In any democracy, elections are the mechanism through which citizens reward or punish the actions of their leaders.
In Cuba, where the Communist Party monopolizes power and candidates for the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP) do not compete on equal terms with citizen candidacies nor represent alternative political projects, that margin of decision practically does not exist.
Paradoxically, the only electoral process that maintains a minimal potential for the expression of citizen discontent is that of the constituency delegates.
They are elections without parties, without campaigns, and deeply limited. However, they remain the only moment when the neighbors could unleash their discontent and directly challenge the management of those who represent the State in their communities, refusing to reelect them or expressing, through voting or abstention, the weariness of the system.
And that process has just been postponed.
The secretary of the National Assembly, José Luis Toledo Santander, justified the repeal of Law 183 —approved only seven months ago— stating that "it is not appropriate to hold an electoral process under the current circumstances" due to the complex economic and social situation facing the country.
The argument is revealing.
It is not argued that the law was erroneous or that it violated the Constitution. Nor is it argued that there are insurmountable legal obstacles. The reason is different: the political and economic situation advises against holding elections.
That is to say, when the context is no longer advantageous for those in power, the rules change.
Just a few months ago, the Parliament itself approved an exceptional reduction of the term of municipal delegates from five to four years to space out local elections from national ones and facilitate the organization of the electoral calendar.
Now that same exceptionalism disappears. The law is repealed. The term is back to five years. And the municipal elections are postponed once again. There have been four municipal elections postponed since 2017.
The official explanation tries to portray the decision as an act of administrative responsibility. Toledo Santander spoke about the economic cost of the electoral process and the need to concentrate resources on "other vital processes for the defense and support of the Revolution."
But that justification raises an inevitable question.
If the economic situation is too dire to allow citizens to vote, shouldn't that crisis be precisely what makes accountability of those in power even more essential?
In any system where elections serve as a mechanism for political control, a crisis of this magnitude would lead to a greater demand for democracy, not to the suspension of participation mechanisms.
In Cuba, the opposite happens. The crisis does not accelerate elections; it delays them.
The implicit message is hard to ignore: the worse the system functions, the less convenient it becomes to consult the population.
The paradox takes on even greater significance when viewed in the context of the political climate of this parliamentary session.
While the Assembly approves the 176 economic measures that the regime is attempting to implement to correct the collapse of its productive model, it also eliminates the only electoral process that could provide a snapshot —albeit imperfect and heavily conditioned— of the public's mood.
It's not a coincidence.
The Cuban regime needs to implement deep reforms amid the worst economic deterioration in decades, while simultaneously reducing any scenario that could translate that discontent into a politically uncomfortable outcome.
Municipal delegates do not decide national economic policy. They do not control the Government. Nor can they alter the monopoly of the Communist Party. However, they do represent the only link in the system where citizens have direct contact with the nomination and voting process.
Even within the enormous limitations of the Cuban totalitarian model, that space holds symbolic value. And precisely that space has just been postponed.
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect is not the postponement itself. What is truly revealing is the ease with which the regime alters its own rules when they no longer serve its needs.
Law 183 was approved in December 2025. Seven months later, it is no longer valid. Not because the Constitution has changed. Not because there was a technical error. Simply because the power believes that the current circumstances suggest otherwise.
That reasoning contains a profoundly different understanding of the rule of law.
In a constitutional democracy, laws limit power. In Cuba, power limits the duration of laws.
The norm stops being a stable framework and turns into a temporary instrument, useful as long as it aligns with the interests of the government and dispensable when it no longer does so.
That is why the decision made this week transcends the electoral calendar. It does not just speak to when Cubans will vote. It speaks to who decides when they can do so. And the answer is once again the same as always.
Not the citizens. The power.
Related videos:
Filed under: