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The prestigious Cuban economist Pedro Monreal warned that the "transformations" announced by the regime have a structurally limited scope, not due to the measures themselves, but rather due to the lack of international commercial and financial support that made recovery possible in the 1990s.
"Without access to energy, foreign currency, technologies, and external demand, it is unlikely that decisions related to the 'refinement' of the current model will be effective. A much deeper transformation is needed, which is not on the agenda of the Communist Party," the analyst wrote on his Facebook page "The State as such", one day before the Extraordinary Plenary called by the Political Bureau.
This Wednesday, the government held an Extraordinary Plenary of the Communist Party of Cuba and intends to present the measures at the extraordinary session of the National Assembly convened for Thursday. It also reported that Raúl Castro had given the green light to the planned economic transformations.
Monreal's central argument rests on a historical parallel: during the Special Period, Cuba experienced a sudden and profound collapse, but managed to stabilize relatively quickly thanks to an international reintegration that included remittances, tourism, external credit, and foreign investment.
"The international reintegration of Cuba in the 1990s was an economic process without the backing of superpowers or subsidies. It did not yield a boom or restore previous production levels, but it did succeed in halting the collapse," he noted.
The decentralizing measures approved in 1993 —the decriminalization of foreign currency, self-employment, and the creation of UBPC— worked precisely because that external financial space was already open. The "Bolivarian arrangements" with Venezuela would come years later.
Today, the scenario is radically different. The economist argues that Cuba is facing "a geopolitical disintegration forced by the U.S., unrelated to any 'economic 'improvement'," and that overcoming this "would depend on a diplomatic process about which there is little information."
In the comments of the post, the analyst himself opened a door: "Perhaps this issue of the approval of 'transformations' is a component of current or future exchanges. Something that could create a point of contact. It's unclear to me."
The material backdrop of this external restriction is devastating. More than 240 sanctions imposed by Washington since January 2026, including Executive Order 14404 from May 1 that introduced secondary sanctions against foreign companies operating with GAESA, have led to the withdrawal of at least 11 airlines, a decline in fuel imports of between 80% and 90%, and blackouts of up to 25 hours daily in more than 55% of the territory.
The Economist projects a contraction of GDP of -7.2% in 2026, accumulating a decline of 23% since 2019.
In that context, commentator Joel Ernesto Marill agreed with the diagnosis and went further in his political assessment: "The pressure being placed on the Cuban economy is set to make its mark in the history books."
Marill acknowledged that Cuba has "many things to change, deeply—including the ineffective central planning scheme—but argued that it has the right to do so 'without starving the population with sanctions in the process.'"
The reforms announced by Díaz-Canel include reducing the number of ministries from 27 to 21, greater municipal and business autonomy, opening up to diaspora investment, and promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes). Other Cuban economists have labeled them as "too late, poorly executed, and insufficient."
Octavio Couso Expósito summarized the situation with a phrase that circulated in the thread: "On our side, too much caution, too much arrogance, and excessive conservatism; on the other side, a government in the White House that has shattered the norms of decency, embodying the worst and the most extreme, without scruples. The perfect storm."
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