The trip of Miguel Díaz-Canel to Asia, with stops in Vietnam, Laos, and particularly in China, has once again brought to the forefront the possible evolution of the Cuban economic model.
The visit comes amid a national crisis marked by rampant inflation, constant blackouts, and a massive migration exodus. The leader is traveling in search of political and economic breathing room, and his statements in Beijing have raised alarms about the direction that Havana might take.
After meeting with Wang Weizhong, governor of Guangdong province, Díaz-Canel emphasized the importance of discussing the "experiences" of both nations and recalled dictator Fidel Castro's visit to that region in 1995.
The gesture is not casual: Guangdong was a pioneer in the opening and reform process that, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, transformed China into one of the largest economies in the world.
Guangdong, the laboratory of China's reforms
In the late 1970s, Guangdong became the epicenter of Deng Xiaoping's experiment. The first Special Economic Zones—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou—were established there, designed to attract foreign investment with tax incentives and more flexible market regulations.
The result was a dizzying transformation: from rural villages to industrial and technological megacities, with Shenzhen as a global emblem of change.
The Guangdong model demonstrated that it was possible to stimulate the economy without disrupting the political control of the Communist Party. The exchange was clear: material prosperity in exchange for political obedience.
Cuba and the Temptation to Imitate
In Cuba, the closest experiment has been the Mariel Special Development Zone, inaugurated in 2013 with the promise of turning it into a hub for foreign investment.
However, as the government of "continuity" itself has acknowledged, its performance has been far below expectations, due to bureaucratic obstacles, lack of transparency, and excessive centralization in decision-making.
The explicit mention of Díaz-Canel to Guangdong suggests that the regime is contemplating the possibility of deepening this approach: opening more spaces for investment and foreign capital in joint ventures, but under the firm leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba.
Is the Guangdong model exportable?
The structural differences between China and Cuba are immense. Guangdong benefited from the proximity of Hong Kong and Macao, capitalist hubs that served as a natural bridge for investment.
Additionally, the Chinese model took advantage of millions of internal migrant workers, which facilitated a productive leap in a very short time.
Cuba, on the other hand, faces a different landscape: deteriorating infrastructure, a declining population, migratory exodus, brain drain, and a level of international isolation that limits its ability to integrate into global value chains. The possibility of replicating Guangdong's success appears, in this regard, to be limited.
Rights and freedoms at stake
Beyond the economic aspect, the key lies in the political realm. The Chinese model did not come with democratic freedoms, but rather with an enhancement of the State's control over society. Today, China combines prosperity with censorship, repression, and mass surveillance.
In Cuba, civil society increasingly demands freedom of expression, political pluralism, and respect for human rights. A limited opening similar to Guangdong could provide some material relief, but it would hardly address those civic aspirations.
The risk is that partial prosperity is presented as a substitute for freedom, reproducing the equation of "economic welfare in exchange for political obedience."
Between Illusion and Disenchantment
The memory of Castro in Guangdong in 1995 serves as a symbolic resource for Díaz-Canel, but the current context is radically different. Cuba in 2025 is not the same: it is more impoverished, more digitally connected, and much more aware of comparative experiences around the world.
The fundamental question is whether Cubans would be willing to pay the same price as the Chinese: economic growth without democracy. Amid a prolonged crisis, the regime seems tempted to attempt a limited “opening and reform.” However, the citizenry, weary of unfulfilled promises, might not settle for partial solutions this time.
In reality, if Díaz-Canel wanted to find a roadmap more aligned with the aspirations of Cubans, instead of obsessively looking at Guangdong, he should take a trip to Warsaw, Prague, or Vilnius and note the plans that were implemented there.
The Balcerowicz Plan in Poland, the Czech shock therapy, or the accelerated integration path of the Baltic countries are imperfect examples, but much more resonant with a citizenry that yearns for freedom, democracy, and prosperity, not for a one-party capitalist system like that of China.
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