"Cuba is poor because it is not free." With this statement, Roberto González, an executive at Human Rights Foundation (HRF), challenged the narrative of the Cuban regime that blames the U.S. embargo as the primary cause of the Island's economic crisis, just days before a new vote on sanctions at the United Nations.
In an opinion column published this Wednesday in Miami Herald, González, director of political advocacy at HRF and adjunct professor of law at Fordham University, stated that the economic decline in Cuba fundamentally stems from a political system that concentrates power, restricts freedoms, and lacks democratic mechanisms to correct its mistakes.
The analysis emerges one week before the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) is set to speak again on the resolution presented annually by Havana against the United States embargo, with the vote scheduled for October 28, 2026.
González recalled that in 2025 the resolution received 165 favorable votes, seven against, and 12 abstentions, a majority support that the Cuban government routinely presents as an international condemnation of U.S. policy.
For the specialist, that vote has become a political tool through which the Cuban authorities blame Washington for issues that, in their view, have much deeper roots in the country's economic and political structure.
The author recalled that Chancellor Bruno Rodríguez stated in September that, according to official estimates from Havana, the U.S. sanctions caused losses of approximately 8 billion dollars during the year ending in February.
However, González questioned whether that estimate could alone explain the impoverishment that has accumulated over decades.
"Cuba is poor because it is not free," he wrote, echoing a formulation by the late Ghanaian economist George Ayittey, who had used a similar argument to analyze the economic and political issues in Africa.
The HRF executive described Cuba as a one-party authoritarian state, where the Communist Party controls the main institutions, the economy, and a significant portion of public life.
As an example, he pointed out that the private sector accounted for approximately 9% of Cuba's production, according to a 2023 report, compared to a share of around 60% in economies like China and Vietnam.
He argued that this difference highlights the restrictions that the Cuban system imposes on private initiative and its reliance on decisions made from the central authority.
González acknowledged, however, that the U.S. embargo does impose real economic restrictions, including limitations on financing agricultural purchases and the prohibition of ordinary tourism from the United States.
He also mentioned the measures adopted by Washington in 2026 against fuel supply to Cuba and the sanctions aimed at certain foreign companies linked to the energy and financial sectors of the Island.
But he rejected that these restrictions constitute the absolute economic blockade described by the official Cuban propaganda.
To support his argument, he stated that U.S. merchandise exports to Cuba exceeded $876 million until August 2026, an amount he used to illustrate the ongoing trade exchanges between both countries despite the embargo.
The expert also cited a study published in September in the academic journal Journal of Development Economics, titled The forsaken road: Reassessing living standards following the Cuban Revolution and the American embargo.
The study analyzes the economic evolution of Cuba after 1959 through revised estimates of gross domestic product and methods of comparison with similar economies.
The authors conclude that the U.S. embargo explains only a limited part of the Cuban economic deterioration and attribute a significantly greater weight to the transformation of the economic system after the Revolution.
González summarized the finding by stating that the embargo harmed Cuba, but it played a secondary role in its prolonged decline.
Another central argument of her column relates to the lack of political mechanisms to hold accountable those responsible for economic decisions.
The specialist recalled that the 2019 Cuban Constitution recognizes the Communist Party as the highest leading political force in society and the State, which prevents the alternation of power through competitive multiparty elections.
According to González, this structure allows failed economic decisions to persist for years without citizens being able to democratically replace those who implemented them.
As a historical background, he mentioned the failed sugar harvest of 10 million tons in 1970, initiated by Fidel Castro through a massive mobilization of resources and labor, without achieving the announced goal.
The author contrasted that failure with Castro's decades-long grip on power and noted that, in a democratic system, a decision of such magnitude could have had political consequences for those responsible.
The column also questions the investment priorities of the Cuban regime amidst the decline of national food production.
González cited statistics from 2024 indicating that 37.4% of state investment went to the tourism and real estate sectors, while only 2.7% was directed towards agriculture, despite the supply challenges faced by the population.
For the expert, these priorities indicate that the government continues to allocate a considerable portion of its resources to building hotel facilities, even as the tourism sector faces occupancy challenges and the country relies on imports to meet its food needs.
One of the most significant points relates to the Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), the conglomerate controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces that manages important businesses linked to tourism, commerce, and other economic sectors.
The executive of Human Rights Foundation referred to internal documents released by the Miami Herald that attributed liquid assets of up to 18 billion dollars to GAESA.
González believed that, if such resources were available, they could help finance the purchase of medications and the repair of the electrical system, two of the most pressing needs of the Cuban population.
However, that figure remains a subject of controversy due to the lack of public financial statements and independent audits of the military conglomerate, so it cannot be regarded as a fully verified amount of money available for immediate use.
The specialist also recalled that in 2024, the then-controller general of Cuba, Gladys Bejerano, acknowledged the limitations of her agency in auditing companies linked to the military business system, and subsequently left her position.
For González, the case illustrates the lack of transparency and oversight of one of the most influential economic groups in Cuba.
The column also addresses the political consequences of the Cuban system, including the imprisonment of dissidents and the exodus of citizens seeking better living conditions outside the Island.
The author cited records from the organization Prisoners Defenders, which reported 1,339 political prisoners by the end of August 2026, and mentioned official statistics indicating that the Cuban population is said to have decreased by 16% since 2017.
His critique culminated in a comparison between the international votes against the embargo and the internal political restrictions in Cuba.
"The embargo is voted on every year. Cuba's communist system has never faced a free one," González wrote as he concluded his analysis.
The debate over the embargo has gained special intensity in the days leading up to the United Nations vote.
On October 14, an international coalition of Cuban democratic organizations urged the UN member countries to vote against the regime's resolution or abstain, through a call supported by over 1,000 endorsements from activists and organizations inside and outside the Island.
Among the promoters of this initiative were the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU). Its leader, José Daniel Ferrer, argued that the resolution blames the United States for problems that he attributes to the Cuban government.
That same day, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez accused Secretary of State Marco Rubio of pressuring foreign governments to change their stance ahead of the annual vote on the embargo.
González's criticisms of the regime's economic priorities also align with analyses previously published by Cuban economists.
In May, Pedro Monreal questioned the high volume of tourism investments while agricultural production continued to deteriorate, using official statistics from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI).
The economist noted that in 2024, investments related to tourism reached 36,843.8 million Cuban pesos, compared to 2,645.5 million allocated to agriculture, a difference he deemed incompatible with the food shortages facing the country.
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