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The Cuban economist Mauricio de Miranda Parrondo harshly criticized the new exchange policy announced by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), arguing that the three official rates approved by the regime not only deepen existing economic distortions but are also designed to benefit military companies grouped within GAESA.
In a post shared on his , De Miranda described the government's decision to maintain a system of multiple exchange rates as "a textbook economic policy error," one that "segments markets, creates negative incentives, and generates distortions." According to the expert, the BCC's decision will keep the population and private entrepreneurs excluded from a genuine foreign exchange market.
According to the explanation, the coexistence of three exchange rates—1x24, 1x120, and a daily floating rate—represents “a new economic absurdity” and an implicit acknowledgment of the failure of the regime's monetary policies.
Three cups and a lie
The official announcement, made by the president of the BCC, Juana Lilia Delgado Portal, introduces a third floating exchange segment, the value of which will be published daily.
The other two segments maintain rates of 1 CUP per 24 USD (for basic state operations) and 1 CUP per 120 USD (for entities with export capacity).
According to the government, this new scheme seeks to "organize the flow of foreign currency" and "prevent sudden devaluations." However, De Miranda warns that it is actually a mechanism of political and financial control, not an economic opening.
“El gobierno intends to tell the market at what rate it should operate. That is not a floating rate; it is a managed rate. This is not how the economy works,” emphasized the economist, who was a full professor at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Cali and is one of the most recognized Cuban specialists in economic policy and development.
GAESA, the great beneficiary
De Miranda was explicit in stating that the companies controlled by GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.) —the military conglomerate that dominates tourism, finance, foreign trade, and foreign investment in Cuba— will be the primary beneficiaries of the scheme.
“What is it that they want? To grant special conditions to certain segments (GAESA among them) so they can operate their imports at a rate of 1x24 that is unsustainable for the country?” the economist questioned, warning that this currency design perpetuates the privileges of the military apparatus while penalizing the rest of the economy.
According to their analysis, maintaining a 1x24 exchange rate for the State's "strategic" operations amounts to artificially subsidizing the imports of companies in power, allowing them to access foreign currency well below its actual value, while other players—especially private entities—must operate at significantly higher rates or turn to the informal market.
"With these overvalued rates, what is achieved is the favoring of imports with artificially low prices, condemning national production to a state of limited competitiveness," he denounced.
A system designed for self-deception
The economist also questioned the macroeconomic logic behind the measure. In his opinion, the new scheme does not address any of the causes of the exchange crisis, but rather deepens the regime's self-deception, by assuming that “just because the government decides that the dollar is worth 24 pesos, the market will accept it.”
"That's not how the economy works, Madam Minister-President of the BCC. You should know that, and so should the Council of Ministers," wrote De Miranda in a direct critique of the current economic leaders' lack of realism and technical knowledge.
His argument aligns with the international academic consensus: the coexistence of multiple exchange rates creates parallel markets, fuels speculation, and undermines the credibility of the national currency.
Studies by the International Monetary Fund and the economist Sebastián Edwards show that these systems create inefficiencies, corruption, and a loss of international reserves, while perpetuating the state's control over the flow of foreign exchange (see IMF Working Paper “Multiple Exchange Rate Systems” and Edwards, 1989, NBER).
The people outside the market
Another central point of his criticism was the official hypocrisy of speaking about "protecting the population" with these measures.
De Miranda openly questioned the minister of the BCC's claim about the supposed intention to "avoid abrupt devaluations to protect the people." "Will the population be able to operate at rates of 1x24 or 1x120? It doesn't seem to me that this will happen," he pointed out.
In reality, ordinary Cubans will only have access to the third segment, the so-called "floating" rate, the value of which will depend on the flow of foreign currency entering the official system—presumably limited—while large state operators will continue to benefit from unrealistic fixed rates.
The foreseeable consequence, it warns, will be the continuation of the informal market as a true reference for the value of the dollar. The Central Bank itself has acknowledged that this market “will not disappear immediately,” which confirms that the new system will not resolve the scarcity of foreign currency or the distrust in the Cuban peso.
Partial dollarization and the increase in inequality
De Miranda also warned about the social effects of the model: “The partial dollarization of the economy will not improve the living conditions of the people. It will deepen social disparities, especially impacting the poorest and will diminish the sovereignty of the Cuban peso.”
His warning is echoed by other Cuban economists and contemporary economic literature.
Research by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, Journal of International Economics) shows that partial dollarization processes increase inequality, as foreign currencies become concentrated in sectors with privileged access to the market, while the majority remains trapped in a weak currency with no purchasing power.
"One Rate, One Real Economy"
As an alternative, De Miranda reiterated that the only sensible solution would be to unify the exchange rate, accompanied by a real monetary reform that establishes a stable and transparent regime: “The exchange rate must be one, that is, unified,” he emphasized.
The economist proposed classic stabilization options, such as a currency board (the Argentine model from the 90s), a crawling peg, or a link to a basket of currencies, as long as it is supported by reserves and fiscal discipline.
But he warned that as long as the current centralized model remains in place, without independence for the Central Bank or openness to the private sector, any reform will be nothing more than a "facade of crisis."
Conclusion: A market made for power
The new currency system, far from being an economic opening, represents —according to De Miranda— a maneuver to financially sustain the military-business apparatus of GAESA, consolidating inequality and political control over the economy.
His analysis, supported by decades of economic theory, dismantles the official rhetoric: there is no reform, but rather a facade; there is no stability, but rather manipulation; and there is no market, but rather control.
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