Related videos:
The structural crisis in Cuba is no longer just impacting ordinary citizens. It is also affecting major foreign investors, particularly Canadian companies that have bet on the island for decades and now face a landscape characterized by massive debts, frequent blackouts, and an increasing political risk.
A report by CBC News warns that these companies could face significant losses amid a rapid economic decline, mentioning even the possibility of expropriations and legal claims that could jeopardize their operations.
While the regime tries to maintain the narrative of stability, the economic reality paints a different picture.
Canada, historically one of Cuba's main trading partners, has started to distance itself. Ottawa has already warned its companies about the “payment risks” arising from a persistent liquidity crisis, and the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) closed its business support program in the island at the beginning of 2026, acknowledging the “increasing financial risk and the deterioration of economic conditions.”
The impact is particularly evident in key sectors such as tourism and mining. Hotels managed by Canadian companies operate amid power outages, food shortages, and poor services, in a country where tourism has not been able to recover since the pandemic. “The operating environment is on the brink of collapse,” warned researcher María Werlau, quoted by CBC News.
The situation is no better in mining. The company Sherritt International, which operates the Moa nickel mine—one of the largest in the world—has accumulated a debt of at least 344 million dollars owed by the Cuban government.
On February 17th, Sherritt temporarily suspended extraction operations in Moa due to a lack of fuel supply reported by Cuban authorities, entering maintenance mode.
For months prior, Sherritt had already acknowledged significant operational challenges stemming from the economic crisis, the shortage of foreign currency, and energy issues. Nickel and cobalt production in 2025 fell below the levels of the previous year and initial forecasts, impacted by the energy crisis, delays in supplies, and damage from Hurricane Melissa in October 2025.
To stabilize its finances, the company completed a debt restructuring that extended maturities until November 2031 and reduced its burden by 68 million dollars in April 2025.
The structural context further exacerbates the situation. At the end of 2025, the Cuban regime formalized the freezing of foreign currency bank accounts for all foreign companies, preventing withdrawals and transfers abroad. The measure affects 334 businesses with foreign direct investment, including 56 with entirely foreign capital.
"There is no clarity. No one knows the rules," summarized an investor quoted by The Economist. It is suspected that the regime is redirecting those funds to finance imports due to the absolute illiquidity of the banking system.
But the problem goes beyond the economic realm. The political risk is starting to emerge as the greatest threat. Many of these investments are linked to properties expropriated after the revolution, which paves the way for legal claims, especially in a context where the United States could decisively influence any future transition on the island.
This is compounded by these companies' exposure to potential lawsuits for labor exploitation and environmental damage, stemming from structural practices of the Cuban system, such as the state withholding wages from workers hired by foreign companies.
In parallel, the regime insists on attributing the crisis to the U.S. embargo, while voices are increasingly highlighting internal inefficiency and decades of mismanagement as the central causes of the collapse.
For many analysts, the message is clear: the Cuban crisis has entered a phase where it is not only expelling its people but also those who invested in doing business under a system that now shows evident signs of exhaustion.
Filed under: