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The victory of Laura Fernández Delgado in Costa Rica occurs during a period of profound reconfiguration of the American political landscape, under the second term of President Donald Trump and the expansion of the so-called "Donroe doctrine," the new strategic framework for regional security promoted by Marco Rubio from the State Department.
The capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in early 2026 marked a turning point: Washington reestablished the hemispheric focus on the eradication of authoritarian regimes and the control of transnational crime.
In this new landscape, moderately center-right governments, such as the one in Costa Rica, play a key role as political and diplomatic partners of the United States.
During his term, Rodrigo Chaves had already shown signs of this alignment: he suspended the educational agreement with the Ministry of Education of Cuba in 2022, a discreet yet symbolic gesture, and in 2025, through his chancellor, supported the complaints to the UN about human rights violations on the island.
Without adopting an openly ideological discourse, Chaves positioned Costa Rica within the bloc of Latin American democracies critical of Havana, alongside countries like Uruguay and the Dominican Republic.
The elected president Laura Fernández, who describes herself as the heir to Chaves' administration, inherits that diplomatic framework in a more polarized context.
Your government comes at a time when the United States is strengthening its policy of economic and informational pressure on Cuba, combined with intelligence strategies and regional cooperation under the umbrella of the new hemispheric security strategy.
Rubio's focus on the region, particularly on the links between organized crime and the power structures of authoritarian regimes, has generated a network of collaboration among allied governments in Central America.
Costa Rica, despite its traditional neutrality, has intensified its cooperation in matters of intelligence and border control, especially concerning human trafficking and capital linked to the Caribbean and Venezuela.
In this scenario, Fernández will need to balance his promise of continuity with the necessity of defining an independent foreign policy. His challenge will be to maintain diplomatic prudence without isolating Costa Rica from the block of democracies that Washington leads in the region.
So far, he has not shown signs of breaking with Chávez's approach, and everything suggests that his government will maintain an institutional distance from the Cuban regime, while not relinquishing diplomatic channels.
The pressure on Havana, however, is no longer expressed solely in the language of sanctions or human rights. Under the Donroe doctrine, Cuba is viewed as a regional risk node —due to its role in opaque financial networks and in providing technical assistance to allied regimes—.
In this context, the new Costa Rican president could become a significant player in the network of governments seeking to isolate Castroism through hemispheric cooperation and regional security.
An increasingly unfavorable regional context for the Bolivarian axis
Costa Rica's new positioning occurs in a regional context characterized by a significant change in the Latin American electoral landscape.
The latest developments have solidified the presence of center-right or pragmatic right-wing governments in countries such as Argentina, with Javier Milei; Ecuador, under Daniel Noboa; Paraguay, with Santiago Peña; the Dominican Republic, with Luis Abinader; Panama, governed by José Raúl Mulino; El Salvador, under Nayib Bukele; and Bolivia, with Rodrigo Paz as president following the 2025 elections.
This block is now joined by Costa Rica, with Laura Fernández continuing the line of Rodrigo Chaves. Although heterogeneous in style and agenda, these governments share priorities such as security, macroeconomic stability, and functional relationships with the United States, reducing the presence of political forces aligned with more traditional leftist projects.
At the same time, the bloc identified with "21st-century socialism" and the Bolivarian axis is experiencing a phase of declining hemispheric influence.
Beyond Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—each increasingly isolated and with integration mechanisms like ALBA-TCP or Petrocaribe of limited scope—the organized left has not managed to build a cohesive regional leadership.
Even center-left governments like Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have taken cautious and low-profile stances on ideological alliances: Lula da Silva, Gustavo Petro, and Claudia Sheinbaum have prioritized domestic agendas and diplomatic balances, steering clear of leading a consolidated leftist front.
The result is a fragmented regional landscape, where the traditional left lacks a unifying axis with effective weight.
In this context of hemispheric realignment and the weakening of the ideological projects that marked regional politics for two decades, Costa Rica emerges as a discreet yet functional actor within the new framework driven by Washington.
The government of Laura Fernández does not appear destined to lead blocs or to play a role in breaks, but rather to consolidate a position of cautious alignment, based on cooperation in security, the institutional defense of democracy, and a relationship that is increasingly distant from the authoritarian regimes of the Caribbean.
In the new hemispheric doctrine, that profile—moderate, predictable, and operational—can be as relevant as that of the most visible actors on the regional stage.
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