Miguel Díaz-Canel announced this Friday a broad package of economic reforms which includes, as one of its central focuses, the formal opening to investment from Cuban residents abroad, in statements to the press from the Presidency broadcast in the program Revista Buenos Días.
The ruler stated that emigrants will be able to participate alongside foreign direct investment and state-owned enterprises "on equal terms" as economic actors.
"Everything would be within a 'stable legal framework that guarantees security for businesses over time, that is respectful, that is safe, and that above all encourages and stimulates the participation of its stakeholders.'"
The announcement comes at a time of acute emergency, not one of prosperity.
In June 2026, Cuba is experiencing an unprecedented energy crisis: Díaz-Canel himself acknowledged that "in the last five months, only one oil tanker has arrived in Cuba," attributing the situation to the "criminal energy blockade."
The electrical deficit exceeded 2,100 MW in May, with blackouts lasting more than twenty hours daily in several provinces, while the electricity availability on the day of the announcement was only 980 MW against a demand exceeding 2,500 MW.
The energy crisis is compounded by the collapse of tourism: in the first four months of 2026, Cuba received only 328,608 international tourists, a 55.8% decrease compared to the same period in 2025, marking the worst drop in two decades.
The mass exit of international hotel chains - Meliá, Iberostar, Blue Diamond Resorts, and Archipelago International - forced by the secondary sanctions of Trump's Executive Order 14404, signed on May 1, left the regime without partners to operate its tourism infrastructure.
It was precisely that crisis that prompted Díaz-Canel to publicly call, on June 5th during an interview with the Spanish media elDiario.es, on emigrants to invest and manage hotels: “We are also proposing different business modalities. Cubans who wish to invest and manage hotels. We are open to that.”
The legal framework for this opening already exists on paper: the State Council approved in April the Decree-Law 117/2026, which established the immigration status of "Investors and Business" for Cubans residing abroad, officially published in the Official Gazette on May 5.
The process costs 3,500 Cuban pesos and is managed at Cuban consulates, with a resolution time of thirty business days.
The reform package presented this Friday encompasses six major areas: economic management system, municipal autonomy, business autonomy, agricultural recovery, foreign trade, and foreign investment.
Díaz-Canel announced that municipalities will be able to import and export without higher-level structures, manage income in foreign currency, and approve investments from Cubans residing in Cuba and abroad.
State-owned companies, for their part, will be able to operate "without interference in their management," export and import directly, select clients and suppliers, and retain a portion of the foreign currencies earned.
The accelerated approval of MIPYMES with stalled applications was also announced, along with a reduction in the list of activities prohibited for the private sector.
Skepticism among analysts and the diaspora is, however, structural.
Carlos Saladrigas, president of the Cuba Study Group, was emphatic last Wednesday: “Investors will not invest in Cuba if there are no political changes”.
For Cubans residing in the United States—the largest concentration of the diaspora—the restrictions imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) add an additional legal risk that makes participation practically unfeasible without exposing themselves to sanctions.
Díaz-Canel himself was personally sanctioned by OFAC on June 4, along with his wife Lis Cuesta Peraza and his stepson Manuel Anido Cuesta.
The leader admitted this Friday that opacity is part of the plan: “We can't say everything so clearly because the enemy is watching everything we do.”
The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts a decline in Cuba's GDP of between 6.5% and 7.2% in 2026, making these reforms, rather than a strategic gamble, an attempt to patch the holes left in the Island's economy by decades of failed state management with capital from the diaspora.
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