The dilemma of the Armed Forces of the Cuban regime

If history teaches us anything about political transitions, it's that armies are rarely neutral actors.

In moments of profound change, the armed forces often face a historic decision: to cling to the power they have wielded for decades or to embrace their transformation into professional institutions at the service of a new democratic order.

Cuba will not be an exception.

In the midst of increasing speculation about possible contacts between the United States and the Cuban regime, and regarding the political landscape that could unfold on the island in the coming years, one question is just beginning to be raised: What role will the Cuban Armed Forces play if the political system enters a phase of transition? 

For more than six decades, the military has been one of the fundamental pillars of power in Cuba.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces have not only ensured the stability of the regime from a military perspective, but they have also become one of the most powerful economic players in the country.

Through business conglomerates like GAESA, the military manages a significant portion of the strategic sectors of the Cuban economy: tourism, commerce, port infrastructure, logistics, financial enterprises, and a large part of the foreign currency that enters the country.

This model has made Cuba one of the clearest cases of militarization of the economy in the contemporary world.

But precisely for that reason, the political future of the island will largely depend on the decision made by the Armed Forces themselves if the system enters a phase of transformation. 

The dilemma is easy to articulate, though not necessarily to resolve: the Cuban army can become the last bastion of a political system that shows clear signs of exhaustion, or it can choose to transform itself into a professional institution that ensures the stability of a transition process towards a new political order.

If Cuba embarks on that path, there will be some unavoidable decisions.

The first step will be to clearly define who the Armed Forces serve. For decades, the army has been closely associated with the figure of the Castros and the political project known as the "Revolution."

In a political transition, that relationship would need to change radically. The Armed Forces should make it clear that their role is not to defend the interests of a family, a political elite, or a single party, but rather to ensure the security of the country and the free exercise of its citizens' rights.

In other words, they should stop being an instrument of power and become an institution of the State. 

That transformation would not only be political. It would also need to be institutional and symbolic.

A gesture as simple as abandoning the name Revolutionary Armed Forces and adopting that of Armed Forces of the Republic could mark the beginning of that transition.  

It would not just be a change of name, but a change of identity. An army that is no longer defined by its connection to a past revolution, but by its commitment to the State and to the nation. 

But the transformation cannot remain in symbols. 

Another inevitable step would be the dismantling of the repressive apparatus that has been used for decades to control the political life of Cubans.

Institutions such as State Security, political counterintelligence, or the various departments dedicated to the ideological surveillance of the population would hardly be able to survive in a scenario of political openness.

A transition process requires civil liberties, and these liberties are incompatible with structures designed to repress dissent.

In that context, the army would have to play a very different role: ensuring public order and institutional stability while Cuban society reclaims its spaces for political freedom.

But perhaps the most complex challenge would be the economic one.

The business network managed by the Armed Forces through GAESA now represents a significant part of the national economy.

For decades, that conglomerate has operated with a level of opacity incompatible with any democratic system. If Cuba enters a phase of transition, that business structure would need to undergo a thorough and transparent audit.

The military should not interfere in that process. On the contrary, they should collaborate with it.

This would involve making available to the civil authorities —even if temporary— all the necessary information to clarify the asset structure of GAESA, make its accounts transparent, and allow those assets to become part of the Cuban state's heritage.

Under no circumstances could they become private property of those who have managed them on behalf of the nation, whether through front men, offshore companies, or any other means of appropriation.

Once their financial situation is clarified, a significant number of those companies could be integrated into an economic opening process where both national and foreign private capital would play an important role in the reconstruction of the country. 

However, for that process to be credible, the military would have to definitively abandon any direct role in economic management.

The armies of democratic states do not manage hotels, shipping companies, or commercial chains. Their role is to ensure national security, not to run the economy. 

This would also imply a profound generational renewal within the institution. Many of the high-ranking officials who have led the Armed Forces for decades are closely linked to the current power system.

A transition process would require a gradual renewal of that leadership, the professionalization of the military, and its effective subordination to democratically elected civil authorities. 

None of this will be easy.

But history shows that many political transitions have been possible precisely when armies have understood that their role is not to prevent change, but to ensure that this change occurs without violence or institutional chaos. 

The Cuban Armed Forces will, when the time comes, also have to decide which side of history they want to stand on.

They can try to preserve a political system that shows clear signs of exhaustion, prolonging a model that has led the country to decades of economic stagnation and international isolation. 

Or they can become the primary guarantor of a new historical era in which Cuba regains its political freedoms, rebuilds its institutions, and fully reintegrates into the international democratic community. 

The decision, ultimately, will not be solely political. It will also be historical. 

Because the Cuban army may go down in history as the last guardian of an exhausted totalitarian regime or as the institution that helped open the doors to a new republic.