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In the midst of an economic crisis characterized by inflation, a shortage of foreign currency, and a drop in productivity, the Cuban regime has introduced a structural change in the country’s business model.
The Official Gazette No. 24, published on March 3, 2026, regulates in detail for the first time how state enterprises can collaborate with non-state actors, including private micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises and cooperatives.
The measure comes just one day after Miguel Díaz-Canel called for an "immediate" reform of the economic and social model.
During the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the leader asserted that the country needs to "implement the urgent transformations" related to "business autonomy" and "take advantage of economic partnerships between the state and private sectors, especially at the municipal level."
The new regulation transforms that discourse into legal architecture.
An Unprecedented Figure: The Mixed Limited Liability Company
Decree-Law 114/2025, titled "On the Association between State and Non-State Business Entities," establishes the legal framework for these alliances and creates a previously nonexistent figure in the internal economic practice: the Mixed Limited Liability Company (S.R.L. mixta).
Article 1 specifies that the regulation governs associations through:
"The establishment of mixed limited liability companies [...] the acquisition, by a state-owned enterprise, of stakes in an already existing private limited liability company; the absorption [...] of a private limited liability company; and the arrangement of economic association contracts."
In practical terms, this implies that:
- A state-owned company can create a new LLC together with a private micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise (mipyme) or a cooperative.
- It can acquire shares in an existing private LLC.
- It can take over a private company.
- It can sign economic partnership contracts without the need to create a new legal entity.
Until now, the relations between the state sector and the private sector operated in gray areas or under limited contractual schemes.
This regulation institutionalizes the possibility of internal mixed capital, something that just a few years ago was politically unthinkable.
Absolute centralization in the Ministry of Economy
However, the opening has a clear control axis: the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP).
Article 3 of the Decree-Law establishes: "The Ministry of Economy and Planning is the Central State Administration body responsible for directing and controlling national policy for the development and functioning of associations."
Nothing can be established without your express approval.
Resolution 8/2026, published alongside the decree, establishes an evaluation committee within the MEP, chaired by a deputy minister and composed of key departments from the Ministry.
Additionally, the National Institute of Non-State Economic Actors will be a permanent invitee in the analysis process.
Every operation - constitution, merger, split, absorption, acquisition of shares, modification of partners, changes in capital or in corporate purpose - requires a ministerial resolution. Even economic association contracts must be authorized.
If a consulted body does not respond within ten calendar days, it is considered to have agreed with the inquiry made, thereby becoming responsible for its inaction.
Autonomy, therefore, is born conditioned by a political-administrative filter.
Business autonomy... within the framework of state control
One of the key themes of the government’s discourse has been "business autonomy." Article 29 of the Decree-Law states:
"Mixed limited liability companies have business autonomy within the framework of current legislation." Among the recognized powers are:
-Export and import directly.
-Manage and administer your assets.
-Determine the distribution of profits.
-Operate bank accounts, including in foreign currency.
-Define products and services.
-Set prices in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Finance.
-Determine labor structure and salaries, with union participation.
Moreover, Article 48 establishes that these companies "are not subject to the Economic Plan," which formally excludes them from the centralized system of mandatory planning. However, the regulation also clarifies that:
- They are subject to the state mechanism for management, allocation, and control of foreign currency.
- They must report strategic indicators to the State (energy, investments, foreign currency inflows and outflows, food production, among others).
- They cannot operate in health or education services.
- They cannot engage in activities related to armed institutions, except for specific exceptions.
- This is not full liberalization, but rather limited autonomy.
- Flexible capital, but strict protection of state assets.
The decree removes the requirement for minimum share capital: "A minimum share capital is not required for the establishment of the company" (Article 18.2).
This facilitates the creation of new entities. However, the capital must be proportional to the level of activity and must be fully disbursed at the time of establishment.
When state assets—whether real estate or intangible—are contributed, an appraisal is mandatory and must be certified by the Ministry of Finance and Prices. This is a mechanism for asset protection aimed at preventing opaque transfers or undervaluation of public assets.
Feasibility filters and political control
Resolution 8/2026 outlines the reasons for which the Ministry may deny an application. Among them:
-Non-compliance with legal requirements.
-Incomplete information.
-Lack of economic viability.
-Existence of hidden debts or litigations.
-Recurrence of tax or banking non-compliance.
-That the purpose is "illegal or contrary to public order, national defense, and security."
Furthermore, if the name includes that of a martyr or a historical reference, it must have the approval of the relevant party authority.
The process is not only technical and financial; it also adheres to political and ideological criteria.
Economic partnership contracts: a more flexible option
Chapter III introduces economic association contracts, which allow for cooperation without creating a new entity.
Article 51 states that these contracts: “Do not constitute a legal entity distinct from that of its parties.”
The parties can freely establish clauses, create a common fund, and define participation percentages. However, they must be formalized before a notary and registered in the Commercial Registry, and they also require approval from the MEP.
It is a potentially more agile formula than creating a mixed LLC, although it is still subject to state control.
The economic context that explains the measure
The announcement does not happen in a vacuum. According to the Minister of Economy, by the end of January, the year-on-year inflation reached 12.5%. The energy crisis, food shortages, and the declining purchasing power keep the economy under constant strain.
Díaz-Canel has emphasized that the goal is to "increase foreign currency income and develop national production, with a focus on food." He has also devolved responsibilities to the municipalities:
"Municipalities need to manage the economic associations between the state and non-state sectors."
The new regulation institutionalizes this orientation and creates opportunities for local governments to promote productive partnerships under central supervision.
Structural reform or tactical adjustment?
In concrete terms, Official Gazette No. 24:
-Formally recognizes the interdependence between the state and private sectors.
-Allows for internal mixed capital.
-Authorizes state-owned enterprises to participate as partners in private micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes).
-Institutionalizes what are known as “productive linkages.”
However, at the same time:
-Does not privatize strategic assets.
-It does not eliminate central planning.
- It does not decentralize approval.
-Maintains political control over every operation.
More than a liberalization, the regulation formalizes a hybrid model under state control. The regime creates a pathway to partner with the private sector without relinquishing economic oversight.
In a country in urgent need of foreign currency and productivity, the State acknowledges that it needs the private sector.
The uncertainty lies in whether the new alliances will be able to operate with the flexibility that the crisis demands, or if they will become trapped in the same bureaucratic structure that the norm seeks, at least in theory, to overcome.
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