The regime's manipulation of ETECSA: Smoke screens to obscure strategic decisions

The tariff hike by ETECSA is not a consequence of an alleged "fraud from abroad"; rather, it is the result of a deliberate strategy to capture foreign currency, restrict rights, and redesign the Cuban economic model with corrupt practices, lacking popular participation and transparency.

Reference image created with Artificial IntelligencePhoto © CiberCuba / Sora

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The recent "rate hike" by ETECSA has sparked a wave of outrage among Cubans both on the island and abroad. The regime justified the measure by claiming alleged "frauds from abroad" that have caused a 60% loss in the revenues of the state-owned company.

But the lack of public investigations, the opacity in the processes, and the coincidence with a series of previous strategic decisions suggest that what happened is merely another episode in the state capture of foreign currency, accompanied by a silent reconfiguration of the economic model, possibly under Russian guidance and with aims of privatization.

The rate hike and the narrative of fraud

Since May 30, ETECSA has limited national top-ups to only 360 Cuban pesos per month, forcing users to purchase packages in dollars to access basic connectivity services.

The executive president of the company, Tania Velázquez Rodríguez, appeared "urgently" on national television on June 1 to justify the measure, stating that “more than 60% of the income from abroad” has been lost due to fraud in international recharges.

According to Velázquez, these frauds operate through unofficial platforms that sell recharges in hard currency and activate them in Cuban pesos within the island, keeping the money outside the country. This phenomenon, he stated, has eroded ETECSA's revenues and worsened its already critical operational situation.

A narrative built in advance

The idea of fraud did not arise after the rate hike. Already in May 2024, ETECSA had begun to publicly denounce the existence of these schemes, warning about their impact on the company's revenue.

A year later, the figure had inflated to 60%, clearly indicating an attempt to prepare the political and media landscape for new measures. This progression suggests that the regime acted with calculation rather than reactively.

Socialist enterprise or power apparatus?

While the government insists that ETECSA is "a socialist state enterprise, of the people and for the people", the reality contradicts that statement.

Decisions regarding rates, access, and the company's structure are made behind the backs of citizens, without public consultations or accountability.

In 2019, the first vice president of the state-owned company, Reinaldo Rodríguez, stated that “ETECSA belongs to the people,” but today that same company marginalizes those who do not have access to dollars or remittances and focuses its commercial strategy on attracting foreign currency.

What if it wasn't fraud, but instead a scheme of corruption?

The argument of "mass fraud" is difficult to sustain. No company in the world would allow 60% of its income to be stolen without initiating investigations, filing complaints, or punishing those responsible.

The lack of legal actions by ETECSA or the regime reveals another possibility: that these alleged frauds could merely be a parallel marketing scheme, tolerated or even facilitated by the company itself, to attract undeclared foreign currency.

Several private and opaque platforms offered data packages in dollars and euros through unofficial channels. ETECSA converted these into Cuban pesos, maintaining an accounting system that was never transparently audited.

The narrative of fraud may be concealing a corrupt mechanism for foreign currency extraction that would benefit third parties close to those in power.

Guaranteed monopoly until 2036: A path to privatization?

Days before the rate hike, the Cuban government extended ETECSA's monopoly until the year 2036, with the possibility of an extension for another three decades.

This decision, far from strengthening the "socialist" nature of the company, consolidates a legal framework that would facilitate its future privatization under conditions of monopoly or limited competition.

It's not just about maintaining control, but also about legally securing a strategic asset for a future opaque transfer of its ownership or management. This pattern dangerously recalls the privatization process experienced in Russia during the 1990s, under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin.

At that time, the transfer of state-owned enterprises to oligarchs close to the government, through corrupt schemes such as "loans for shares," consolidated an economic-political elite that remains a pillar of the regime of Vladimir Putin.

Russian privatizations were carried out at laughable prices, without transparency or citizen participation, transforming key sectors—energy, telecommunications, transportation—into private fiefdoms.

If Cuba continues down that path, ETECSA could become the laboratory for establishing a form of state capitalism controlled by the elite of the Communist Party, under the guise of "reforms."

The extension of the monopoly would not be an end in itself, but rather a prerequisite to ensure that any eventual privatization happens without competition, without oversight, and with benefits concentrated within the circle of power.

The Russian advisory in this process, as evidenced by the agreements with Boris Titov and the Joint Center for Economic Transformation, lends more weight to this hypothesis.

Moscow as an advisor to the new Cuban economic model

For at least the past two years, Russian experts have been advising the Cuban regime on its economic transformation.

The Kremlin commissioner, Boris Titov, has defended the need to abandon the socialist model and move towards market reforms. Under his leadership, a Joint Economic Transformation Center was established in Havana, focused on converting state-owned enterprises into commercial companies.

Meanwhile, Cuba has offered land on usufruct to Russia for 30 years, consolidating an asymmetric relationship that includes technical and economic assistance.

This geopolitical framework reinforces the hypothesis that ETECSA's rate hike is not an isolated measure, but part of a broader experiment: dollarizing public services, restricting basic rights such as connectivity, and laying the groundwork for transferring state assets to regime-loyal elites under a business facade.

Emotional blackmail in emigration

ETECSA knows that a significant portion of its revenues comes from international top-ups paid by the Cuban diaspora.

By limiting access to the internet in Cuban pesos, the regime forces those living abroad to financially support their relatives on the island, under the threat of disconnection. It is emotional blackmail disguised as an economic model.

In a context of growing social tension, blackouts, inflation, and latent protests, controlling digital connectivity also becomes a tool of political deterrence.

The summer of 2025 will be a test to measure the ability of citizens to resist and organize against a State that uses its "people's" companies against the people themselves.

Conclusion: A covert strategy of capture and control

The ETECSA rate hike is not the result of fraud; it is the outcome of a deliberate strategy to capture foreign currency, restrict rights, and redesign the Cuban economic model without transparency.

In the name of the people, the regime acts against the will of the people. And while it peddles the narrative of economic siege, it reconfigures the country to consolidate a state capitalism overseen by the power elites and Moscow.

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Iván León

Degree in Journalism. Master's in Diplomacy and International Relations from the Diplomatic School of Madrid. Master's in International Relations and European Integration from the UAB.