The economist Pedro Monreal reacted this Friday to the announcement of a new package of economic reforms presented by Miguel Díaz-Canel, describing it as "late pragmatism with no apparent clear connections between the measures" and warning that without first addressing "a moderately functional framework for international insertion, none of the other measures could be effective."
Monreal labeled the government's idea that such proposals could bring about the substantial change needed in the Cuban economic model as "problematic."
"Given the collapse of the centralized planning model, primarily due to its own internal shortcomings, there are two respectable alternatives: to accept the political cost of failure, or to self-critically rectify and drastically transform the model," he emphasized on X.
The expert recalled that on previous occasions, the official narrative has been inflated to try to sell a supposed "refinement" with hints of "openness" that is nothing more than an outdated trick.
"That the government doesn’t come up with anything else like 'removing obstacles' and the 'centralization-decentralization contradiction', or regarding the municipality and the state enterprise as key components of the 'country machinery', says a lot about the intellectual fatigue of the government’s economic team," he emphasized.
In the television program "Revista Buenos Días," Díaz-Canel presented six major reform pillars: economic management system, municipal autonomy, business autonomy, agricultural recovery, foreign trade, and foreign investment.
Among the most striking measures is allowing municipalities to import and export "without the need for higher structures," enabling state-owned enterprises to operate "without intermediaries," and allowing non-state actors to freely access foreign trade.
The ruler promised that "companies will have a broad purpose; in other words, they will be able to produce and offer services of everything they are capable of, taking advantage of all their potential without any limits."
He also stated that the proposals are part of the Economic and Social Program for 2026, which will be presented for public consultation at the end of 2025 with over two million people participating, and that the government studied the experiences of China and Vietnam and even used artificial intelligence tools to assess models compatible with the Cuban political system.
However, the measures are still awaiting formal approval from the Political Bureau and the National Assembly, scheduled for July, which underscores that amid a crisis of historical proportions, the implementation process remains slow and bureaucratic.
Monreal, one of the most recognized independent voices in the analysis of the Cuban economy, has been warning for years about the inadequacy of the regime's reforms.
On June 9, he questioned the reduction of ministries -from 27 to 20- stating that it had "more symbolic weight than transformative impact," and in April he lowered expectations for Decree 127/2025 considering it "conservative and of limited effect."
In February, Monreal compared Díaz-Canel's new phase of austerity to the Soviet Liberman-Kosygin frameworks, and in May he warned of a possible historic decline in Cuban GDP.
The context in which these announcements are made is devastating. CEPAL projects a contraction of the Cuban GDP of 6.5% for 2026, while The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates a decline of 7.2%, compared to the official growth target of 1%.
The country suffers from power outages lasting up to 20 and 30 hours straight, widespread shortages of food, medicine, and fuel, and an average salary equivalent to barely 15 dollars a month.
The internal crisis is compounded by external pressure.
The Trump administration imposed direct sanctions against Díaz-Canel on June 4, affecting him, his wife, and other officials, freezing their properties and bank accounts in the United States, and set June 5 as the deadline for foreign companies to dissolve their ties with GAESA, the military conglomerate that controls a large part of the Cuban economy.
Analysts refer to "Cubastroika" as Washington's strategy to compel economic reforms in Cuba through a combination of pressure and selective opening to the Cuban private sector.
The recent history of the regime does not inspire optimism.
The 2011 Guidelines promised to "update the economic model" but maintained strong state control: Cuba continued to import around 80% of the basic food basket.
The 2021 Order Task was implemented without addressing its structural foundations and ultimately resulted in inflation, shortages, and a decline in purchasing power.
Monreal summarized in a few words what many analysts think about the new announcement: "We'll see the details."
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