Vicente de la O Levy: The person responsible for the energy collapse in Cuba

While the government repeats its mantra of "creative resistance," the population lives in gloom, trapped between material decay and misinformation. The blackout has become permanent not only in households but also in the public sphere.

Vicente de la O Levy and Miguel Díaz-CanelPhoto © Video capture Facebook / Canal Caribe - Facebook / Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez

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Since Vicente de la O Levy was appointed Minister of Energy and Mines on October 17, 2022, Cuba has not experienced a single year of electrical stability.

His designation was presented as a technical bet within the discourse of "continuity" by the ruler Miguel Díaz-Canel, in an attempt to demonstrate that the country was facing the crisis with competent personnel.

Three years later, reality proves the opposite: the National Electric System (SEN) has experienced the worst period of collapses and blackouts since the so-called “Special Period.” During its management, the SEN has suffered five nationwide blackouts, deficits that have exceeded 1,700 megawatts, and simultaneous failures in the country’s main thermoelectric plants.

The minister has attributed the disaster to a lack of fuel, overdue maintenance, and "financial limitations," but the outcome is the same: an obsolete, broken, and unresponsive network. What was once a declining system is now a collapsed energy model.

From structural blackout to the discourse of the "bearable"

De la O Levy's statements reflect the gap between power and the daily reality of Cubans.

In May 2024, he asserted on television that “the blackouts are now more bearable,” a statement that sparked public outrage because it coincided with one of the most critical weeks of the year: blackouts lasting up to 20 hours a day in areas of the east and center of the country. It was not a metaphor, but rather an expression of the normalization of suffering under a narrative that presents endurance as a virtue.

In the following months, his tone became predictable: partial acknowledgments, promises of recovery, and new failures. In September 2024, he declared that the system was "weak, but not in danger of collapsing."

A month later, the SEN completely collapsed, leaving the entire island without electricity. And in September 2025, it justified itself again: “Without the solar parks, we would be worse off.”

Each of De la O Levy's phrases illustrates a management pattern focused on minimizing disaster and transforming precariousness into political discourse, typical of Castroism and its "continuity." Instead of assuming responsibility, the minister asks for patience and understanding, while the entire country endures the rhythm of scheduled blackouts.

The language of technical demagoguery

Few figures in the current Cuban cabinet master the empty technocratic language as effortlessly. In September 2024, during the International Renewable Energy Fair, De la O Levy made a statement that has already become famous:

"Producing 30% of energy from renewable sources is no easy feat. It involves millions of photovoltaic solar panels; hundreds of millions of screws, nuts, washers, and steel structures… it requires thousands and thousands of piles to be driven in."

Instead of explaining a concrete plan, the minister continually hides behind the rhetoric of volume and complexity, as if an abundance of figures could justify inaction.

The "tubes," the "nuts," and the "piles" have become involuntary metaphors for a bureaucratic system that confuses quantity with efficiency. Meanwhile, the thermoelectric plants are falling apart, and the people listen in disbelief to an explanation more suited to a play than to a ministerial report.

The Mirage of Renewable Energies

De la O Levy has attempted to position himself as the promoter of an "energy transition," but the contribution of renewable sources does not exceed 10% of national generation, and most solar parks operate without storage batteries.

Each inaugurated project is presented as a historic success, even though its real impact is insignificant compared to a structural deficit of thousands of megawatts.

In his vision, Cuba's energy future is always five to ten years away. In 2024, he promised that by 2030 the country would produce 30% of its energy from clean sources. However, those goals lack financial and technological backing and clash with the reality of a state that cannot even guarantee the supply of diesel to its distributed generators.

The so-called "energy transition" is nothing more than a narrative designed to buy time and appease social discontent.

Figures that define the disaster

The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) itself has acknowledged that thermal generation is in a state of permanent crisis.

The Guiteras, Renté, Felton, and Nuevitas power plants operate well below their nominal capacity; maintenance is conducted with recycled materials, and the technical staff works without basic resources. The Cuban oil they consume has a high sulfur content, and its low quality necessitates frequent shutdowns for cleaning and maintenance.

In 2025, blackouts spread across the country again, and the national electric system recorded its fifth national collapse in less than twelve months. Recently, the minister acknowledged that "there isn't enough fuel to last the whole month" and that many units remain idle due to "a lack of parts."

The paradox is evident: while oil is being exported and resources are allocated to propaganda projects, the country cannot keep even half of its electrical grid operational. The National Electricity System no longer functions on engineering but rather on inertia.

Ramiro Valdés: The Electric Shock That Does Not Illuminate

Amid this scenario, the regime decided to turn to an emblematic figure: Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, a historic commander, former Minister of the Interior, and one of those responsible for the country's harshest political repression.

His appointment as supervisor of the electrical sector was presented as an attempt to "ensure discipline and efficiency," but in reality, it revealed the civil government's inability to resolve a technical crisis and the need to resort to fear and coercion to achieve results.

Ramiro Valdés is neither an engineer nor an energy specialist. His presence corresponds to a different logic: that of control. His reputation as a stern man, his track record as head of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), and his role in digital censorship make him a figure of formidable authority within the regime, but irrelevant for rescuing a collapsed electrical system.

Their incorporation into the sector was a political signal: when technique and management fail, power resorts to coercion. Instead of repairing facilities and modernizing infrastructure, the crisis is militarized. What should be an energy policy turns into an exercise in obedience.

Social Impact: Living in the Dark

The blackout, more than just a technical event, has become a daily experience. The lack of electricity impacts health, education, and food security.

Hospitals that suspend operations, schools that interrupt classes, neighborhoods where water pumps don’t work for days. Lines form at the few places where there is electricity, and empty refrigerators have become a symbol of domestic collapse.

CiberCuba has documented spontaneous protests in nearly all the provinces of the country. Residents shout "We want electricity!" and take part in pot-banging protests while local authorities send patrols to quell the discontent. Each prolonged blackout not only extinguishes a light bulb: it ignites the awareness of state failure.

The model of impunity

Vicente de la O Levy has neither been dismissed nor sanctioned. His continued leadership at MINEM is a political decision by Miguel Díaz-Canel, who values loyalty over effectiveness. The minister is the technical face of a policy that seeks control rather than results. In Cuba, positions are held due to obedience, not performance.

The problem, therefore, goes beyond the official. The root of the energy collapse lies in a centralized model that stifles any entrepreneurial initiative and reduces management to an act of propaganda.

There are no independent audits or transparency in the figures. Every time the system crashes, the government promises a "fresh start," but without altering anything fundamental.

Conclusion: Darkness as a State Policy

The Cuban energy collapse is not an inevitability nor an exclusive consequence of external factors. It is the direct result of years of neglect, underinvestment, and the political exploitation of public resources.

Vicente de la O Levy, with his discourse of tubes, screws, and supportability, embodies the continuity of a failure that Díaz-Canel manages with resignation and propaganda.

While the government repeats its mantra of "creative resistance," the population lives in gloom, caught between material deterioration and misinformation. The blackout has become permanent not only in households but also in the public sphere.

And although promises or slogans may change, darkness remains the truest metaphor for power in Cuba.

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Iván León

Degree in Journalism. Master's in Diplomacy and International Relations from the Diplomatic School of Madrid. Master's in International Relations and European Integration from the UAB.