"Cuba is poor because it is not free." With this statement, Roberto González, an executive at the Human Rights Foundation (HRF), challenged the narrative of the Cuban regime that blames the U.S. embargo as the main cause of the economic crisis on the Island, just days before a new vote on sanctions at the United Nations.
In an op-ed published this Wednesday in Miami Herald, González, director of political advocacy at HRF and adjunct professor of law at Fordham University, stated that the economic decline in Cuba is fundamentally a result of a political system that concentrates power, restricts freedoms, and lacks democratic mechanisms to correct its mistakes.
The analysis emerges a week before the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) is set to address the resolution submitted annually by Havana against the United States embargo, with voting scheduled for October 28, 2026.
González recalled that in 2025 the resolution received 165 favorable votes, seven against and 12 abstentions, a majority support that the Cuban government typically presents as an international condemnation of U.S. policy.
For the specialist, that vote has become a political tool through which Cuban authorities hold Washington accountable for issues that, in their view, have much deeper roots in the country's economic and political structure.
The author recalled that Chancellor Bruno Rodríguez stated in September that, according to official calculations from Havana, the U.S. sanctions caused losses of approximately 8 billion dollars during the year ending in February.
However, González questioned whether that estimate alone can explain the poverty accumulated over decades.
"Cuba is poor because it is not free," he wrote, referencing a formulation by the late Ghanaian economist George Ayittey, who had employed a similar argument to analyze the economic and political issues in Africa.
The HRF executive described Cuba as a single-party authoritarian state, where the Communist Party controls the main institutions, the economy, and much of public life.
As an example, he pointed out that the private sector accounted for approximately 9% of Cuban production, according to a 2023 report, compared to a share of nearly 60% in economies like China and Vietnam.
This difference, he argued, highlights the restrictions that the Cuban system imposes on private initiative and its dependence on decisions made by the central authority.
González acknowledged, however, that the U.S. embargo does impose real economic restrictions, including limitations on financing for agricultural purchases and the prohibition of ordinary tourism from the United States.
He also mentioned the measures adopted by Washington in 2026 against the supply of fuel to Cuba and the sanctions aimed at certain foreign companies associated with the energy and financial sectors of the Island.
But he rejected that these restrictions constitute the absolute economic blockade described by Cuban official propaganda.
To support his argument, he stated that U.S. merchandise exports to Cuba exceeded 876 million dollars by August 2026, a figure he used to illustrate the continuity of trade exchanges between both countries despite the embargo.
The expert also cited a study published in September in the academic journal Journal of Development Economics, titled The forsaken road: Reassessing living standards following the Cuban Revolution and the American embargo.
The study analyzes the economic evolution of Cuba after 1959 through revised estimates of gross domestic product and comparative methods with similar economies.
Its authors conclude that the U.S. embargo accounts for only a limited part of the Cuban economic deterioration and attribute a significantly greater weight to the transformation of the economic system after the Revolution.
González summarized the finding by stating that the embargo harmed Cuba, but it played a secondary role in its prolonged decline.
Another central argument of his column is related to the lack of political mechanisms to hold accountable those responsible for economic decisions.
The specialist recalled that the Cuban Constitution of 2019 recognizes the Communist Party as the highest leading political force in society and the State, which prevents the alternation of power through competitive multiparty elections.
According to González, this structure allows failed economic decisions to persist for years without citizens being able to democratically replace those who implement them.
As a historical background, he mentioned the failed harvest of 10 million tons of sugar in 1970, driven by Fidel Castro through a massive mobilization of resources and workers, which did not reach the announced target.
The author contrasted that failure with Castro's decades-long hold on power and noted that, in a democratic system, a decision of such magnitude could have had political consequences for those responsible.
The column also questions the investment priorities of the Cuban regime amid the deterioration of national food production.
González cited statistics from 2024 indicating that 37.4% of state investment was allocated to the tourism and real estate sector, while only 2.7% was directed towards agriculture, despite the supply challenges faced by the population.
For the expert, these priorities indicate that the government continues to allocate a significant portion of its resources to building hotel facilities, even as the tourism sector faces occupancy issues and the country relies on imports to meet its food needs.
One of the most emphatic points is related to the Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), the conglomerate controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces that manages significant businesses linked to tourism, trade, and other economic sectors.
The executive of Human Rights Foundation referred to internal documents disclosed by the Miami Herald that attributed liquid assets of up to 18 billion dollars to GAESA.
González suggested that, if resources of such magnitude were available, they could help finance the purchase of medications and the repair of the electrical system, two of the most urgent needs of the Cuban population.
However, that figure remains a subject of controversy due to the lack of public financial statements and independent audits of the military conglomerate, which means it cannot be considered a fully verified amount of money available for immediate use.
The specialist also recalled that in 2024 the then Comptroller General of Cuba, Gladys Bejerano, acknowledged the limitations of her agency in auditing companies linked to the military business system and subsequently left her position.
For González, the case illustrates the lack of transparency and oversight of one of the most influential economic groups in Cuba.
The column also addresses the political consequences of the Cuban system, including the imprisonment of dissidents and the exodus of citizens seeking better living conditions outside the Island.
The author cited records from the organization Prisoners Defenders, which reported 1,339 political prisoners as of the end of August 2026, and mentioned official statistics indicating that the Cuban population has decreased by 16% since 2017.
His critique culminated in a comparison between international votes against the embargo and the internal political restrictions in Cuba.
"The embargo gets voted on every year. Cuba's communist system has never faced a free election," González wrote to conclude his analysis.
The debate over the embargo has gained special intensity in the days leading up to the United Nations vote.
On October 14, an international coalition of democratic Cuban organizations urged the UN member states to vote against the regime's resolution or abstain, through a call supported by over 1,000 endorsements from activists and organizations both on and off the Island.
Among the promoters of this initiative were the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU). Its leader, José Daniel Ferrer, argued that the resolution holds the United States responsible for issues that he attributes to the Cuban government.
That same day, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez accused Secretary of State Marco Rubio of pressuring foreign governments to change their stance on the annual vote regarding the embargo.
González's criticisms of the regime's economic priorities also align with analyses previously published by Cuban economists.
In May, Pedro Monreal questioned the high volume of tourist investments while agricultural production continued to decline, using official statistics from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI).
The economist noted that in 2024, investments related to tourism reached 36,843.8 million Cuban pesos, compared to 2,645.5 million allocated to agriculture, a disparity he deemed incompatible with the food scarcity the country is facing.
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