and directly associates it with Cuba. Outlets like Fox News, CNN, Reuters, The New York Times, and Al Jazeera have devoted extensive reports to explaining Cuban infiltration in Venezuela. Politicians, analysts, and international organizations have stopped viewing Cuba as a minor actor or a victim of sanctions and have begun to regard it as an active exporter of repression and a key supporter of regional dictatorships.

That narrative shift has consequences. It hardens the diplomatic climate, reduces the margins for soft negotiations, and places Havana at the center of Washington's confrontational rhetoric. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State and hardline Cuban-American, has been explicit: "If I lived in Havana and were part of the government, I would be worried, at least a little." Donald Trump was even more direct: "Cuba looks ready to fall."

The negotiation window is closing

For the Cuban elite, the lesson should be clear: the transition is going to happen. That is no longer up for debate. What is at stake is how it will happen and at what cost. And the time to choose is now, while there is still room to negotiate.

A controlled transition, initiated from within and guided by strategic criteria, could include elements that protect the interests of those currently in power: selective amnesties for those who have not committed serious crimes, safe exits into exile with legal guarantees, preservation of a portion of accumulated assets, and even a supervised institutional role during a transition period. Studies on negotiated transitions show that when the elites of the old regime facilitate change instead of obstructing it, they manage to maintain influence, avoid mass judicial persecution, and participate in shaping the new political order.

The model of a negotiated transition requires, at a minimum, four steps: the release of all political prisoners (currently, Cuba has 1,187, the highest number ever recorded); full legalization of opposition parties and organizations, which exist but are criminalized; real economic opening that allows for private investment and productive reactivation; and a transparent electoral calendar, with international oversight, that enables Cubans to freely choose their future.

In return, those who facilitate this process could obtain legal protections, guarantees of non-extradition, access to foreign accounts, and the ability to withdraw from public life without facing trials or media lynchings. This is the difference between a negotiated exit and an imposed collapse: in the former, the actors still have the ability to set conditions; in the latter, they are completely at the mercy of what others decide to do with them.

But that window has an expiration date. Each month that passes without signs of an opening diminishes the regime's negotiating power. The economy will continue to deteriorate, protests will keep growing, emigration will keep emptying the country of its active population, and international pressure will continue to rise. At some point, the accumulation of crises will cross a threshold where change will no longer be negotiable, but inevitable and disorderly.

The Armed Forces: a key piece

In any transition scenario in Cuba, the role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) will be crucial. The FAR is not just an army; it is the most powerful institution in the Cuban state, controlling nearly 60% of the active economy (especially the sectors that generate foreign currency), having a territorial presence throughout the country, monopolizing the legitimate use of force, and enjoying a level of institutional prestige that far exceeds that of the Communist Party.

Historically, the FAR have shown a remarkable ability to adapt. They survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, transformed into economic managers during the Special Period, and have been the main driving force behind gradual reforms over the past three decades. Expert analysts agree that, in a transition scenario, the FAR are more likely to survive than the party and could play a key role as guarantors of order, facilitators of dialogue, and implementers of a controlled opening process.

The question is whether the high command of the FAR recognizes that their best strategic option is to facilitate an orderly transition rather than to rely on repression and resistance. In the first case, they could preserve their institutional role, avoid a chaotic collapse that leaves them out of control, and negotiate guarantees for both themselves and the country. In the second case, they risk ending up like the Venezuelan military: demoralized, fragmented, and eventually forced to surrender or flee when the pressure becomes unsustainable.

The Washington calculation

Since the Trump administration, the approach towards Latin America has once again invoked the Monroe Doctrine, a 19th-century perspective that views the Western Hemisphere as a zone exclusively under U.S. influence. The operation against Maduro was explicitly framed within that context: Trump declared that "U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never again be questioned."

Cuba fits perfectly into that narrative. Marco Rubio, the architect of Trump's Latin American policy, has made it clear that he holds Cuba responsible for sustaining Maduro and views the fall of the Venezuelan regime as an opportunity to weaken Havana. The official rhetoric suggests that Washington has limited patience: if Cuba does not show signs of change, the pressure will increase. That pressure can take many forms: tightening sanctions, blocking remittances, interdiction of energy supplies, support for internal opposition groups, and even — in an extreme scenario — direct military intervention.

Trump has publicly suggested that he does not believe an intervention in Cuba is necessary because "it seems to be falling on its own." However, that stance may change if the Cuban crisis leads to undesirable consequences for the United States: a new wave of mass migration, a power vacuum that allows hostile actors (China, Russia) to enter, or an episode of internal violence that requires a humanitarian response.

The calculation for the Cuban elite should be obvious: the later the change, the greater the likelihood that it will be imposed from outside, with all the implications that this entails for those currently in power.

Three paths, one destination

Cuba is going to change. That is no longer up for debate. What is at stake is how and at what cost. The three options on the table are:

First option: negotiated and controlled transition. Release of political prisoners, legalization of the opposition, gradual economic opening, supervised electoral calendar. In exchange: amnesties for those who did not commit serious crimes, safe exits, legal guarantees, partial preservation of assets. Result: the country moves towards democracy with less trauma, the elites come out protected, and Cuba has an opportunity for reconstruction without massive revenge.

Second option: collapse under internal and external pressure. The regime resists, the economy continues to decline, protests increase, repression intensifies, Washington escalates sanctions and eventually supports internal forces or intervenes indirectly. Result: inevitable but chaotic change, with a high risk of violence, institutional fragmentation, and zero capacity for the elite to negotiate protections.

Third option: direct military intervention. Scenario similar to Venezuela or Panama 1989: special forces operation, capture of key leaders, temporary occupation. Outcome: the country is liberated, but the regime's leaders face courts in the United States, imprisonment without guarantees, total confiscation of assets, and global public exposure. Zero room for negotiation, zero protections.

The three options lead to the same final destination: a Cuba without the current regime. The difference lies in the level of control that the Cuban elite retains over the process and the personal cost they bear for having waited too long.

The moment is now

After Maduro's fall, after the public exposure of Cuba's role in Venezuela, after the loss of the oil subsidy, and following the explicit statements from Trump and Rubio, the margin for maneuver has dramatically narrowed. Each passing month without signs of openness reduces the options. Each week that goes by with more blackouts, increasing shortages, and heightened repression fuels internal pressure. Each day that Havana insists on resisting increases the likelihood that the transition will be forced on the least favorable terms possible for those currently in power.

Recent history is clear: leaders who bet on holding out until the end rarely achieve their goal, and when they fall, they do so without a safety net. Gaddafi ended up executed in a ditch. Milošević died in prison. Maduro is in a cell in New York awaiting trial. All of them had opportunities to negotiate dignified exits. All rejected them. All paid the highest price.

Cuba can choose a different path. But only if it acts now, while it is still possible to sit down and negotiate. Because the time has come for change. And the only question that remains is whether that change will be controlled by those who still hold power, or imposed by those who are no longer willing to wait.