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The Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) adjusted its official exchange rate for the so-called Segment III again this Saturday, implementing one of the most noticeable adjustments since the beginning of the exchange rate system in December, in an attempt to reduce the gap with the informal market.
For this February 7, 2026, the US dollar (USD) was set at 455 Cuban pesos (CUP), with an increase of six pesos, while the euro (EUR) rose to 537.86 CUP.
The movement confirms an acceleration in the official devaluation of the peso, but it also reinforces a recurring conclusion: the so-called "floating rate" does not lead the market, but rather reacts belatedly to what is already happening outside the formal system.
A week of staggered adjustments, not real floating
The official data from the BCC itself allows for an accurate reconstruction of the rate's behavior over the past week.
Between January 30 and February 2, the rate for Segment III remained completely frozen at 441 CUP per dollar, showing no variation for four consecutive days.
The first adjustment came on February 3, when the BCC raised the rate to 447 CUP, a jump of six pesos that broke the previous inertia. After two days of renewed stability, on February 5 the rate rose again, this time to 449 CUP, and ultimately remained unchanged until the end of the week.
This pattern reveals a key characteristic of the system: there is no daily floating based on supply and demand, but rather a sequence of extended administrative pauses followed by discrete jumps that are applied when the gap with the informal market becomes too evident to sustain.
Currency fragmentation: A "floating rate" that was never just one
The analysis of the entire historical series of Segment III, since its implementation, confirms that the main issue with the exchange rate scheme of the Central Bank of Cuba is not only the level of the rate, but also its internal fragmentation and the inconsistency in the way it is adjusted.
Official data shows that the so-called "floating rate" has not exhibited a continuous or organic behavior, but rather a series of rigid segments.
During several initial periods, the dollar rate remained frozen for consecutive days, without any variations, even though the informal market was already showing upward movements.
This administrative inertia was followed by sudden jumps, often of several pesos in a single day, implemented when the gap with the street became politically unsustainable.
This pattern is repeated throughout the entire series: prolonged pauses, abrupt adjustments, new immobility. There is no evidence of daily fluctuations based on supply and demand signals, but rather a reactive mechanism, conditioned by internal decisions of the BCC and not by the actual market.
This dynamic is further compounded by an even deeper fragmentation. The official registry itself reveals that, while Segment III set a base rate for general operations, there were other higher official prices coexisting at counters, airports, hotels, and specific cash sales channels.
At various times, these parallel rates exceeded the "floating" quotation published by 20 and even 30 pesos, creating a system of multiple prices within the state apparatus itself.
The result is a contradictory signal for citizens and economic actors: the State implicitly acknowledges that the value of the dollar is higher than its own official rate, yet it resists unifying it.
This dispersion does not reduce the informal market; on the contrary, it legitimizes it by confirming that even the government does not operate with a single reference price.
Since the beginning of Segment III until now, the gap with the informal market has never closed; it has only shifted. Each official adjustment has come late, after the street had already established a new level.
Thus, the "floating rate" does not anchor expectations nor does it organize the market: it chases prices that already exist.
In economic terms, the accumulated evidence points to a structural failure. A system with multiple rates, restricted access, and discretionary adjustments cannot generate trust or stability.
The historical data confirms it: the problem is not temporary or recent, but rather inherent to the very design of the exchange rate system.
A late adjustment
The context in which the BCC accelerates its rate is not favorable. The Cuban economy is facing persistent inflation, an energy crisis, a shortage of foreign currency, and an increasingly uncertain political environment.
In light of this situation, the informal market reacted gradually but steadily throughout the week, while the official rate fluctuated erratically.
Independent economists agree that this behavior confirms the practical failure of the exchange rate scheme. Without transparency, without real access to foreign currency, and with multiple official prices coexisting, the "floating rate" remains a reactive instrument, incapable of organizing the market.
The message conveyed by the official data is clear: the BCC adjusts, but does not control the process.
As long as the informal market continues to determine the real value of money, each delayed adjustment of the official exchange rate will only reinforce the loss of credibility of the Cuban peso and the regime's exchange rate policy.
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