The Spanish writer and historian Cesáreo Jarabo raises a question that has remained unanswered for over a century: were Admiral Pascual Cervera's decisions before and during the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba on July 3, 1898, the result of military incompetence or something deliberately more sinister?
Jarabo, author of "1898: A Milestone in the Great Betrayal," presents his thesis in an interview with Tania Costa for CiberCuba, where he breaks down two decisions made by Cervera that he finds inexplicable.
The first is the so-called "Caribbean excursion." According to Jarabo, before arriving in Cuba, Cervera claimed the need to search for coal, but the ships would have arrived with their coal holds full. "Before reaching Cuba, he says he needs to make an excursion around the Caribbean to look for coal. But if you go with your holds full...," points out the historian, emphasizing that with that fuel, there would have been enough time even to bomb New York and return.
The second decision that Jarabo questions is the choice of port. Instead of heading to Havana, which he describes as a spacious and operationally favorable port, Cervera chose to confine himself in Santiago de Cuba. "When he goes to Cuba instead of going to Havana, which has a beautiful port from which he could set out and get the Navy operational, he goes and confines himself in Santiago where only one ship can fit through La Bocana," he states.
That narrowness proved fatal. At the time of departure, each ship had to stop at the mouth of the harbor to pick up the harbor pilot, the sailor responsible for guiding the vessel to open waters. This mandatory stop left them vulnerable and motionless in front of the enemy.
What makes the defeat even more striking, according to Jarabo, is the low accuracy of the American artillery. "The percentage of successful fire they had was 0 something percent. But of course, they had it served up on a plate," he concludes, suggesting that the static position of the Spanish ships more than compensated for the rival's poor aim.
Before all of this, the historian poses the question that underpins his analysis: "But can it be clumsiness or betrayal?"
The documented historical context does not align with Jarabo's thesis. The Spanish squadron, it is claimed, faced real supply difficulties: in Martinique, it could not obtain coal, and in Curaçao, it only secured about 600 tons, which was insufficient to fill the tanks. Moreover, Cervera himself had repeatedly opposed the order to set sail on July 3, which was issued by Captain General Ramón Blanco in response to the American ground advance.
The result was devastating for Spain: nearly 343 Spanish sailors were killed, 151 were injured, and approximately 1,890 were taken prisoner, including Cervera himself. The American casualties were one dead and two injured.
The predominant academic historiography attributes the defeat to the naval superiority of the United States, the material shortcomings of the Spanish fleet, and the orders from the political-military command, dismissing any notion of deliberate betrayal. Jarabo's thesis is a minority view, equally valid and controversial, but the debate over whether Cervera acted with blind obedience, incompetence, or something darker remains open in Spanish historiography more than a century after the disaster.
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