Related videos:
Doctor Ivette García González, a Cuban historian and professor, published an analysis on the website CubaxCuba last Wednesday, arguing that the regime in Havana has been able to capitalize on the escalating tensions with Washington to bolster its internal control, buy time, and create an international network of support that hinders the democratic momentum on the island.
In his article “Against the Current: Cuba-United States and Freedom”, García González argues that the Island's government is “unable to resolve the systemic crisis and the internal conflict with its citizens,” but “knows how to handle and take advantage of tension scenarios with the U.S.” to survive and provoke “a certain ebb in the democratic struggle within the country.”
The academic identifies seven specific responses from the regime between February and May 2026, largely triggered by the intensification of U.S. pressure following the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela on January 3.
In the domestic sphere, the first response was an increase in repression. The number of political prisoners reached a historic high of 1,260, with 23 new detainees in April alone, according to Prisoners Defenders, including 35 minors and 142 women. Despite this, the Cuban Conflict Observatory recorded more than 1,133 protests and critical expressions in April, evidence of sustained civic resistance, the researcher notes.
The second internal response was the "Por la Patria" signature campaign, presented as spontaneous popular support. The government claims that over six million citizens—81% of those over 16 years old—signed it, a figure that García González describes as "incredible," pointing to testimonies of manipulation and coercion by the Party's apparatus and its subordinate organizations.
The third event was the May 1st parade, which official media reported had more than five million participants and delegations from 152 organizations across 38 countries, amid prior repression against independent trade unionists and activists.
In the international arena, the regime launched four additional maneuvers: flotillas of humanitarian aid with hundreds of participants from various countries, a propaganda campaign coordinated from its embassies in over one hundred countries, and the consolidation of a "structural and adaptive" support network with Mexico, Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Turkey, according to a report from Gobierno y Análisis Político (Gapac), cited by the professor.
The fourth maneuver was the acquisition, by acclamation, of a seat on the ECOSOC NGO Committee of the UN for the period 2027-2030. García González describes the appointment as paradoxical: "They have appointed a government that only accepts state-subordinated organizations in its country to that specialized commission on Civil Society."
The academic warns that Washington's aggressive rhetoric is not yielding the expected results: "Apparently, the climate and aggressive discourse from the U.S. are not helping as believed. Neither is the silence of other important actors, such as the European Union, which is distancing itself as the conflict falls under the Monroe Doctrine."
In light of that situation, García González proposes the creation of a Cuban National Civic Movement: "It would give substance, political momentum, and moral authority to the Cuban citizenry. Besides being legitimate, it would attract the non-ideological solidarity of the world, and, in any scenario, it would be an actor that cannot be overlooked."
His conclusion serves both as a diagnosis and a statement of hope: "The Cuban dictatorship will come to an end, but for the transition to occur, for it to be real and sustainable, an intelligent combination of paths is needed; less grandstanding and with the protagonism of the Cuban democratic sectors." He concludes with a phrase that encapsulates his thesis: "Cuba is not an exception, nor are dictatorships invincible."
Filed under: