Cuban economy: More production entities, worse economic performance

The National Office of Statistics and Information of Cuba (ONEI) has just published the “Institutional Organization” present in the Cuban economy, as of December 2025.

This publication provides an overview of the various entities operating within the Cuban economy, featuring an interesting breakdown by territories, specialties, administrative dependencies, and more. In summary, it serves as an analysis of the business directory that exists in any economy and allows for drawing some relevant conclusions.

The table shows the comparative results between 2022 and 2025. There are several reasons for this. It is important to remember 2022 as the first year in which the devastating effects of the task of restructuring were felt in the Cuban economy, as well as the first year in which the emergence of small and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes) became significant, following some specific experiences in the previous year.

Therefore, the Table provides an overview of what has happened with the entities operating in the Cuban economy, and, as general conclusions, we can mention the following:

Firstly, the number of all types of entities operating in the Cuban economy has seen a significant increase. Specifically, the figure has surpassed 20,000 (a total of 20,349), still far from the numbers before the so-called "revolutionary offensive" of 1968. Furthermore, the total number of entities has recorded a percentage growth of 39.73%, equivalent to 5,786 units.

However, these seemingly favorable results are heavily influenced by various factors. Initially, an increase in the number of operators in an economy can be seen as good news, as it has a direct effect on the level of activity.

However, this hypothesis is not confirmed in the Cuban economy, according to the data, since during the period under analysis, rather than growing, the economy has shrunk at an average annual rate of -2%. Something is not right in this Castro-like Sudoku. More productive entities are operating in the arena, but they do not lead to better overall economic performance. Something prevents that virtuous circle from functioning in Cuba's communist economy.

Second: the small and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes) have been the entities that, by far, have recorded the greatest increase. This is great news, however you look at it. The total number has exceeded 10,000 - 232 state-owned and 9,941 private - with state-owned enterprises multiplying by a factor of three, while private ones, being greater in absolute number, have grown by 113.05%, practically doubling the initial figure during the period under analysis.

In other words, 91% of the total growth of entities operating in the Castro economy has corresponded solely to the figure of private micro, small, and medium enterprises (mipymes), which now represent 49% of the total, having started in 2022 at 32%. This raises another equally controversial question.

That the rise of micro, small, and medium enterprises (mipymes) has not helped to stimulate economic behavior is concerning and likely demands a more detailed examination of the available figures. However, it is evident that the low productivity of these entities and the excessive control by the state may be affecting their production capacity. It is worth noting that the majority of mipymes are concentrated in just four sectors: manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, construction, and commerce; together, these specialties account for 85% of the total mipymes.

Third: the rise of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes) has coincided with a significant decline in the cooperative sector, which has experienced a percentage variation of 3.7% in the entities operating in 2022. In other words, a total of 191 cooperatives have vanished from the Cuban economy without a trace. Among the different forms that make up the sector, the reduction of UBPC (Basic Units of Cooperative Production) has been particularly pronounced, decreasing by 11%, which corresponds to 155 units and accounts for 81% of the cooperatives that have disappeared. In this segment, only CNoA (Non-Agricultural Cooperatives) have seen a slight increase, standing at 1.69% more, which amounts to just eight units.

Fourth: What has happened to the budgeted units? Let us remember that these represent the direct intervention of the communist state in the economy, and their operation depends on the state budget that provides them with resources for their functioning. And here lies the most significant issue, because despite the weakness of the Cuban economy and its continuous decline in recent years, the number of budgeted units has increased by no less than 17.18%, which is equivalent to 387 more units. The communist state has not ceased to allocate more resources to the functioning of entities under its absolute control. In fact, the number of state-owned enterprises has also remained relatively stable, but necessary adjustments have not been made to face a more complex economic environment, as indicated by the recessionary nature of the economic cycle since 2021.

Fifth: mercantile companies experienced a 20.24% increase, while subsidiary companies showed a 53.96% rise, presenting results that again contrast with the poor dynamics recorded by the economy in recent years. However, these entities represent a lower figure, around 500 units.

Finally, the report indicates that the foreign investment sector comprises a total of 390 units, of which 137 are International Economic Association Contracts (CAEI), 131 are joint ventures, and 72 are foreign companies. Unfortunately, data for 2022 is not available, but it does not seem that there have been any significant changes.

In summary, the entities operating in the Cuban economy have significantly increased since 2022, particularly the private micro, small, and medium enterprises (mipymes), which are approaching 10,000 (those that disappear are not counted in this statistic). However, this fact has not contributed to better performance of the economy, which has experienced a decline of 2.1% annually during this period. Something is not working.

State interventionism and the obstacles that the apparatus imposes on various productive forms to control and limit their growth are at the root of this anomalous behavior, which is another good example of the lack of justification for the embargo/blockade, existing solely in the Castro regime's obsession with maintaining a dominated economy.