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For years, the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (ADPC) between the European Union and Cuba was portrayed as a strategic bet on gradual change.
However, what today appears as a review process in Brussels is, in fact, the result of sustained —and increasing— pressure from independent Cuban civil society, which has shifted from questioning the agreement to openly demanding its suspension or replacement.
This evolution has not been linear or homogeneous. However, it does reveal a clear trend: as evidence accumulated that the ADPC was not bringing about real advances in human rights, the tone of the demands grew harsher.
From European Optimism to Civic Skepticism
The starting point is 2016. That year, the European Union signed the ADPC with Cuba, marking the end of a two-decade cycle defined by the Common Position, which conditioned cooperation on democratic progress.
The new agreement focused on "critical engagement": to dialogue with the regime in order to promote changes from within.
Of course, Havana welcomed the agreement, but deemed the attached resolution from the European Parliament, which included a human rights clause, "unnecessary and interventionist".
For many sectors of Cuban civil society, however, this shift meant the loss of one of the few instruments of international pressure on the regime.
Since the outset, it was reported that the design of the agreement allowed the Cuban state to control who participated as "civil society," effectively excluding independent organizations.
These concerns quickly translated into actions. In 2020, activists and opposition platforms tried to influence the ratification process, especially in countries like Lithuania, seeking to halt or suspend the agreement before its final consolidation.
It was the first sign of a strategy that would gain strength over time.
2023: the bridge to demand
The year 2023 marked a turning point. The letter sent by the platform 'Cuba says NO to the Dictatorship' to the European Parliament introduced an important change: without yet requesting the suspension of the ADPC, it raised the need to condition the relationship with Havana on concrete results.
Release of political prisoners, sanctions on those responsible for human rights violations, and verifiable progress towards political openness became explicit demands. This represented a crucial intermediate step: from implicit rejection to structural questioning.
This change did not occur in a vacuum. It came after the impact of the protests on July 11, 2021, and the subsequent wave of repression, which highlighted the limits of the European approach.
For many activists, the ADPC not only failed to improve the situation, but coexisted with its deterioration.
2024: the agreement as failure
In 2024, demand saw a qualitative leap. Organizations such as the Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba began to openly call for the activation of the suspension clause of the agreement.
The central argument was compelling: the ADPC had failed in its main objective. Far from promoting reforms, it had been used by the regime to gain international legitimacy and access to resources, without making any real commitments.
This diagnosis reflected an increasingly widespread conclusion among activists: the problem was not just the implementation of the agreement, but its very logic.
2025: from review to replacement
The year 2025 solidified that evolution. First, with proposals for a thorough review: the inclusion of independent civil society in official dialogues, mechanisms for tracking funds, and changes in cooperation criteria.
But a few months later, a broader coalition of organizations went further. It was no longer about correcting the ADPC, but about replacing it with a new framework based on verifiable democratic conditionality.
This shift was crucial. It indicated that, for a significant part of Cuban civil society, the agreement was no longer open to reform.
The substantive arguments
Beyond the tactical differences, the analyzed documents agree on four fundamental criticisms.
First, the systematic exclusion of independent civil society. The design of the ADPC allows the regime to decide who participates, turning the dialogue into a controlled space.
Second, the lack of transparency in the use of European funds. The absence of public traceability mechanisms fuels the suspicion that these resources may benefit state structures.
Third, political legitimacy. Maintaining a cooperation agreement without consequences for human rights violations projects an image of normalcy that the regime uses to its advantage.
And fourth, the empirical balance: after nearly a decade, the situation in Cuba has not improved. On the contrary, repression, the economic crisis, and mass exodus have worsened.
This ecosystem of pressure must also include the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance (ARC), which has been engaging in sustained political advocacy with European institutions since at least 2023.
Unlike other organizations focused on the architecture of the agreement, the ARC has framed its criticism in broader terms, combining allegations of internal repression, opaque use of European funds, and the strategic alignment of the Cuban regime with Russia.
Its activity was particularly noticeable in September 2024, when a delegation appeared before the European People's Party Group in the European Parliament and held meetings with key leaders.
That line was consolidated in 2025 with new rounds of contacts in Brussels and resurfaced in January 2026 at a conference of the ECR group dedicated to Cuba's role in the war in Ukraine, where Orlando Gutiérrez Boronat participated.
In that context, the continuity of the ADPC was questioned not only from the perspective of human rights but also as a strategic consistency issue for European security.
The clash with European politics
The pressure from civil society has had an impact, but it has been uneven. The European Parliament has been the primary recipient of these demands, adopting resolutions that openly question the agreement and even suggest its suspension.
However, this shift has not resulted in changes to the executive policy. The European Commission, the European External Action Service, and the Council have kept the ADPC as the central framework for relations with Cuba,
This institutional gap partly explains the frustration of activists. While political discourse evolves, diplomatic practice remains virtually unchanged.
This parliamentary echo is not only explained by the pressure from organized platforms. It has also been fueled by the sustained actions of key figures in the Cuban opposition.
Alongside civil society platforms, several key figures of the Cuban opposition have decisively contributed to bringing this debate to Brussels.
Rosa María Payá, leader of Cuba Decide, has likely been the most consistent voice in calling for the suspension of the ADPC. Since 2020, she has requested the activation of its democratic clause and the conditioning of any relationship with Havana on verifiable progress in human rights, a stance she has reiterated in institutional forums of the European Parliament up to 2025.
In parallel, figures such as Guillermo “Coco” Fariñas and Berta Soler, leader of the Damas de Blanco, reported early on that the agreement legitimized the regime and excluded independent civil society.
Both took these criticisms directly to European institutions, and even accused the European External Action Service itself of undermining the spirit of the ADPC by sidelining independent actors.
The case of José Daniel Ferrer has followed a different yet equally influential logic. More than as a promoter of specific campaigns against the agreement, his figure has been recurrently used by the European Parliament as evidence that Cuba is failing to meet the democratic clauses of the ADPC.
His imprisonment and persecution have reinforced, resolution after resolution, the argument that the agreement is not producing the expected results.
Together, these actors have helped to maintain constant pressure on European institutions, particularly in the Parliament, where their complaints have resonated more than within the community's executive apparatus.
A new phase: geopolitics and pressure
In recent years, the context has changed. The war in Ukraine and the involvement of Cuban citizens in the conflict have added a geopolitical dimension to the debate.
The approval of Amendment 82 in the European Parliament, which identifies Cuba as a dictatorship aligned with Russia, marks a turning point in the European narrative.
In this scenario, the initiation of a review process of the ADPC, although not yet public, suggests that the accumulated pressure is beginning to have more concrete effects.
A decade that redefines the debate
As of April 2026, the balance is clear. Cuban civil society has not yet achieved the suspension of the agreement, but it has accomplished something significant: changing the terms of the debate in Europe.
What began as an isolated critique has evolved into a structural discussion about the coherence of European foreign policy towards Cuba.
The issue is no longer whether the ADPC works, but whether it is compatible with the principles that the European Union itself claims to uphold. And that is, precisely, the question that is starting to gain traction in Brussels today.
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