A study from CiberCuba | First of four installments
The discussion about a potential transition in Cuba often centers around one question: What could trigger the end of the regime? However, in light of the possibility of a governance crisis, a rupture, a negotiation, or a political opening, there is another question that receives less attention: Is Cuba prepared to navigate that moment and prevent a crisis of power from turning into a power vacuum?
CiberCuba has reviewed a wide range of documents, roadmaps, legal projects, programs, academic studies, and proposals from independent civil society organizations, both within and outside the island, to reconstruct what has been considered regarding a potential Cuban transition, what tools exist, and what is still missing.
This research will be published in four installments.
The first examines the different proposed paths to achieve the transition —referendum, negotiation, rupture, exit "from law to law", provisional governments, and constituent processes—.
The second will analyze what steps need to be taken once the process has begun: institutions, justice, security, economy, infrastructure, and essential services.
The third will address the gap between that accumulated knowledge and the existence of a political alternative with leadership, legitimacy, and the capacity to govern.
The fourth will study the international ecosystem that has contributed to this preparation and the support that a Cuban transition may require.
The research does not assume that the fall of the regime is imminent or that there is a single path to change. It examines scenarios of rupture, negotiation, openness, governance crisis, or combinations of these.
The question is whether, in any of those scenarios, there is already enough political, legal, and technical thought in place so that the transition does not have to start from scratch.
Think not only about the destination, but also about the journey
One of the most striking conclusions from this corpus is that the independent civil society in Cuba has not been limited to imagining what the country should look like after Castro's regime.
He has also thought about how Cuba could get there.
Some proposals stem from a plebiscite; others from a negotiation; some from a breakdown; a few initially rely on existing legal mechanisms; others suggest provisional governments, constitutional restorations, constituent processes, or hybrid formulas.
That diversity does not necessarily equate to immaturity. Political transitions rarely follow a completely predictable path. They can accelerate, diverge, or combine different mechanisms. A part of Cuban reflection has been studying that uncertainty for years.
Manuel Cuesta Morúa warned in 2016, in Will We Be Able to Navigate in Cuba?, published by , that transitions do not usually unfold entirely under the control of their protagonists.
His trajectory also represents one of the longest threads of opposition reflection on consensus, constitutionalism, and political change, spanning from the Reflection Table of the Moderate Opposition and Common Platform to New Country Platform, Constitutional Consensus, and the current Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba.
The plebiscite as a mechanism of legitimacy
Cuba Decide, an initiative led by Rosa María Payá, has been proposing for years a binding plebiscite that would allow citizens to decide whether they want free elections and a system based on political and civil liberties.
The proposal envisions the plebiscite as the starting point of a process that would lead to a transition and subsequently to competitive elections.
His main contribution to the transition map is to address a fundamental question: Where does the citizen mandate to initiate change come from?
It is a different model that stems from a fracture within power, a negotiation, or a governance crisis.
The tradition of the exit "from law to law"
Another movement has sought to use, at least initially, existing legal mechanisms to initiate the process.
The Varela Project, led by Oswaldo Payá, was one of the fundamental precedents. Its promoters utilized the citizen initiative outlined in the Constitution to call for a referendum on freedom of expression and association, amnesty, new electoral legislation, and expanded opportunities for private activity.
The Payá environment later developed a Transition Program with a referendum, a transitional government, a Fundamental Law of Transition, a Constituent Assembly, and elections.
The idea of a "law-to-law" transition reemerged in other areas. Programa Cuba published in 2021 a work by Yaxis Cires dedicated precisely to exploring a legal exit capable of reducing uncertainty and the social costs of the transition.
An older tradition of negotiation
The reflection on how to organize change did not begin with current initiatives either.
In 1995, Concilio Cubano brought together numerous opposition organizations around an effort for concerted action. Its declaration advocated for a peaceful transition to a democratic state governed by law, amnesty for political prisoners, legal reforms, and the participation of all Cubans, including the diaspora.
In 1997, The Homeland Belongs to Everyone, signed by Félix Bonne, René Gómez Manzano, Vladimiro Roca, and Martha Beatriz Roque, proposed a pluralistic conception of the nation and the political future of Cuba, along with proposals for economic openness and social participation.
Later, among others, Otro18, D Frente, Proyecto Emilia, and Cuba11J emerged, each with varying degrees of development and different strategies for mobilization, electoral reform, negotiation, and democratization.
The issue that permeates much of this production is the same: how to transform a collection of organizations and demands into a political process capable of establishing common rules for change.
State of Sats and the Problem of Ungovernability
In 2018, Estado de Sats presented a Program for a new political, legal, and economic arrangement in a democratic transition in Cuba.
The document addressed the organization of power, rights, justice, property, economic liberalization, labor freedom, education, health, and social security, and it stemmed from a concern directly related to the scenario being discussed today: the need to rapidly rebuild certain institutions to prevent ungovernability and dysfunctionality.
The program also left some issues pending for future work, including political parties, transitional justice, and armed forces.
The transition was beginning to be viewed not merely as a replacement of a regime, but as a matter of institutional continuity and power management.
Cuesta Morúa and the search for common rules
The trajectory of Manuel Cuesta Morúa deserves particular attention as it connects several generations of this reflection.
His work in the Reflection Table of the Moderate Opposition, Common Platform, New Country Platform, and Constitutional Consensus was focused on creating plural spaces and establishing rules before deciding who would hold power.
That approach reemerges in the Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba (CTDC) with For a New Beginning, published in 2026. The document distinguishes between democratic transition and the regime that would follow, proposing a minimum agenda that includes amnesty, decriminalization of dissent, citizen participation, and institutional reforms.
The idea is that the transition needs political legitimacy and rules of the game, not just candidates.
Break, stabilization, and democratization
A very different formulation is that of the Agreement of Liberation, signed on March 2, 2026, by Pasos de Cambio and the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance along with over 50 organizations.
Their roadmap divides the process into three stages: Liberation; Stabilization and Reconstruction; and Democratization.
The model begins with a break from the current system and immediately follows with a stabilization phase aimed at restoring services, security, and basic capacities, ultimately leading to free elections.
The document also includes commissions on humanitarian emergencies, security and public order, economic recovery, infrastructure, health, education, legislation, justice, and the Constitution.
It is a relevant proposal for the debate on the power vacuum because it starts from a simple premise: political change does not automatically resolve the governance crisis; it may be necessary to stabilize the country first in order to democratize it later.
The "Agreed Opening"
At the other end of the strategies is Cuba Próxima.
Its Apertura Acordada, published in April 2026, proposes a negotiated transition through reciprocal, verifiable steps supported internationally.
The model combines a Multi-Actor Sovereign Dialogue within Cuba with a strategic normalization with the United States and the international community. Its sequence includes the release of prisoners, emergency stabilization, economic changes, institutional reforms, elections, and a subsequent constitutional process.
Cuba Próxima supports this proposal with specific works on electoral law, provisional constitution, constitutional process, judiciary, municipalities, legislative function, business and commerce.
That is to say, the organization is not limited to proposing negotiations: it seeks to develop the legal framework that should support that negotiation and the order that would emerge from it.
Compare scenarios instead of betting on just one
The Consultation with the Independent Civil Society on the Democratic Transition in Cuba, developed by Cultura Democrática and Consorcio Justicia, provides another perspective.
The study examined different scenarios —reformist, negotiated, ruptured, and hybrid— and analyzed their risks, opportunities, and needs.
This work is particularly revealing because it shows that a segment of civil society is not contemplating a single outcome, but rather multiple plausible pathways for change.
Differences arise in matters such as the role of certain actors, the scope of transitional justice, or the level of international pressure. However, there is a significant core of agreement regarding freedoms, civic participation, elections, and the rule of law.
Diversity, therefore, can be an expression of political fragmentation, but also a reflection that acknowledges that the specific form of the transition is not predetermined.
Also consider the constituent moment
The problem does not end with the replacement of the regime.
The CTDC, Cuba Próxima, the Center for Convivial Studies (CEC), and other initiatives have developed proposals regarding provisional governments, transitional legislation, Constitution, elections, and constituent processes.
The platform ENTRE TODOS brings together citizen and organizational proposals regarding a potential Constitution and a national roadmap.
The Social Pact and its proposal for a Digital Citizen Constituent Assembly explore an alternative path: to build legitimacy from the citizenry and use digital tools for constitutional participation.
These initiatives address a critical question: how does opposition legitimacy transform into democratic legitimacy?
The corpus is broader than the major roadmaps
The Centro de Estudios Convivencia has developed over the years a framework of thought and proposals that encompasses constitutional transition, rule of law, governance, economy, agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, security, transitional justice, and diaspora.
Programa Cuba has gathered works from specialists and organizations on the transition "from law to law," memory, transitional justice, economy, agriculture, education, pensions, and aging.
Pasos de Cambio has served as a space for gathering and coordinating proposals on justice, economy, health, education, housing, armed forces, and internal order.
Cubalex, from a human rights perspective, has warned that a political transition does not by itself guarantee democratization and has suggested safeguards to prevent new forms of power concentration, including judicial independence, due process, transitional justice, and independent oversight mechanisms.
In parallel, Programa Cuba, CADAL, elTOQUE, Ciudadanía y Libertad, and other platforms have produced analyses of scenarios, governance, law, civil society, and comparative experiences.
What exists, therefore, is not a single transition plan, but rather a broad and cumulative set of ideas, scenarios, and proposals that addresses many of the issues that change would raise. What is missing is to transform this intellectual legacy into a common political architecture.
More than a program: a repertoire of scenarios
The map that emerges from this journey does not contain a common recipe.
Cuba Decide advocates for a plebiscite.
The legacy of Oswaldo Payá develops transition formulas "from law to law".
Estado de Sats examined institutional reconstruction.
Cuba Próxima proposes a negotiated opening.
The Acuerdo de Liberación organizes a sequence of liberation, stabilization, and democratization.
The CTDC emphasizes citizen and constitutional legitimacy.
Cultura Democrática y Consorcio Justicia study multiple scenarios.
CEC and Programa Cuba have accumulated a body of sectoral and transitional proposals.
Manuel Cuesta Morúa has spent decades working on consensus, common rules, and comparative experiences.
There is no agreement on the way forward.
But there is indeed a much less visible common characteristic: the independent Cuban civil society has approached the transition as a political issue that can be studied, compared, and prepared for.
Is Cuba more prepared than it seems?
The response should be cautious.
There is no unified alternative government, no opposition authority recognized by all sectors, nor a political structure that can automatically take over the functions of the State in the event of a crisis.
But the idea that a potential transition would find Cuban civil society without prior thought on how to produce and direct change also does not seem sustainable.
There are proposals for plebiscites, negotiations, breakups, and hybrid formulas; projects for provisional governments; legal models; constituent processes; mechanisms for legitimization; and decades of reflection on the comparative experiences of other transitions.
The maturity of the corpus lies not in having a single recipe, but in having tailored responses for different scenarios.
The question that remains open is another: knowing how a transition could begin does not yet equate to knowing how to govern it.
Who would assume provisional authority? How would electricity, water, hospitals, food, and security remain operational? What would happen to justice, the armed forces, property, and the economy?
This will be the second installment of this research by CiberCuba, dedicated to the existing proposals for governing and rebuilding Cuba during a potential transition.
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