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Recent contacts between the United States and Cuba have revived a key debate: the actual scope of negotiations that, rather than being limited to just two governments, are influenced by a third actor with significant weight.
Analysts and political actors agree that any rapprochement between Washington and Havana inevitably involves the influence of Miami and the Cuban-American community.
The agency EFE clearly summarizes it by stating that “the contacts between Washington and Havana are not a two-way dialogue, but rather a three-way one, because in any understanding it is essential to include Miami, which has its own objectives and interests.”
That reality shapes a political landscape where interests do not always align, and where the Cuban diaspora in South Florida continues to be a significant pressure factor.
A "Cuban triangle" with internal tensions
The historian Michael Bustamante, associate professor at the University of Miami, defines this scenario as a "Cuban triangle."
In his words, “there is always a tension among the three vertices”, a constant strain between the foreign policy of the United States, the decisions of the Cuban government, and the demands of the exile community.
That balance, far from being stable, shows fractures even within the American bloc itself.
Bustamante points out that, although one might assume a complete alignment between Washington and Miami, "there are some indications that this is not entirely the case."
That divergence becomes particularly apparent in the role of the current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.
Rubio: between national politics and his political base
Rubio, an emblematic figure of the Cuban exile community and at the same time the head of U.S. diplomacy, holds a particularly delicate position.
Bustamante describes him as an actor who plays "a crucial role" by acting as a bridge between Washington and Miami, but also as someone compelled to reconcile interests that do not always align.
That duality is also emphasized by Ric Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, who recalls that “Rubio is the son of Miami, but now he is the Secretary of State and must follow Trump’s orders. He shouldn't implement Miami's policy, but rather Trump's.”
Herrero insists that, although Rubio cannot entirely detach himself from his political origins, his role demands a broader perspective.
"Rubio will always keep in mind the interests of the community he comes from, but his job is to set priorities," notes Ric Herrero.
In that regard, it is noteworthy that the Secretary of State's speech has been more pragmatic than expected: “we have not seen the maximalist demands from Miami towards Cuba, but rather something much more pragmatic and strategic.”
That nuance introduces a potential fracture.
While some sectors of the exile community hold on to historic hardline positions, Washington seems to be exploring less radical alternatives, focused on gradual changes rather than a complete break from the Cuban system.
Bustamante points out precisely that point of friction.
Rubio "has shown signs of some openness to slightly more pragmatic attitudes," but "his community in South Florida does not think that way."
In fact, remember that political representatives from that community have made it clear that “an economic agreement is not enough.”
Expectations, pressure, and political risks
The expectations created by the U.S. administration itself also add pressure to the process.
According to Bustamante, officials such as the chargé d'affaires in Havana, Mike Hammer, have referred to 2026 as the "year of freedom and change."
The problem, the academic points out, is that this type of message raises expectations within the exile community: “not delivering a dramatic change to Miami in some way could leave many people disappointed.”
And it adds a key warning: "the risk of this increases over time."
In other words, any agreement that does not involve deep political transformations runs the risk of being viewed as insufficient by a significant portion of the diaspora.
Has the exile lost political weight?
Not all analysts agree on the extent of Miami's current influence.
Herrero argues that the Cuban-American community has lost its influence in recent years, partly due to its near-total alignment with the Republican Party.
Florida, it explains, has ceased to be a "swing state," which diminishes its strategic weight at the federal level.
In that context, while the leaders of the exile “certainly want to influence,” it remains to be seen “how much they can ultimately achieve.”
Herrero goes further by pointing out that the more radical sectors could find themselves in a complicated position: they are "trapped" politically because "they wouldn't have anywhere to turn politically if Trump doesn't deliver."
According to their analysis, this would force the Congress members from Miami to "dress it as a victory" any agreement reached with Havana, even if it does not fully meet their demands.
Bustamante, however, disagrees on this point and believes that the influence of Miami remains significant, especially as a blocking factor.
In his opinion, the pressure from certain groups "has the power to significantly hinder the dynamics between the other two vertices."
The red line of political change
That power of interference becomes evident when observing the stance of a significant portion of the Cuban exile community.
In Miami, the idea of an agreement without profound political changes is still widely rejected.
Members of the Cuban community in South Florida have reiterated that any rapprochement must be conditioned on real change in the island. The central demand remains the restoration of democracy and the end of the current system.
Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat, from the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance, expresses this strongly while defending that the only way to guarantee fundamental rights such as private property is through a structural political change.
In his opinion, as long as the current system remains in place, there can be no collaboration with the Cuban government.
That stance is not exclusive to a single generation.
Among the exiles, various experiences coexist, but an important consensus remains: without deep political reforms, any economic opening is insufficient. Even among the younger generation, like Waldo Toyos, there is a continued rejection of any form of assistance that could strengthen the regime.
A balance that is difficult to maintain
The scenario that emerges is, therefore, one of unstable equilibrium. Washington appears to be moving towards more pragmatic positions, Havana is facing internal and external pressures to implement changes, and Miami acts as an actor that can both influence and obstruct.
EFE itself summarizes this complexity by highlighting that, although Miami cannot be regarded as an equivalent actor to governments, its political weight "influences any potential agreement."
In that context, any negotiations between the United States and Cuba will not only have to resolve historical differences between both governments but also manage the expectations, pressures, and constraints imposed by a third key actor.
Because, in practice, the future of that relationship is not decided in two capitals, but in three. And in that triangle, Miami remains a vertex that is impossible to ignore.
In Miami, the rejection of any agreement that does not involve profound political changes is overwhelming.
The mayor of Miami-Dade, the Democrat Daniella Levine Cava, insisted that Cuba needs real change and that there can be no dialogue without transformations led by civil society and dissidents, not by the military or the Castro family.
Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart publicly recalled the three conditions of the Helms-Burton Act as non-negotiable requirements, while Ramón Saúl Sánchez from the Democracy Movement warned Trump that he will not accept any agreement if Castroism remains in power.
The producer Emilio Estefan cautiously supported a genuine change in Cuba, trusting Rubio because, in his view, he knows the pain firsthand.
Jorge Duany, emeritus professor at the University of Florida, summarized Washington's strategy: "Trump 2.0 has applied maximum pressure to hasten the fall of the Cuban government."
Trump, for his part, described Cuba as "a very weakened nation" and was emphatic: "There will be an agreement or we will do what we have to do".
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