In any democracy, elections are the mechanism by which citizens reward or punish the performance of their leaders.
In Cuba, where the Communist Party monopolizes power and candidates for the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP) do not compete on equal terms with citizen candidates nor represent alternative political projects, that margin of decision is virtually non-existent.
Paradoxically, the only electoral process that retains a minimal potential for the expression of citizen discontent is that of the constituency delegates.
They are elections without parties, without campaigns, and deeply limited. However, they remain the only moment when the neighbors could unleash their discontent and directly question the management of those who represent the State in their communities, refuse to reelect them, or express, through voting or abstention, the weariness with the system.
And that process has just been postponed.
The Secretary of the National Assembly, José Luis Toledo Santander, justified the repeal of Law 183—approved just seven months ago—arguing that "it is not appropriate to conduct an electoral process under the current circumstances" due to the complex economic and social situation facing the country.
The argument is revealing.
It is not argued that the law was erroneous or that it violated the Constitution. Nor is it stated that there are insurmountable legal obstacles. The reason is different: the political and economic situation advises against holding elections.
That is, when the context ceases to be favorable for those in power, the rules change.
Just a few months ago, the Parliament itself approved an exceptional reduction of the municipal delegates' term from five to four years in order to stagger local elections away from national ones and facilitate the organization of the electoral calendar.
Now that exceptional situation has disappeared. The law is repealed. The mandate returns to five years. And the municipal elections are postponed once again. There have already been four postponed municipal elections since 2017.
The official explanation attempts to frame the decision as an act of administrative responsibility. Toledo Santander addressed the economic cost of the electoral process and the need to concentrate resources on "other vital processes for the defense and sustainment of the Revolution."
But that justification raises an inevitable question.
If the economic situation is too dire to allow citizens to vote, shouldn't that crisis make it even more necessary to hold those in power accountable?
In any system where elections serve as a mechanism for political control, a crisis of this magnitude would lead to a greater demand for democracy, not the suspension of participation mechanisms.
In Cuba, the opposite occurs. The crisis does not accelerate elections; it delays them.
The implied message is hard to ignore: the worse the system works, the less convenient it becomes to consult the population.
The paradox takes on even greater significance when considering the political context of this parliamentary session.
While the Assembly approves the 176 economic measures with which the regime attempts to correct the collapse of its productive model, it also eliminates the only electoral process that could provide a snapshot —albeit imperfect and heavily conditioned— of the public's mood.
It's not a coincidence.
The Cuban regime needs to implement deep reforms amid the greatest economic deterioration in decades while simultaneously minimizing any scenario that could translate that discontent into a politically uncomfortable outcome.
Municipal delegates do not decide national economic policy. They do not control the Government. Nor can they alter the monopoly of the Communist Party. But they do represent the only link in the system where citizens have direct contact with the nomination and voting process.
Even within the enormous limitations of the Cuban totalitarian model, that space retains a symbolic value. And precisely that space has just been postponed.
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect is not the postponement itself. What is truly revealing is the naturalness with which the regime modifies its own rules when they no longer serve its needs.
Law 183 was approved in December 2025. Seven months later, it is no longer effective. Not because the Constitution has changed. Not because there was a technical error. Simply because the authorities believe that current circumstances suggest otherwise.
That reasoning contains a profoundly different conception of the rule of law.
In a constitutional democracy, laws limit power. In Cuba, power limits the duration of laws.
The norm ceases to be a stable framework and transforms into a temporary tool, useful as long as it serves the government's interests and dispensable when it no longer does.
That is why the decision made this week goes beyond the electoral calendar. It is not just about when Cubans will vote. It is about who decides when they can do so. And the answer remains the same as always.
Not the citizens. The power.
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