The sinking business: Spanish hotel chains trapped in Cuba's collapse

Cuba awoke on February 10, 2026, with its nine international airports closed for refueling. A NOTAM warning (A0356/26), confirmed by the FAA, certified what the regime had taken weeks to acknowledge: there is not a drop of Jet A-1 fuel left on the island. Not in one airport. In none. The alert extends at least until March 11.

It is the starkest image of a crisis that has been brewing for years but has recently reached a breaking point. The combination of the capture of Nicolás Maduro —which abruptly cut off Venezuelan oil supplies—, the tightening of sanctions by the Trump administration, and the chronic collapse of the electrical system has left Cuba in a situation that even the most pessimistic had not predicted: without energy, without flights, without tourists, and without options.

The Cuban president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, confirmed on February 6 that since December, the country has not received oil from abroad "due to the pressures and oil blockade by the United States government." On the same day, Deputy Prime Minister Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga appeared on state television to announce a plan for tourist "consolidation": closing hotels, relocating tourists, and rationing the last remaining resources.

The Venezuelan domino effect: from 90,000 barrels to zero

To understand the magnitude of the disaster, one must start with Venezuela. For more than two decades, Venezuelan oil was the lifeblood of the Cuban economy. During the best times of Chavismo, Cuba received up to 90,000 barrels daily at subsidized prices. In exchange, Havana sent doctors, teachers, and intelligence agents.

That flow had already drastically reduced before Maduro's capture. In 2024, Venezuela was barely sending around 35,000 barrels per day. Mexico had overtaken it as the main supplier, with about 12,284 barrels. But even those dwindling amounts were vital to keep the thermoelectric plants, distributed generation engines, and airports operational.

The U.S. military operation that captured Maduro in early January 2026 was the definitive blow. Additionally, in operations against the "dark fleet" of Chavismo, the United States intercepted at least four oil tankers linked to Venezuela. Furthermore, Washington imposed tariffs on any country that sells or supplies crude oil to the island, classifying it as a "national security threat."

The energy expert Jorge Piñón from the University of Texas Energy Center described it bluntly: "It is a death sentence for the Cuban economic model." The economist Pavel Vidal from Javeriana University in Colombia was equally direct: "If the supply of oil comes to a complete halt, the Cuban economy will grind to a halt."

Trump and Rubio: the maximum pressure strategy

From Air Force One, hours after Maduro's capture, Donald Trump made the strategy clear: "Cuba is ready to fall. They no longer have any income. They were living off Venezuelan oil, and that is over." Weeks later, he intensified the pressure: "Cuba will fail very soon. They should reach an agreement before it's too late."

Secretary of State Marco Rubio also added an ideological dimension to the debate by warning, “I would be concerned if I were the Cuban regime.” In another statement, he was even more emphatic: “The Cuban dictatorship has to choose: have a real country with a real economy or continue with its failed dictatorship. The era of subsidies is over.”

The maximum pressure policy is not limited to oil. In July 2025, Trump imposed new direct sanctions against the Cuban tourism industry, including the addition of Iberostar Selection La Habana (the controversial Torre K) to the State Department's restricted list, a 42-story hotel with 600 rooms that Iberostar opened with a 200 million euro investment from the Cuban government.

An island without flights: the exodus of airlines

The most visible consequence of the oil collapse is the paralysis of air transport. Cuba has lost, in just a matter of days, the majority of airlines that connected it to the world.

The Canadian market, which accounted for 42.5% of all visitors, was the first to decline. Air Canada suspended all its flights until May 2026, leaving about 3,000 passengers stranded who must be repatriated on 16 emergency flights weekly. Air Transat canceled operations until April 30, affecting more than 6,500 travelers. WestJet also suspended services. In total, it is estimated that 10,000 Canadians have been left stranded on the island.

A Canadian tourist named Brittney Culmone recounted how the simple process of checking in to board turned into an ordeal due to the blackouts.

U.S. airlines had already begun their withdrawal in 2025. United Airlines suspended its only regular route (Houston-Havana) in September 2025 due to a lack of demand. Southwest Airlines reduced frequencies from Tampa. American Airlines requested to suspend the Miami-Santiago de Cuba route.

The Europeans improvise. Iberia and Air Europa maintain their frequencies, but from February 10 they make a technical stop in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, to refuel before continuing to Havana. Aeroméxico is practically the only airline still operating normally. Even Russian and Chinese airlines, traditional allies of the regime, have reduced their operations.

"Compacting": closing hotels to save assets

On February 7th, the Cuban government initiated what it euphemistically calls "tourism compaction". In practice, this means closing hotels with low occupancy and relocating tourists to facilities that concentrate the few available resources.

Hotels are already closing in Varadero, a worker in the industry confirmed to EFE on the condition of anonymity, "but also in other provinces." The areas most affected are Varadero and the northern cays: Cayo Coco, Cayo Guillermo, and Cayo Cruz.

The government did not specify how many hotels have closed or how the relocation is being carried out. However, information from the hotel chains themselves helps to outline the situation:

Meliá Hotels International, with 33 hotels in Cuba —the largest foreign operator on the island—, closed three facilities. The chain described it as "an operational decision strictly based on occupancy levels" and assured that it has "supplies in place to support the operational continuity" of the remaining hotels. The newspaper Mallorca al Día was less diplomatic: it headlined that Meliá and Iberostar "are overcrowding tourists in Cuba amid total collapse".

Iberostar, with 20 hotels, closed at least two: the Iberostar Origin Daiquirí and the Iberostar Origin Playa Pilar, both in Cayo Guillermo. Tourists were relocated to the Iberostar Selection Esmeralda in Cayo Cruz.

Other affected chains include Blue Diamond (Canada, 8 hotels), Blau Hotels (3), Valentín Hotels (3), and Barceló (2).

Meliá and Iberostar: trapped in a dead end

The numbers of the disaster

The financial data of Meliá in Cuba is devastating. An analysis by the economic newspaper Cinco Días rated them as the "worst of all the regions where it operates":

Hotel occupancy dropped to 39.4% in 2024—compared to a global average of 60%—and plummeted to 21.5% in the first half of 2025. Revenue per available room (RevPAR), the most important indicator of the sector, stood at 31.7 euros, one third of the global average of 83.8 euros. In 2024, Cuba incurred pre-tax losses of 4 million euros, while Spain, within the same company, reported profits of 185.3 million.

In the first quarter of 2025, before the oil collapse worsened, Meliá was already reporting a 20.8% drop in management fees attributed to Cuba, equivalent to about 5 million euros in losses.

On February 10, 2026, the day the closure of airports for refueling became public, Meliá's shares plummeted by 8.5% in a single session on the Madrid stock exchange, erasing approximately 130 million euros in market capitalization.

Iberostar, not being publicly traded, avoids stock market scrutiny, but not the associated risks. Its shift to a leasing model in Cuba —compared to the more secure hotel management approach— increases its direct financial exposure.

Why don't you leave?

Despite the disaster, both Gabriel Escarrer (Meliá) and Miguel Fluxá (Iberostar) "seize any public appearance to emphasize their commitment to the Cuban government," betting that the embargo will eventually be lifted and Cuba will open up. The reasons are numerous:

Long-term contracts with the Cuban state —through Gaviota, the tourism company of the military conglomerate GAESA— have durations of 25 to 30 years. Unilaterally breaking them would entail compensations and the loss of assets. Meliá has been in Cuba for 35 years: it was the first Western chain to enter, and the island holds emotional significance for the Escarrer family.

The latent real estate value also explains the resistance. Meliá's market capitalization (around 1.7 billion euros) is well below the actual value of its real estate assets (5.285 billion according to CBRE), which encourages a "wait" for a regime change that would unlock the potential of Cuban properties.

In addition, there is a tacit domino effect: if one chain withdraws, the others become more vulnerable, and the Cuban government could retaliate. The Mallorca Hotel Federation has opted for a coordinated silence. "We do not have direct information from the chains. The only thing I can say is that the chains have not made any statements for now," said its president, Javier Vich, during the International Tourism Fair in Madrid in January.

The Sword of Damocles: Helms-Burton

The legal risk is not hypothetical. Trump activated Title III of the Helms-Burton Act in 2019, allowing lawsuits from Cuban-American families against companies operating on confiscated properties. There are about 6,000 claims for expropriated assets valued at nearly 8 billion euros. Meliá already faced a lawsuit in federal courts in Florida filed by the Mata family. Spanish courts dismissed similar cases due to lack of jurisdiction, but both hotel chains have properties in the United States—Meliá in New York, Miami, and Orlando; Iberostar in New York and Miami—that could be subject to seizure.

If the Trump administration decides to fully reactivate the enforcement of Title III —which Biden had suspended in his final days— Spanish hotel companies would face a wave of lawsuits in U.S. jurisdiction.

GAESA: the military company that controls tourism and exploits workers

To understand the moral dimension of the hotel business in Cuba, one must know its true owner. It is not the Ministry of Tourism. It is GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.), the business conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Through its subsidiary Gaviota S.A., GAESA controls 121 hotels, 20 marinas, a transportation company, a travel agency, and a logistics firm.

A Miami Herald investigation based on internal financial documents from the military group revealed that, between January and March 2024, Gaviota achieved a net profit margin of 42%—nearly four times the global average for the tourism sector—generating profits of 554 million dollars on revenues of 1.3 billion. Gaviota's sales accounted for 72% of GAESA's total.

How are those margins achieved? With pittance salaries. An average hotel worker earns the equivalent of 11 dollars per month. The model works like this: foreign chains pay the Cuban State —that is, GAESA— the total salary in foreign currency. The State keeps the majority and gives the worker a fraction in devalued Cuban pesos. The average salary in the Cuban tourism sector was 5,839 pesos per month in 2024, approximately 16 dollars at the informal exchange rate.

The Cuban Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH), based in Madrid, has repeatedly alerted Spanish hotel chains that this model violates agreements set by the International Labour Organization (ILO). "Do not participate in the feudal exploitation of Cuban workers," the OCDH directly urged Meliá, Iberostar, Barceló, and other chains. The observatory documented that 55% of Cubans report discrimination in the tourism sector, with 72% citing political ideas as the main cause.

Iberostar, which has an Ethics Code that rejects "any manifestation of harassment and abuse of authority," tolerated interrogations by State Security agents of its own employees within its hotel premises, according to documented by Diario de Cuba. The dissonance between the ESG commitments that these companies proclaim in Europe and their practices in Cuba is becoming increasingly evident.

The labor exodus has emptied the job positions. More than 2.7 million Cubans have left the island since 2020, and over 60% of tourism positions remain unfilled. In response to the outflow, the government has proposed coercive measures: mandating that tourism graduates remain in the sector for a minimum of five years without the possibility of relocation or emigration.

The "lost decade": a tourism sector that was already dead before the final blow

The current crisis did not begin with Maduro's capture. José Luis Perelló, an economist from the University of Havana and one of the most respected voices in the study of Cuban tourism, has been stating for years: Cuba is in the midst of a "lost decade."

The numbers don’t lie. Cuba nearly reached 4.7 million tourists in 2018, its historical record. In 2024, it welcomed only 2.2 million, the worst figure in 17 years. In 2025, the decline accelerated to 1.8 million. Data from the first half of 2025 showed sharp decreases in all source markets: Canada (-25.9%), Russia (-43.5%), Germany (-41.4%), Spain (-27.7%).

Perelló notes that even in the best-case scenario —with a year-on-year growth of 10.65%, the highest ever recorded during the thaw under Obama— Cuba would not return to pre-pandemic levels until 2030. And that calculation was made before the loss of Venezuelan oil.

Meanwhile, the Cuban government continued to build hotels. GAESA invested billions in new luxury facilities—such as the 200 million euro Torre K—while the electrical system, food production, public health, and basic infrastructure were crumbling.

How much longer will the Spanish hotel companies hold out?

Mallorcan hotel operators—about 70 establishments with Balearic capital operating in Cuba—are trapped between rising losses, legal risks, and reputational pressure that they can no longer ignore. The sustainability of their presence depends on three variables.

The first is the full reactivation of the Helms-Burton Act. If Trump reinstates lawsuits under Title III, Meliá and Iberostar could face litigation in federal courts that may result in the seizure of their assets on U.S. soil. For companies with hotels in New York, Miami, and Orlando, that risk is existential.

The second variable is the duration of the energy crisis. With occupancy rates below 20%, airports closed, and the peak season lost, each month without fuel generates operational losses that even the most aggressive “compression” cannot offset. If the crisis extends beyond March, as all signs indicate, the 2026 season will be irretrievable.

The third is the patience of the shareholders. The 8.5% stock market drop on February 10 was an initial warning sign. If Cuba transitions from being an accounting burden to a systemic risk for Meliá's stock price, institutional investors might pressure the Escarrer family. Iberostar, being a family-owned company without public listing, has more leeway, but it is not unlimited.

In the short term, the most likely scenario is not a formal withdrawal—the contracts, pride, and hope for a regime change prevent it—but rather a slow death: progressively closing hotels, downsizing staff, minimizing new investment, and maintaining a symbolic presence with a handful of establishments in Havana and Varadero. This is precisely what is already happening.

But there is a factor that no financial statement accounts for, which can ultimately be decisive: moral contradiction. Companies that in Europe champion corporate social responsibility, diversity, and labor rights, in Cuba participate in a system where the military retains 80% of workers' salaries, where State Security agents interrogate employees inside hotels. Their continued presence in Cuba has already taken a clear reputational toll, and all indications suggest that this damage will only intensify in the coming months.