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The hearing taking place this Monday in the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the scope of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is not merely another legal episode in the long-standing dispute over properties confiscated following the so-called "Cuban revolution."
It is, above all, a clear demonstration of how the current administration of President Donald Trump seeks to align the judicial power with its foreign policy strategy towards Havana.
The two cases examined by the Supreme Court—one brought by Exxon Mobil against Cuban state companies and the other by Havana Docks against several cruise lines—have received unusually strong support from the federal government.
In both instances, the Executive presented documents as amicus curiae — a legal figure that allows a third party to intervene as a "friend of the court" to provide arguments without being a direct party to the litigation — in which it not only analyzed technical issues but also emphasized that the interpretation of Title III has direct consequences for the strategic interests of the United States.
The message is unequivocal: the White House believes that the Court's decisions can strengthen or weaken a key tool of economic pressure against the Cuban regime.
Title III as an Accountability Instrument
In its arguments before the Supreme Court, the Government insisted that the United States has "significant foreign policy interests" in ensuring that American citizens whose properties were confiscated by the regime of Fidel Castro can obtain compensation, as well as in preventing the Cuban state from continuing to benefit from those expropriations.
The Helms-Burton Act, approved in 1996, established Title III specifically to allow lawsuits against those who "traffic" in confiscated property. However, for more than two decades, its implementation was suspended by successive administrations. It was not until 2019 that this suspension was allowed to expire, paving the way for the first lawsuits.
Today, the administration not only upholds that decision but also advocates before the Supreme Court for a broad interpretation of the regulation.
In the case of Exxon, the central debate is whether Cuban state-owned enterprises like CIMEX can invoke foreign sovereign immunity to block lawsuits.
The Government argues that Congress designed Title III to explicitly allow actions against "agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state" and that imposing additional barriers would undermine that legislative authorization.
In the case of Havana Docks, the controversy revolves around whether a port concession confiscated in 1960, which would have expired in 2004, can serve as a basis for claiming the use of the port between 2016 and 2019.
The Executive rejects the interpretation of the appeals court that requires analyzing the situation as if the expropriation had never occurred. What the law protects, it argues, is not the hypothetical validity of the original right, but the “claim”: the certified claim that arises after the confiscation.
In both processes, the Administration warns that restrictive readings would undermine a tool created specifically for the Cuban case.
Prevent the law from being deactivated
One of the strongest points in the official writings is the argument that imposing additional conditions—whether through the general regime of sovereign immunity or through counterfactual interpretations of temporary rights—would ultimately block most claims.
In the case of Exxon, the Executive argues that requiring the plaintiffs to overcome the traditional exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act amounts to imposing a general framework over a specific rule designed by Congress to address confiscations in Cuba.
If Title III authorizes lawsuits against Cuban state entities, imposing additional requirements would make that authorization practically inoperative.
In the litigation of Havana Docks, the Government warns that the interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit would effectively eliminate a wide range of claims based on temporal rights — concessions, leases, or even patents — many of which would have expired before the enforcement of Title III in 1996.
Given that most of the expropriations occurred in the 1960s, only extraordinarily long rights would survive under that analysis.
For the Administration, this reading contradicts the legislative intent. Title III protects the right to claim compensation and to prevent third parties from obtaining economic benefits from confiscated assets without the authorization of the "claim" holder, not the perpetual validity of the original right.
Justice and foreign policy
Beyond the technicalities, both government writings clearly indicate that the litigation is part of a broader strategy.
The State Department has publicly emphasized that the United States has foreign policy interests in promoting democracy in Cuba by fostering accountability for unlawful confiscations and supporting compensation for American victims of expropriations from the Castro era.
The connection between legal claims and democratic transition is not implicit: it is explicit. The Executive asserts that allowing these actions helps to deprive the regime of income derived from the exploitation of confiscated assets and strengthens economic pressure to promote political reforms.
Additionally, remember that the President retains the authority to suspend claims if deemed necessary for national interests. This clause reinforces the idea that Title III is not an isolated judicial instrument, but an integrated tool within the framework of foreign policy.
The fact that the current Administration has decided not to suspend its implementation and has actively defended a broad interpretation before the Supreme Court, indicates that it considers this moment to be strategic.
A precedent with structural impact
The decision made by the Supreme Court in the coming months will have implications that extend beyond the specific cases.
A ruling in favor of the Government's position could clear key obstacles for thousands of certified claims, with a total value amounting to billions of dollars.
It would also send a clear message to international companies and private entities: doing business with properties confiscated in Cuba may lead to liability in U.S. courts, even years after the transactions.
In short, the Trump Administration is not just defending two lawsuits. It is seeking to consolidate a legal interpretation that transforms Title III into a fully operational tool for economic pressure and accountability.
The Supreme Court will decide in the coming months whether it shares that view. However, what has already become clear is that, for Washington, the dispute over confiscated properties is not only a matter of the past.
Be an active part of the strategy with which the United States seeks to shape the political and economic future of Cuba.
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