Why Cuba is a unique case compared to Venezuela and Iran



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Cuba is neither Venezuela nor Iran, and this structural difference explains why the scenarios of collapse or transition applicable to Caracas or Tehran are not directly replicable in Havana, according to experts consulted this week and reported by SWI swissinfo.ch.

Several factors radically distinguish the Island: the absence of massive energy resources, a collective power architecture, its geographic proximity to the United States, the lack of a cohesive opposition, and the political weight of the diaspora in Washington.

Venezuela built its regime on the largest oil reserves in the world, which financed Cuba with up to 100,000 barrels a day at its peak. Iran combines an oil-based economy with nuclear capability and long-range missiles. Cuba, on the other hand, lacks significant hydrocarbons; its main resources are nickel and cobalt, which are of lesser strategic scale.

Cuban economist Ricardo Torres summarizes it accurately: "Cuba has potential, but the country needs to be completely rebuilt. It doesn't have as significant resources as Venezuelan or Iranian oil. It's more of a promise for the future than something immediate."

Power on the Island is not concentrated in a single figure, but rather distributed among the Communist Party, the Revolutionary Armed Forces—which control approximately 60% of the economy—and historical figures like Raúl Castro, who is 94 years old.

Cuban academic Tamarys Bahamonde warns that external pressure does not fragment the regime but rather reinforces it: "External pressure encourages them to stand united."

And something very important, there are no evident signs of fragmentation within the power structure.

"Here, it will not be easy for the United States to find someone with whom they can negotiate behind the backs of Cuban society and launch a government replacement project," asserts Cuban historian Pável Alemán.

On the other hand, experts assert that the Cuban opposition lacks the level of organization and support that María Corina Machado has gained in Venezuela.

"There are no figures or programs that generate consensus," stated former Cuban diplomat Carlos Alzugaray.

The debate comes at a time of maximum pressure on Havana. After the capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, the supply of Venezuelan oil to Cuba was abruptly cut off, eliminating between 30% and 35% of Cuba's crude oil demand.

The impact on the population has been devastating: daily power outages of more than 20 hours, over 96,000 surgeries have been postponed, and nearly half a million children are attending reduced classes.

Alzugaray warns that, given the geographical proximity, any collapse of the regime would translate into a potential immediate migratory wave towards U.S. soil, something that the Trump administration cannot afford.

"It is a country that is 90 miles away, you cannot ignore it," he points out.

U.S. military authorities have already stated that "we do not want to see a massive armada arriving" through the Florida Strait.

The attempts by Cubans to enter the U.S. fell from 180,000 in 2024 to just 8,000 in 2025, but a chaotic collapse of the regime could explosively reverse that trend.

Another factor that distinguishes the Island from Venezuela and Iran is the political power of Cubans in the United States.

The Cuban diaspora constitutes 13% of the metropolitan population of Miami and has elected two senators and nine federal representatives. Marco Rubio, the Cuban-American Secretary of State, influences every decision made by the White House regarding the Island.

"The decisions of the Trump administration in any scenario must include those interests, those forces, that pressure," stated economist Ricardo Torres.

Alzugaray believes that the Cuban regime is "between a rock and a hard place and is going to have to do something," but he adds that the White House also "urgently needs to resolve something with Cuba" before the elections in November.

On the Island, Díaz-Canel chose to negotiate without relinquishing control. On March 13, he confirmed direct conversations with representatives of the Trump administration, after having denied them.

On April 20, Washington issued a two-week ultimatum to release high-profile prisoners. Díaz-Canel threatened to break off negotiations if Trump insisted on regime change: "Our internal problems are not on the table of a conversation with the United States."

The dictator continues with his militant strategy, insisting that Cuba must prepare for war, although experts point out that the country lacks the military capability of Iran and the resources of Venezuela to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

Analysts in Miami warn that no agreement is possible between the US and Cuba under the current conditions, leaving the Island caught between external pressure from Washington and the internal collapse accelerated by 67 years of communist dictatorship.

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CiberCuba Editorial Team

A team of journalists committed to reporting on Cuban current affairs and topics of global interest. At CiberCuba, we work to deliver truthful news and critical analysis.

CiberCuba Editorial Team

A team of journalists committed to reporting on Cuban current affairs and topics of global interest. At CiberCuba, we work to deliver truthful news and critical analysis.