The Platt Amendment: the men behind the vote (Part II)

The Platt Amendment was not unanimously approved in Cuba, nor can that decision be understood by dividing the constituents into patriots and traitors. On June 12, 1901, the Constituent Assembly approved its incorporation as an appendix to the Constitution by 16 votes to 11, while four delegates did not attend the session.

But behind those numbers lay something much more complex: an Assembly made up of men who had fought for independence, who understood the military power of the United States, and who faced an extraordinarily difficult dilemma.

Accept the Amendment and pave the way to the Republic, or reject it and risk prolonging the military occupation? That was the real scenario.

Those who said "No"

Among those who voted against the Amendment were figures of undeniable independence track records such as Juan Gualberto Gómez, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Alfredo Zayas, José Braulio Alemán, José Lacret Morlot, Rafael Portuondo Tamayo, Rafael Manduley, Luis Fortún, José Fernández de Castro, Manuel Ramón Silva, and Eudaldo Tamayo.

Her position was based on a fundamental principle: a nascent Republic should not accept as a condition of its existence clauses that limited its sovereignty.

Juan Gualberto Gómez was particularly firm. The commission tasked with studying the relations between Cuba and the United States formulated a position opposing the provisions it deemed incompatible with Cuban independence. Gómez defended the rejection of the Amendment and specifically questioned the right of U.S. intervention and the establishment of naval bases.

Alongside him was Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, another figure who maintained a constant opposition. For these men, the issue was not merely about getting U.S. troops to leave the Island. The question was a different one: What kind of Republic would be born if its independence was conditioned from the very first day? This stance was consistent with the ideal for which they had fought.

Those who said "Yes"

The other group cannot be reduced to the category of men willing to relinquish sovereignty. Among the 16 who ultimately voted in favor were Manuel Sanguily, José Miguel Gómez, Pedro Betancourt, Domingo Méndez Capote, Emilio Núñez, Gonzalo de Quesada, Enrique Villuendas, Eliseo Giberga, Martín Morúa Delgado, José de Jesús Monteagudo, Diego Tamayo, Joaquín Quílez, Leopoldo Berriel, Pedro González Llorente, Alejandro Rodríguez, and José Nicolás Ferrer.

Many of them had fought for independence and did not see the Amendment as desirable. They accepted it for another reason: they understood that under those circumstances it was the price to be paid to achieve the Republic.

Several explained that they trusted the U.S. government's statements regarding the scope of the Amendment and, above all, believed that rejecting it could hinder the withdrawal of troops and extend the occupation indefinitely. This brings up one of the most interesting cases in the entire debate.

Sanguily, the most difficult vote

Manuel Sanguily had fought during the Ten Years' War and can hardly be portrayed as an indifferent man towards Cuban sovereignty. However, he voted in favor.

His explanation is essential for understanding that moment. Sanguily argued that he accepted because he understood that the Amendment could allow for the establishment of the Republic and, above all, because he believed that directly confronting U.S. imposition could be disastrous for Cuban aspirations.

I wasn’t saying that the Amendment was good. I was stating something much more uncomfortable: that Cuba did not have enough strength to reject it without jeopardizing the very creation of the Republic. There lies the real dilemma.

José Nicolás Ferrer: the change of position

Even more revealing is the case of José Nicolás Ferrer. In a previous vote, he was among those who rejected the acceptance of the Amendment. However, on June 12, he changed his vote. His explanation allows us to see just how much the situation had been narrowing.

Ferrer believed that the resistance had reached a limit and that there was no longer a real possibility for the U.S. Congress to modify or repeal the provision. His change was not merely a personal contradiction; it was the expression of a political reality: the Assembly had found that it was not negotiating on equal terms.

The four who did not vote 

And there is another group that tends to be overlooked. Juan Rius Rivera, Miguel Gener, José Luis Robau, and Antonio Bravo Correoso did not participate in that vote. Their absence deserves to be considered within the history of the debate. Not all disagreements necessarily result in an affirmative or negative vote. Sometimes, absence can also represent a political stance.

Who is correct?

This is where the historian must be careful. From the post-revolutionary perspective of Cuba, we can look back at that episode with over a century of experience. We know that the Platt Amendment severely limited Cuban sovereignty and that its intervention clause would have profound consequences during the Republic.

But the constituents did not foresee the future. Before them lay a Cuba devastated by decades of war, a destroyed economy, foreign military occupation, and a U.S. government that had set the conditions for its withdrawal.

That is why it is too easy to judge those votes from the present. The opposing vote defended a principle: sovereignty could not be negotiated. The favorable vote responded to a reality: without accepting the American conditions, the Republic might never come into being.

Both positions had their logic. And both came with a cost.

The story didn't end on June 12th

What is truly interesting is that voting in favor of the Amendment did not necessarily mean accepting Cuban subordination forever. Sanguily himself provides the best demonstration of this. He had voted in favor in 1901, but later became one of the staunchest opponents of the expansion of American influence over Cuba's economy and political life.

For this reason, we must distinguish a situational decision from an entire political trajectory. The History of the Platt Amendment cannot be reduced to a list of good and bad. It was a political tragedy in which a nation freshly emerged from a war of independence had to choose between limited sovereignty and the risk of not yet achieving the Republic.

The men who voted that day bore that responsibility. Some said no because they believed that accepting meant renouncing the principle for which they had fought. Others said yes because they thought that rejecting would mean losing the opportunity to establish the Republic.

And some, like Sanguily and Ferrer, left behind an explanation with their vote that demonstrates how much more complex that decision was than mere betrayal or a simple act of patriotism.

History must judge the facts, but first it has the obligation to understand the circumstances. That is precisely the historian's job.