The Cuban regime has begun to psychologically prepare the population for a new economic blow, or perhaps for an even greater shock that could change its paradigms and the keys to its power that have lasted for over sixty years.
In an interview with the agency EFE, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Fernández de Cossío acknowledged that the country is preparing to initiate a “reorganization process” that will be “very difficult for the population”.
Although the diplomat avoided giving details, the choice of words—process, reorganization, difficulty—reveals much more than it seems: Cuba is preparing to manage the collapse, not to prevent it.
The euphemism is old, yet it has proven effective: when the Cuban regime talks about "reorganization," it means adjustment, rationing, centralization, and control.
But perhaps the "reorganization" being proposed now will sweep away the regime and its euphemisms.
The backdrop: An economy in a coma
Fernández de Cossío's confession comes at the worst economic moment of the post-Castro era.
The country has lost its main ally —Venezuela, following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces on January 3rd— and oil shipments have been reduced to a minimum.
The energy blockade imposed by the White House, which penalizes any country that supplies oil to the island, has paralyzed industries, transportation, and distribution networks.
This is compounded by rampant inflation, a plummeting currency, and a state lacking liquidity and productive capacity.
The dollar surpasses 480 Cuban pesos, power outages exceed 20 hours daily in many areas of the country, and shortages have reached levels even greater than during the "Special Period."
In light of this situation, the "reorganization" that the government of Miguel Díaz-Canel promises to be "difficult" for the population seems inevitable. The question is what type of reorganization we are talking about.
Hypothesis 1: An internal adjustment of the state apparatus
One initial hypothesis points to an internal adjustment of the State and the public enterprise sector, aimed at reducing costs and concentrating resources in critical areas: energy, defense, controlled tourism, and internal security.
The government may announce in the coming days mergers or closures of state-owned companies, layoffs in unproductive workforces, and a drastic reduction in subsidies.
It is also likely that GAESA, the military conglomerate that dominates the economy, will absorb functions of the civil state under the pretext of "operational efficiency."
In practical terms, this would mean a deeper economic militarization: the military directly managing the country's scarce resources, while the rest of the population faces a new wave of hardships.
Hypothesis 2: A new cycle of rationing and social control
Another possibility is the implementation of a new scheme for rationing food, fuel, and currency.
The government could reinstate stricter controls on retail and self-employed workers, limit foreign currency operations, and even introduce "digital vouchers" or electronic consumption control mechanisms, under the pretext of "equity and distributive efficiency."
That reorganization would not alleviate the crisis; it would deepen it, as it would further restrict the economic autonomy of families. The regime would bet on social discipline and surveillance, not on recovery.
In that context, "reorganize" would mean adjusting scarcity to the population, not solving it.
Hypothesis 3: A covert monetary reform
It could also be an attempt to restructure the monetary system amid the ongoing devaluation of the Cuban peso.
The government may announce measures to unify exchange rates, restrict access to foreign currency accounts, or freeze deposits in foreign currencies.
Such measures, previously tested during the so-called Tarea Ordenamiento (2021), only exacerbated inflation and inequality, but allowed the State to absorb circulating currency and control the flow of foreign exchange.
Now, with the coffers empty, the Castro regime could attempt a Task Ordering 2.0, more severe and with devastating social effects.
Hypothesis 4: Total centralization of economic power
The fourth hypothesis would identify the “painful process of reorganization” as a political survival operation, designed to recentralize economic power within the military apparatus and shield the country's strategic resources from external pressures.
GAESA's control over tourism, foreign trade, telecommunications, and offshore finance turns the Armed Forces into the true economic core of the Cuban state.
Amid international isolation and U.S. sanctions, the Díaz-Canel government needs to protect that structure. Therefore, reorganization would be synonymous with closing ranks: less autonomy, less transparency, more military control, and increased preventive repression.
Hypothesis 5: Towards an "oligarchic" capitalism in the Cuban way
A fifth possibility—of greater structural significance—is that the so-called "reorganization process" may be a prelude to a mutation of the Cuban model towards a form of oligarchic capitalism, similar to the experience in Russia in the 1990s.
In the face of economic suffocation and pressure from Washington, the regime may be considering a controlled transformation of the ownership system, in which some state-owned companies would be handed over to individuals allied with the military or the Communist Party, under the guise of privatizations or partnerships with foreign capital.
The Russian precedent provides a disturbing reflection. After the Soviet collapse, the old structures of the KGB and the Party were recycled into business oligarchies, which seized state assets without altering the power structures.
The result was an authoritarian capitalism where economic control replaced ideological control.
In Cuba, the process could be reproduced on a smaller scale and under the covert supervision of the Kremlin – recently, Havana welcomed the visit of the Russian Interior Minister, Vladimir Kolokoltsev – and the business machinery of GAESA, the military conglomerate that controls over 70% of the economy.
The transfer of state-owned enterprises to “mixed” companies, MIPYMES, or investment funds managed by military personnel and relatives of the elite would allow for a reconfiguration of the regime without losing control.
Formal socialism would remain mere rhetoric, while the country turns into a uniform capitalism: a system privatized from within, where political power is recycled into economic power.
For Havana, this route would have three advantages: 1) It ensures the continuity of power, disguising the reform crisis. 2) It guarantees fortunes and legacies to the families and officials that support the system. 3) It provides Washington and the European Union with the appearance of openness, attracting foreign currency without relinquishing political sovereignty.
But the cost would be incredibly high: an even more unequal society, an economy captured by the same old players, and a frustrated transition before it even begins.
If this hypothesis is confirmed, Castroism would not extinguish, but rather mutate into its definitive form: a post-socialist oligarchy, disguised as modernization.
"Reorganize" as a political discourse
The use of the term is not casual. Speaking of "reorganization" allows the regime to acknowledge the collapse without recognizing its failure. It’s a way to reconstruct the heroic narrative of resistance, appealing to collective sacrifice.
During the Special Period, the dictator Fidel Castro used the term “rectification” to justify the enforced adjustments following the Soviet collapse.
Today, Díaz-Canel and Fernández de Cossío revive that rhetoric, but without the epic: there is no longer a "revolution" to support the misery.
The international context: The mirror of Venezuela
The announcement should also be understood in light of the new U.S. policy towards the region.
After the capture of Maduro, the government of Donald Trump has implemented the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela, promoted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio: stabilization, recovery, and a democratic transition under the supervision of Washington.
Havana observes this process with alarm. It knows that it is the next target and that the White House will not accept a dialogue that excludes political and economic reforms.
Therefore, Fernández de Cossío’s speech—rejecting any debate on the Constitution, the economy, or the socialist system—aims to tighten the internal circle before facing the external storm.
In other words, Cuba is reorganizing to resist, not to reform.
Conclusion: Managing the collapse
The "reorganization process" that the government promises will be "very difficult for the population" appears to be an emergency plan to manage scarcity and maintain political control, rather than a program for national recovery.
The regime is not preparing to change, but rather to survive in a state of prolonged suffocation. And while the official discourse calls for sacrifice and patience, the reality is that Cubans will once again bear the cost of a system that resists its own decomposition.
In their reasoning, the message is clear: "We withdraw to resist. Resist in order to continue leading."
The question is no longer what the Díaz-Canel government is up to, but how much longer a country can endure an endless reorganization that never actually reorganizes anything and perpetuates the same individuals in power.
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