The leak of financial documents from GAESA, the business conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), continues to create ripples beyond Cuba.
The investigation by the Miami Herald has not only highlighted the magnitude of the military corporation's reserves—over 14.467 billion dollars deposited in unidentified bank accounts until March 2024—but it has also raised alarms among governments, businesses, and taxpayers who have been hearing the same response from Havana for years: there is no money to pay.
The U.S.–Cuba Economic and Trade Council, based in New York, raised the fundamental question: has the Cuban regime lied about its real ability to honor its debts?
For this entity, which closely monitors the commercial relations with the Island, the revelation from the Herald not only describes a powerful business group but also forces a reevaluation of the credibility of decades of official statements.
In a statement, the Council questioned the true nature of the leaked financial statements: are they a reflection of a complex yet legitimate business structure, or evidence of a deliberate strategy to conceal value, evade payments, and manipulate international creditors?
Accounts and contradictions
The question is particularly significant because, while GAESA held multi-million dollar reserves, the Cuban regime was negotiating—or failing to meet—commitments with its closest creditors: Moscow, Beijing, and the Paris Club.
Havana has insisted on its inability to cover payments or interest, while simultaneously holding deposits equivalent to 76% of the liquidity of its main state corporation.
The Council recalled that since December 2001, U.S. exporters of food and agricultural products have received approximately $8 billion in advance payments from Cuba, as required by U.S. trade sanctions law.
If there are foreign currencies available to strictly comply with that legal framework, it raises the question of why they are not being used to settle debts with other partners.
Creditors in the spotlight
The list of those affected is long. Shareholders of Sherritt International Corporation (Canada) are owed $100 million in accounts receivable tied to their mining and energy operations on the Island.
Meliá Hotels International (Spain) still manages more than 2,300 rooms in Cuba, but they have had to delist almost a thousand in just the first half of 2025. The reason, according to corporate reports: chronic delays in the maintenance of the properties —all owned by GAESA companies— and a decline in service quality.
In Spain, taxpayers also have reasons to question their government's policy, which chose to convert about 400 million dollars of unpaid debt from Cuba into investment. A formula that, in practice, means accepting that cash collection is unlikely.
A pattern of non-compliance
The history of non-payments in Havana is long and recurrent. The Council noted that Cuba has not honored restructuring agreements worth billions of dollars with countries such as Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam, despite significant debt cancellations and discounts.
The case of the Paris Club is paradigmatic: after a 76% reduction of the debt in 2015, Cuban authorities once again failed to meet the payment schedule.
Meanwhile, foreign companies not based in Cuba are accumulating hundreds of millions of dollars in accounts receivable, facing constant requests for discounts and deferrals.
Credibility in question
The conclusion drawn from the document is as straightforward as it is uncomfortable: the credibility of the Cuban government and its state-owned enterprises is under suspicion.
If the leaked data is accurate, Cuba would have had the resources for years to pay a significant portion of what it owes, but chose to keep them under military control, shielded from any civil or international scrutiny.
For creditors and taxpayers around the world, the leak of the so-called "GAESA Papers" is not just an accounting issue: it is confirmation that, beyond the embargo or internal crisis, there exists a structural problem of transparency and willingness to pay.
The burdensome weight of Cuban debt
The controversy surrounding GAESA's multimillion-dollar reserves occurs in a country that has a long history of debts and restructurings with some of the major financial and commercial players in the world.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Cuba's total debt—adding both public and private obligations—was estimated to be between 28.5 and 28.7 billion dollars at the end of 2023.
The Paris Club, which brings together the main official creditors, is among the most affected. In 2015, the organization forgave Havana 8.5 billion dollars from an original debt of 11.1 billion, leaving the remainder to be paid by 2033.
However, Cuba failed to meet the deadlines again, and in January 2025, a new restructuring was agreed upon that only covers about 16% of the total external debt.
Other major creditors have chosen partial forgiveness or renegotiations. Russia forgave 90% of a historical debt of 35 billion dollars in 2014, leaving a balance of about 3.2 billion to be paid over ten years.
China forgave 6 billion in 2011, restructured another portion in 2022, and provided about 100 million more in credits or aid. Mexico forgave 70% of a debt of 487 million in 2013, and Vietnam canceled about 144 million in 2018.
Paradoxically, since 2001 and in strict compliance with the U.S. trade sanctions law (TSREEA), Cuba has paid around 8 billion dollars in advance to agricultural and food exporters from the United States.
This selective payment capacity is one of the elements that most draws the attention of analysts and creditors, as it contrasts with the refusal to meet financial commitments with other partners.
In this context, the revelations about GAESA's reserves not only call into question the transparency of the Cuban economy, but also reignite the question of whether Havana has exaggerated or manipulated for years its "inability" to pay, while keeping billions under military control, outside of civil or international oversight.
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