A study by CiberCuba | First of four installments
The discussion about a potential transition in Cuba often centers around one question: What could lead to the end of the regime? But in the face of the possibility of a governance crisis, a break, negotiations, or a political opening, there is another, less addressed issue: Is Cuba prepared to navigate that moment and prevent a crisis of power from turning into a power vacuum?
CiberCuba has reviewed a extensive corpus of documents, roadmaps, legal projects, programs, academic studies, and proposals from independent civil society organizations, both on the island and abroad, to reconstruct what has been considered regarding a potential Cuban transition, what tools are available, and what is still lacking.
This research will be published in four installments.
The first examines the different paths proposed to achieve the transition —plebiscite, negotiation, rupture, exit "from law to law," provisional governments, and constituent processes—.
The second will analyze what needs to be done once the process has begun: institutions, justice, security, economy, infrastructure, and essential services.
The third one will address the gap between that accumulated knowledge and the existence of a political alternative with leadership, legitimacy, and the ability to govern.
The fourth will study the international ecosystem that has contributed to this preparation and the support that a Cuban transition might require.
The research does not assume that the fall of the regime is imminent, nor does it presume a single path for change. It examines scenarios of rupture, negotiation, openness, governance crisis, or combinations of these.
The question is whether, in any of these scenarios, there is already enough political, legal, and technical thought so that the transition does not have to start from scratch.
Think not only of the destination, but also of the journey
One of the most striking conclusions from this corpus is that the independent civil society in Cuba has not limited itself to imagining how the country should be after Castro's rule.
He has also thought about how Cuba could get there.
Some proposals stem from a plebiscite; others, from a negotiation; some arise from a breakdown; some initially resort to existing legal mechanisms; others suggest provisional governments, constitutional restorations, constituent processes, or hybrid formulas.
This diversity does not necessarily equate to immaturity. Political transitions rarely follow a completely predictable course. They can accelerate, deviate, or combine different mechanisms. A segment of Cuban reflection has been studying this uncertainty for years.
Manuel Cuesta Morúa warned in 2016, in Will We Know How to Transition in Cuba?, published by , that transitions typically do not unfold entirely under the control of their protagonists.
His trajectory also represents one of the longest threads in the opposition's reflection on conciliation, constitutionalism, and political change, spanning from the Reflexion Table of the Moderate Opposition and Common Platform to the New Country Platform, Constitutional Consensus, and the current Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba.
The plebiscite as a mechanism of legitimacy
Cuba Decide, an initiative driven by Rosa María Payá, has been proposing for years a binding plebiscite that allows citizens to decide whether they want free elections and a system based on political and civil liberties.
The proposal envisions the plebiscite as the starting point of a process that would lead to a transition and subsequently to competitive elections.
His main contribution to the transition map is to answer a fundamental question: Where does the citizen mandate to initiate change come from?
It is a different model that stems from a fracture within power, a negotiation, or a governance crisis.
The tradition of the departure "from law to law"
Another movement has sought to initially utilize existing legal mechanisms to open the process.
The Varela Project, led by Oswaldo Payá, was one of the fundamental precedents. Its promoters invoked the civic initiative outlined in the Constitution to demand a referendum on freedom of expression and association, amnesty, new electoral legislation, and greater opportunities for private activity.
The Payá environment later developed a Transition Program that included a referendum, a transitional government, a Fundamental Transit Law, a Constitutional Assembly, and elections.
The idea of a "law-to-law" transition reappeared later in other areas. Programa Cuba published a study by Yaxis Cires in 2021, specifically aimed at exploring a legal pathway capable of reducing uncertainty and social costs during the transition.
An older tradition of consensus
The reflection on how to organize change did not begin with the current initiatives either.
In 1995, Concilio Cubano brought together numerous opposition organizations around a concerted effort. Its statement advocated for a peaceful transition to a democratic rule of law, amnesty for political prisoners, legal reforms, and the participation of all Cubans, including the diaspora.
In 1997, The Homeland is Everyone's, signed by Félix Bonne, René Gómez Manzano, Vladimiro Roca, and Martha Beatriz Roque, proposed a pluralistic concept of the nation and of Cuba's political future, along with suggestions for economic opening and social participation.
Later, among others, Otro18, D Frente, Proyecto Emilia, and Cuba11J emerged, each with varying levels of development and different strategies for mobilization, electoral reform, consensus-building, and democratization.
The question that underlies much of this production is the same: how to transform a multitude of organizations and demands into a political process capable of establishing common rules for change.
State of Sats and the Problem of Ungovernability
In 2018, Estado de Sats presented a Program for a New Political, Legal, and Economic Order in a Democratic Transition in Cuba.
The document addressed the organization of power, rights, justice, property, economic liberalization, labor freedom, education, health, and social security, and was based on a concern directly related to the current scenario being discussed: the need to quickly rebuild certain institutions to avoid ungovernability and dysfunctionality.
The program also left some matters pending for later work, including political parties, transitional justice, and armed forces.
The transition was beginning to be conceived not just as a replacement of a regime, but as a problem of institutional continuity and power management.
Cuesta Morúa and the search for common rules
The trajectory of Manuel Cuesta Morúa deserves particular attention as it connects several generations of this reflection.
His work on the Reflection Table of the Moderate Opposition, Common Platform, New Country Platform, and Constitutional Consensus was focused on building plural spaces and establishing rules before deciding who would hold power.
This approach reappears in the Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba (CTDC) with For a New Beginning, published in 2026. The document distinguishes between democratic transition and the regime that would follow, proposing a minimal agenda that includes amnesty, decriminalization of dissent, civic participation, and institutional reforms.
The idea is that the transition needs political legitimacy and clear rules, not just candidates.
Break, stabilization, and democratization
A very different formulation is that of the Agreement for Liberation, signed on March 2, 2026, by Pasos de Cambio and the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance along with more than 50 organizations.
Their roadmap divides the process into three stages: Release; Stabilization and Reconstruction; and Democratization.
The model begins with a break from the current system and immediately follows with a stabilization phase aimed at restoring services, security, and basic capabilities, ultimately leading to free elections.
The document also includes commissions on humanitarian emergency, security and public order, economic recovery, infrastructure, health, education, legislation, justice, and the Constitution.
It is a relevant proposal for the debate on the power vacuum because it is based on a simple premise: political change does not automatically resolve the governance crisis; it may be necessary to stabilize the country first in order to democratize it afterward.
The "Agreed Opening"
At the other end of the strategies is Cuba Próxima.
Its Agreed Opening, published in April 2026, proposes a negotiated transition through reciprocal, verifiable steps that are internationally supported.
The model combines a Multi-Actor Sovereign Dialogue within Cuba with a strategic normalization with the United States and the international community. Its sequence includes the release of prisoners, emergency stabilization, economic changes, institutional reforms, elections, and a subsequent constitutional process.
Cuba Próxima accompanies this proposal with specific works on electoral law, provisional constitution, constituent process, judicial power, municipalities, legislative function, business, and commerce.
In other words, the organization is not limited to proposing negotiations; it seeks to develop the legal framework that should support that negotiation and the order that would emerge from it.
Compare scenarios instead of betting on just one
The Consultation with Independent Civil Society on Democratic Transition in Cuba, developed by Cultura Democrática and Justice Consortium, provides another perspective.
The exercise studied different scenarios —reformist, negotiated, rupture, and hybrid— and analyzed their risks, opportunities, and needs.
This work is particularly revealing because it shows that a segment of civil society is not thinking about a single outcome, but rather about several plausible paths for change.
Differences emerge in areas such as the role of certain actors, the scope of transitional justice, or the level of international pressure. However, there is a significant core of agreements regarding freedoms, citizen participation, elections, and the rule of law.
Diversity, therefore, can be an expression of political fragmentation, but also of a reflection that recognizes that the specific form of the transition is not predetermined.
Also consider the moment of constitution
The problem does not end with the regime's replacement.
The CTDC, Cuba Próxima, the Center for Convivial Studies (CEC) and other initiatives have developed proposals regarding provisional governments, transitional legislation, constitutional matters, elections, and constituent processes.
The platform ENTRE TODOS brings together citizen and organizational proposals concerning a potential Constitution and a national roadmap.
The Social Pact and its proposal for a Digital Citizen Constituent explores another pathway: building legitimacy from the citizenry and utilizing digital tools for constitutional participation.
These initiatives respond to a crucial question: how does opposition legitimacy transform into democratic legitimacy?
The corpus is broader than the major roadmaps
The Centro de Estudios Convivencia has developed over the years a framework of thought and proposals that encompasses constitutional transition, the rule of law, governance, economy, agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, security, transitional justice, and diaspora.
Programa Cuba has gathered works from specialists and organizations on the transition "from law to law," memory, transitional justice, economy, agriculture, education, pensions, and aging.
Pasos de Cambio has served as a platform for gathering and coordinating proposals on justice, economy, health, education, housing, armed forces, and internal order.
Cubalex has warned, from a human rights perspective, that a political transition does not guarantee democratization on its own and has proposed safeguards to prevent new forms of power concentration, including judicial independence, due process, transitional justice, and independent oversight mechanisms.
In parallel, Programa Cuba, CADAL, elTOQUE, Ciudadanía y Libertad, and other platforms have produced analyses on scenarios, governance, law, civil society, and comparative experiences.
What exists, therefore, is not a single transition plan, but rather a broad and cumulative set of ideas, scenarios, and proposals that address many of the issues that change would pose. What is needed is to transform that intellectual heritage into a common political framework.
More than a program: a repertoire of stages
The map that emerges from this journey does not contain a common recipe.
Cuba Decide supports the plebiscite.
The legacy of Oswaldo Payá develops formulas for transition "from law to law".
Estado de Sats studied institutional reconstruction.
Cuba Próxima proposes a negotiated opening.
The Acuerdo de Liberación organizes a sequence of liberation, stabilization, and democratization.
The CTDC emphasizes citizen and constitutional legitimacy.
Cultura Democrática y Consorcio Justicia explore multiple scenarios.
CEC and Programa Cuba have accumulated a body of sectoral and transitional proposals.
Manuel Cuesta Morúa has been working for decades on consensus, common rules, and comparative experiences.
There is no agreement on the path.
But there is indeed a much less visible common characteristic: the independent Cuban civil society has approached the transition as a political issue that can be studied, compared, and prepared for.
Is Cuba more prepared than it appears?
The response must be prudent.
There is no unified alternative government, no opposition authority recognized by all sectors, nor a political structure capable of automatically assuming the functions of the State in the face of a crisis.
But the idea that a potential transition would find Cuban civil society without any prior thought on how to produce and channel change also doesn't seem sustainable.
There are proposals for plebiscites, negotiations, breakups, and hybrid formulas; projects for provisional governments; legal frameworks; constituent processes; mechanisms of legitimization; and decades of reflection on the comparative experiences of other transitions.
The maturity of the body of work lies not in having a single solution, but in the existence of thoughtful responses tailored to different scenarios.
The question that remains open is another: knowing how a transition could begin does not yet mean knowing how to govern it.
Who would assume provisional authority? How would electricity, water, hospitals, food, and security remain operational? What would happen to justice, the armed forces, property, and the economy?
This will be the second installment of this research from CiberCuba, dedicated to the existing proposals for governing and rebuilding Cuba during a possible transition.
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