Díaz-Canel's measures: too late, too poorly, too little

This Friday, June 12, Díaz-Canel appeared before the microphones of the state press with a package of "economic reforms" that he presented as a sign that the regime is willing to change. "The country cannot continue to function the same way," he said. He is correct in his diagnosis. But what he announced is not the cure. It is, as so many times before, a painkiller administered to a patient who needs surgery.

The timing says it all. These measures are not announced during a moment of reflective calm nor as a result of a national vision. They are announced days after Marco Rubio imposed new sanctions against CUPET, the Cuban state oil company, and hours after the U.S. Secretary of Defense made statements from the Guantanamo Naval Base. It is not reform. It is reaction.

The usual pattern

The regime in Cuba has been repeating the same cycle for 65 years: acute crisis, announcement of opening, minimal controlled concession, recovery of oxygen, and then closure again. We saw it in the 90s with the so-called "special period." We saw it in 2010 with Raúl Castro's reforms, and during Obama's "opening." We saw it in 2021, when the "ordering task" was implemented partially and triggered a devastating inflation because the fundamental reforms that would have sustained it were never carried out.

Now they are loosening the reins a bit again. And they do it, as always, just enough to avoid collapsing, not to grow.

What they announced and what it means

The package has seven axes. It is worth reading them carefully because the devil is in the details that Díaz-Canel didn't provide.

1. In tourism, the regime speaks of allowing "new players" to operate the hotel sector. The underlying issue is that the major foreign chains—Meliá, Iberostar—have withdrawn completely or partially from Cuba to avoid U.S. sanctions. The State needs someone to operate those empty hotels. It is not an opening. It is a management issue disguised as reform.
2. State-owned enterprises would gain "autonomy" to export and import directly, retain part of the foreign currency generated, and partner with other actors. On paper, it sounds like decentralization. In practice, this autonomy exists only as far as the Party allows, and no decree changes that.
3. The importers, which are state-run companies that mandatorily mediate all foreign trade, would be eliminated. This is an implicit recognition that these structures are a burden. However, removing them without establishing a clear legal framework for private trade merely shifts the bottleneck.
4. Farmers were promised direct access to inputs, accounts backed by real cash, and participation in the foreign exchange market. Cuba imports about 80% of the food it consumes despite being a fertile island. If this were genuinely implemented, it would be urgent and necessary. However, the land market remains closed: without stable property rights or long-term leases, no one invests in agriculture.
5. In the real estate sector, Díaz-Canel spoke of "new modalities" and "new actors" without providing any details. It is the most hollow announcement of the package.
6. Cuban residents abroad are offered "the same conditions" as those living on the island to invest. The problem, as we will see, is that those conditions do not yet exist in legal form.
7. Finally, the ministries will be reduced from 27 to 20. This is the most concrete measure of the day, and also the most irrelevant for the average citizen.

What is not said

The most revealing aspect of Díaz-Canel's statements is not what he announced, but rather what he omitted.

1. No measure touches the monopoly that the military conglomerate GAESA has over foreign currency, tourism, imports, and distribution. Any "new player" entering the Cuban market will hit that wall. There is no real competition when the referee of the game is also the player with the most chips.
2. There is no unified and stable exchange rate that allows any company to make real calculations. There is no access to private credit. There is no reliable property registry. Under these conditions, no serious investor will enter. And Cubans who start businesses do so knowing that what the State gives them today can be taken away tomorrow, by decree, without compensation or legal recourse.
3. There is no stable or predictable regulatory framework. There are no reliable economic statistics that allow anyone—inside or outside the island—to understand the actual state of the country.
4. There is not a single word about legal security. There has been no announcement of binding international arbitration, nor an independent tribunal for disputes between investors and the State, nor a compensation mechanism in case of expropriation or unilateral cancellation of contracts. Cuba has a long history in all these areas, and nothing in today's package addresses them. Any liberalization decree that does not resolve this is literally "up in the air," subject to the political will of the moment.
5. The regime has not lifted the de facto financial freeze affecting foreign company accounts, nor has it presented a timeline for normalizing the repatriation of dividends. There is no transparent exchange system: with multiple rates coexisting amidst high inflation, no one can calculate at what exchange rate they will convert their earnings or whether they will be able to withdraw them from the country.
6. The case of the emigrated investor illustrates well this gap between rhetoric and reality. Díaz-Canel announced that Cubans abroad will have "the same conditions" as residents on the island for investment. However, the regulatory changes that would make this possible — including migratory modifications associated with a hypothetical category of "resident investor" — have not appeared in the Official Gazette. Without publication in the Gazette, there is no legal validity. It is an announcement without legal backing, and no one has explained what would happen to the assets of an emigrant who comes into political conflict with the regime or loses their migratory status.

The underlying problem

The Cuban economy is not broken by accident nor solely due to the U.S. embargo. It is broken by design: it is the predictable result of six decades of a system that prioritizes political control over wealth creation. Truly reforming that is not about adjusting some regulations. It is about dismantling the architecture of power.

Díaz-Canel and the Communist Party do not want to do that, do they? Not because they cannot envision it, but because doing so would mean relinquishing control over which their entire hegemony rests. That’s why every reform comes with a safety valve: the State gives, and the State can take away. Always.

For Cubans who have been without stable electricity for years, without medicine, without hope, these measures come too late and are far too little. As always.