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The official newspaper 5 de Septiembre published this Saturday an article that presents the so-called "Fidelista thought circles" as a tool of the Young Communist League (UJC) in Cienfuegos to convey the ideological legacy of dictator Fidel Castro (1926-2016) to new generations.
The text, signed by Lidanay Artiles Cárdenas, an official of the UJC Municipal in Cienfuegos and published during the "Year of the Centennial of the Commander in Chief," openly outlines the political indoctrination strategy that the regime is trying to reinforce among young people in a context marked by increasing social rejection, mass emigration, and the accelerated deterioration of living conditions in Cuba.
The publication outlines five principles that youth leaders should replicate from Castro's leadership style: "comprehensive political vision," "personal exemplarity," "contact with the masses," "collective leadership," and "training of leaders."
According to the article, the leaders of the UJC in Cienfuegos "do not see their work as an administrative routine," but rather understand "each task as a political action."
The official discourse insists on presenting the revolution as "a living process that constantly renews itself through its generations," although the text itself reveals a telling admission by acknowledging that "there is little research on the subject."
Such a situation, he admits, "limits the possibility of leveraging their experience in leadership training" and highlights "a gap in the historiography of the province, the municipality, and the Young Communist Union."
The confession is significant because it reflects a reality that is increasingly visible both inside and outside of Cuba: the gradual distancing of young people from the official political discourse and the waning influence of the regime's youth organizations.
This deterioration is supported by recent data. A 2026 survey indicates that 97.61% of Cubans aged 18 to 30 disapprove of the government's management. Even in official spaces, signs of disillusionment are beginning to emerge.
In a podcast from the official portal Cubadebate, participants acknowledged that "it is very difficult to be a revolutionary youth" and that many "do not feel part of the revolutionary process."
Emigration further complicates the situation for the UJC. In 2024 alone, 251,221 people left Cuba, with approximately 30% belonging to the age group of 15 to 34 years old, precisely the segment that the youth structures of the Communist Party are trying to attract and mobilize.
The case of Cienfuegos also reveals the contradictions of the official narrative. While the article portrays it as a "privileged stage" of Fidel's legacy, the province ranks among the five with the highest levels of food insecurity in the country, amid a national crisis further exacerbated by extreme power outages.
In that context of economic collapse and political weariness, the "Fidelista think tanks" emerge as part of a broader propaganda offensive launched by the regime this year to try to rebuild ideological loyalty among the new generations.
In April, the regime mobilized children and youth for an Anti-Imperialist Youth Parade under the slogan "Here, with Fidel." That same month, it launched the Community Youth Network, which includes "digital wasp nests" to combat "fake news" on social media.
Far from representing a genuine revitalization of the official political project, these initiatives reveal the regime's growing fear of losing definitive ideological control over a generation facing blackouts, shortages, a housing crisis, and a lack of prospects, which is increasingly finding less meaning in the old revolutionary slogans.
Gerardo Hernández, national coordinator of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, also attempted to revitalize that structure, arguing that "young people are not going to invade someone else's territory, but rather their own neighborhood."
Almost 34% of Cuban households reported experiencing hunger in 2025, an increase of 9.3 percentage points compared to the previous year. In light of this reality, the question that the article from 5 de Septiembre does not address is whether any "Fidelist think tank" can compete with hunger, blackouts, and the lack of a future that drive young Cubans towards emigration.
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