In-depth analysis: Venezuelan army vs. Cuban army and possibilities of a similar operation in Cuba as in Venezuela

Introduction

On January 3, 2026, the United States conducted **Operation "Absolute Resolve,"** a lightning attack on Venezuela that culminated in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro in less than three hours. This historic event exposed the vast gap between the military inventory "on paper" and the actual combat capabilities of a degraded armed force. For Cuba, which closely observed the Venezuelan collapse and also lost 32 of its intelligence officers deployed in Caracas, the question is inevitable: **How would a similar action unfold in Cuba?**

This analysis thoroughly compares the military capabilities of Venezuela (before January 3) and Cuba (January 2026), evaluating air defenses, aviation, armored units, ground forces, and, crucially, the geographical and structural differences that would determine the outcome of a hypothetical U.S. operation against Havana.

PART I: THE VENEZUELAN ARMY BEFORE JANUARY 3, 2026

Size and Structure of the FANB

The Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) maintained just over 123,000 active personnel: 63,000 in the Army, 25,500 in the Navy, 11,500 in the Air Force, and 23,000 in the National Guard. On paper, it appeared to be a significant regional force. However, the main issue was not the number of personnel, but rather the extreme politicization, corruption, demoralization of mid-level commanders, and low morale in regular units, which were more focused on internal control and illegal activities (mining, drug trafficking) than on conventional warfare.

Anti-Air Defense: The Illusion of the Modern IADS

Venezuela had invested billions in Russian, Chinese, and Iranian systems since the Chávez era, creating one of the most dense integrated air defense networks (IADS) in Latin America on the map:

Long-range systems:

• S-300VM (SA-23 "Gladiator/Giant"): 1-2 divisiones (2 baterías), con misiles 9M82M/9M83M (alcance ~130 km contra aeronaves, hasta 200 km contra misiles balísticos), desplegados en la Base Aérea Capitán Manuel Ríos (estado Guárico) para proteger Caracas
• Buk-M2E (SA-17 "Grizzly"): Aproximadamente 12 lanzadores (varias baterías) de medio alcance (30-45 km), sobre chasis MZKT-6921 6x6, altamente móviles

Short-range systems:

• Pantsir-S1: Point defense systems (20 km) with cannons and missiles, deployed to protect S-300VM sites.
• S-125 Pechora-2M: At least 6 sites, technology from the 1960s modernized
• MANPADS Igla: Hundreds of portable units

Radars:

• 55Zh6M "Nebo-SV" (long-range UHF)
• 64N6E Gamma-DE (3D medium range, integrated with S-300VM)
• 1L119 "Kasta-2E2" (low elevation coverage)
• JY-27A and JYL-1 (Chinese radars, promoted as "stealth hunters")

The Real State: Critical Operativity

Various analyses prior to the attack warned that less than 50% of the systems were actually operational. The Chinese radar network had over 60% of its equipment out of service due to a lack of spare parts and technical support. Equipment cannibalization was common, training was sporadic, and the dependence on Russia, China, and Iran for spare parts and ammunition left the FANB in a critical condition.

Combat Aviation

Venezuela had in inventory:

• 21 Su-30MK2 Flanker (multirole, Russian origin)
• ~10 F-16 residuals (acquired in the 80s, without American spare parts since 2006)
• Mi-35 attack helicopters, Mi-17 transport helicopters

Readiness: It was estimated that less than half could effectively fly due to a shortage of fuel, spare parts, and limited flight hours.

Armored and Ground Forces

The Venezuelan army had:

• ~180 main tanks: 92 T-72B1V (modernized Russian), 81 AMX-30 (French, obsolete)
• 123 BMP-3 (infantry fighting vehicles), BTR-80A (armored transports)
• Artillery: MLRS Smerch and Grad (multiple rockets), M-46 self-propelled

Status: Under training, scarce fuel, irregular morale. Most units could barely operate beyond the battalion level.

Marina

The Venezuelan Navy was limited: 1 frigate, Mariscal Sucre, 1 Type-209 submarine, patrol boats, and fast boats. It had no real capacity for projection or air defense until recently.

January 3rd: Collapse in Three Hours

Sequence of Operation "Absolute Resolve"

H-hour -60 min: Cyber and electronic warfare

• Cyberattack cuts electricity in large areas of Caracas, leaving the IADS network without command and control
• Aviones EA-18G Growler (electronic warfare) jam Venezuelan radars, forcing them to increase power and reveal positions.

H-hour -30 min: SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses)

• F-35C and F-22 fire AGM-88 HARM (anti-radiation missiles) at SAM emitters attempting to track U.S. aircraft.
• At least two Buk-M2E systems are destroyed on the ground (La Carlota Base, Higuerote) without firing a single missile
• The 9S32ME radars of the S-300VM are blinded by jamming, unable to guide missiles.
• The Chinese JY-27A radars and the Pantsir-S1 never detect assault helicopters flying at low altitude during night operations.

H-hour: Airborne Assault

• ~150 American aircraft are participating (from 20 bases in the Caribbean, Florida, and Trinidad and Tobago)
• Helicopters MH-47 Chinook and MH-60 Black Hawk from the 160th SOAR penetrate into Miraflores (Caracas) with Delta Force operators.
• Direct assault on Fuerte Tiuna (the fortified military complex where Maduro resided)
• Capture of Maduro after limited resistance

H+180 min: Complete extraction

• Helicopters with Maduro on board return to USS Iwo Jima, following transfer to the US

Casualties and Lessons

• 75-100 dead (32 Cuban officials, 23+ venezolanos, 2+ civiles confirmados)
• The FANB was unable to offer sustained resistance: blinded air defenses, grounded aviation, cut communications
• The gap between inventory and actual capacity was revealed to the world

PART II: THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF CUBA

Size and Structure

The FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) maintain:

• 50,000-76,000 active: Army 35,000, Navy 5,000, Air Force/Air Defense 10,000
• 39,000 reservations
• 90,000 paramilitaries (Military Territorial Forces, Civil Defense)

The official doctrine is the "Total People's War": total mobilization, asymmetric territorial resistance, and urban and rural guerrilla warfare. However, this doctrine requires resources (ammunition, fuel, food, electricity) that Cuba simply does not have in 2026.

Air Defense: Obsolete Even After Modernization

Inventory:

• 144 S-125 Pechora-2BM launchers: Modernized in May 2025 with Belarusian assistance, montados en chasis T-55 para movilidad, con electrónica actualizada
• S-75 residuals (años 1950s)
• MANPADS Igla
• Without long-range systems like S-300 or S-400
• Without an integrated IADS comparable to the Venezuelan one

Critical technical evaluation:

The S-125, even in its modernized version Pechora-2BM, is a system from the 1950s originally designed to intercept subsonic low-altitude bombers. Its maximum range is 18 km in altitude and 25 km in distance. Against fifth-generation stealth aircraft (F-35, F-22) equipped with advanced electronic warfare, it is "effectively useless", according to analyses following the Venezuelan failure.

The S-125 achieved its greatest success in 1999 when a Yugoslav battery shot down an F-117 Nighthawk from the United States. However, that victory relied on exceptional tactics (momentary radar activation, taking advantage of open bomb bay doors) that cannot be replicated against modern aircraft operating with AWACS, intensive jamming, and anti-radiation missiles.

Aviación Cubana: Museum Collection

Inventory (on paper):

• 18 MiG-29 (fourth-generation multirole, Soviet/Russian origin)
• 17 MiG-23 (third-generation interceptor, 1970s)
• 24 MiG-21 (interceptor de segunda generación, años 1960s)
• ~12 Mi-17/24/35 helicopters (transport/attack)

Royal State:

A recent specialized analysis claims that the Cuban MiG-29s are "currently out of operation". Without Russian spare parts, limited fuel, and inadequate maintenance, the Air Force is decorative. The MiG-23 and MiG-21 are completely obsolete compared to fifth-generation fighters. Military analysts assume that they would neither take off nor would they be shot down in seconds.

Armored Vehicles: T-55, T-62, and BMP-1 (1960s Technology)

Inventory:

• ~500 main tanks: T-54/55, T-62 (Soviet, 1950s-1960s)
• ~400 armored vehicles: BMP-1, BTR-60/BRDM (transport/reconnaissance)
• Artillery: M-46, D-30 (towed), MLRS Grad

State:

Technology from 70 years ago. Although some have been locally modernized with basic night vision, they remain vulnerable to drones, anti-tank missiles, and modern air-to-ground threats. Without sustained fuel, they are rolling museum pieces.

Marina: Symbolic

Cuba has:

• 2 Pauk-class frigates (former fishing vessels converted, 1980s)
• 1 Dolphin class submarine (training mini-submarine, 200 tons, without real combat capability)
• Coastal patrols

Without projection capacity or air defense. Insignificant against the naval power of the United States in the Caribbean.

PART III: REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR A CUBAN RESPONSE

Air Defense: None

The S-125 Pechora-2BM, even with the Belarusian modernization of 2025, is technology from the 1950s. Against the F-35/F-22, electronic warfare EA-18G, and AGM-88 HARM, they would be annihilated without firing a shot, just as more modern systems were in Venezuela.

Aviation: Ineffective

The Cuban MiG-29/23/21 do not have capability against fifth-generation fighters. Military analysts assume they would either not take off or be shot down within seconds. A specialized analysis states that the Cuban MiG-29s are "currently out of operation." Without sustained fuel, the Air Force is decorative.

Armored Units and Ground Forces: Irrelevant in Operation Lightning

In a Venezuela-style action (capturing a leader in 2-3 hours), the T-55/T-62 would not have the time or fuel to deploy effectively. Their role would be post-incursion, in a scenario of prolonged resistance or occupation, but without air support or logistics, they would collapse quickly.

Asymmetrical Warfare (MTT, Guerrillas): Theoretical Potential, Material Limitations

The doctrine "Total People’s War" is the only real strategic blueprint of Cuba. With over 1 million militia members and a historical tradition of guerrilla warfare, it could cause attrition during prolonged occupation. However:

1. Moral Crisis: Exhausted population, massive exodus, questionable fighting spirit in 2026 vs. 1961
2. Without resources: Ammunition, food, fuel, electricity depleted
3. Doctrine requires leadership: With Díaz-Canel captured, chain of command fractured, effectiveness in question
4. Unfeasible in lightning raids: The doctrine works in prolonged resistance, not in the point defense of strategic objectives against special operations.

Marina: Insignificant

Two former fishing frigates and a mini-submarine cannot counteract U.S. naval power in the Caribbean.

CONCLUSION: ABSOLUTE ASYMMETRY

If Venezuela—with a superior inventory, continental geography, and regional support—collapsed in three hours, Cuba would face an even faster and more decisive fate:

Factors That Make Cuba MORE Vulnerable than Venezuela

1. Extreme geographical proximity: 90 miles from Florida vs. operations from multiple Caribbean bases facilitate U.S. logistics and response time
2. Overwhelming technological superiority: The gap between the F-35/F-22/EA-18G Growler vs. S-125/MiG-21 is 70 years of military evolution
3. Deeper previous structural collapse: Cuba in January 2026 is in worse condition than Venezuela in December 2025:
   • Terminal electricity crisis (5 total collapses in 2025)
   • Depleted fuel (without Venezuelan supply)
   • Devastated economy (free fall)
4. Most vulnerable presidential objective: El Laguito is a civilian residential area without military fortifications, unlike Fuerte Tiuna, which was a military complex integrated with a guard battalion, bunkers, and tunnels.
5. Completely inoperable aviation: MiG-29 out of service, no fuel for operations
6. Without credible external support: Russia and China have symbolic agreements but would not intervene militarily in the Caribbean against the US.

Estimated Operating Time

2-3 hours from the start of SEAD to complete extraction (similar to or faster than Caracas):

• H-30 min: SEAD (neutralization of S-125)
• H-hour: Assault on El Laguito (15-30 min on land)
• H+60-90 min: Complete extraction, "forces above water"

Probability of Success

90-95%, higher than that of Venezuela due to:

• Objective in a civilian residential area, not a fortified military complex
• Obsolete air defenses (S-125 vs. S-300VM)
• Infrastructure (electricity, fuel) collapsed
• Geographic proximity to the US
• Overwhelming technological superiority

Estimated Losses

• USA: 0-2 (low risk due to extreme superiority)
• Cuba: 10-30 (MININT guards/personal, limited resistance)
• Civilians: 0-5 (if the operation is surgical like in Venezuela)

The Only Real Cuban Capability

The "War of All the People" is the only Cuban military doctrine with real potential, but it operates in prolonged asymmetric resistance following an invasion, not in the specific defense of strategic targets against swift special operations.

In a leadership capture raid (2-3 hours), the Territorial Militias would not have time to mobilize. And without captured leadership, collapsed logistics, or external support, their effectiveness in prolonged resistance would be limited and the humanitarian cost to the civilian population, devastating.

Critical Variable

The only critical operational variable for the USA is to confirm the exact location of Díaz-Canel at the moment H (El Laguito residence vs. the Palace of the Revolution), which requires accurate prior HUMINT/ISR intelligence. With that information, the operation is highly feasible and likely to achieve quick success with minimal casualties.

The lesson from January 3, 2026, is clear: paper inventory does not win wars; real operational capacity does. And in that regard, Cuba is in a worse position than Venezuela was when Maduro fell.