The Cuban regime acknowledged that the country is facing a new fuel crisis, just two years after promising an "energy recovery" following the collapse of 2023.
The Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, admitted this Friday on state television that "the fuel will not last for the entire month of October" and that Cuba only has reserves “for a few days”.
The statement comes amid massive blackouts, partial and total collapses of the National Electric System (SEN), partial shutdown of transportation, and a visible deterioration in the national economy.
According to the minister, the SEN remains "very weak" after the simultaneous shutdown of three thermal plants that resulted in the loss of 270 megawatts. Additionally, there are breakdowns at Renté, Felton, and Nuevitas, along with a shortage of diesel fuel for distributed generation engines, which keeps over 600 MW offline.
“We found a small amount of fuel, but it's not enough for the entire month. It is being distributed among Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago de Cuba”, said De la O Levy, while reiterating that the government is working “together” with the Electric Union (UNE) and Cuba-Petroleum (CUPET) to mitigate the shortage.
History repeats itself: The crisis of 2023
The minister's words echo the discourse of 2023, when the government acknowledged a “state of emergency” due to the lack of fuel.
In September of that year, De la O Levy acknowledged that the country was “zero fuel” and that the reserves had been almost entirely depleted, impacting both electricity generation and transportation.
What a coincidence!: there always seems to be one of those timely crises following the always unsuccessful attempts to "reduce blackouts" in the summer.
During the first months of 2023, Cuba experienced one of the worst energy crises in recent decades: long lines at gas stations, public transportation halted, and power outages lasting up to 20 hours.
The minister himself and other high-ranking officials of the regime then warned that the country was facing a "critical scenario" due to a lack of funding to import hydrocarbons.
In April and May of 2023, authorities acknowledged that the supply relied on "irregular arrivals" of fuel and that there were no strategic reserves. "We are not clear on how we will get out of this", admitted the leader Miguel Díaz-Canel in mid-April of that year.
In September, the regime ordered "energy-saving measures" in state organizations and admitted that the fuel allocated for electricity generation "was not enough to meet national demand."
"Economic restructuring": A solution that deepened the crisis
The 2023 crisis provided the regime with a justification for implementing new measures within the “economic ordering,” presented as structural solutions but which, in reality, deepened inequality and exacerbated the underlying problem.
In December 2023, Díaz-Canel announced a fuel price reform, increasing the cost of gasoline and diesel fivefold, and transitioning its sale to freely convertible currency (MLC). "When we raise fuel prices, prices will go up", the leader comfortably warned from the Palace.
"Fuel cannot be sold subsidized", stated the then Minister of Economy and Planning, the ousted and now absent Alejadro Gil Fernández.
According to the government, the goal was to "ensure the sustainability of supply", but the measure had an immediate effect: it restricted access to energy only to those with foreign currency, excluding the majority of Cubans, whose incomes are in pesos with no purchasing power.
Instead of stabilizing the market, the change generated an energy duality: stations in MLC with unaffordable prices and gas stations in pesos almost always empty. State and private transporters were unable to obtain fuel, which halted routes, reduced mobility, and increased the cost of distributing food and essential goods.
The alleged "modernization of the energy system" was, in fact, a strategy to collect foreign currency in a country without liquidity, sacrificing citizens' access to an essential service.
Since then, rather than improving, the fuel and electricity crises have become more frequent and severe, with daily blackouts lasting 20 hours, industrial shutdowns, and increasing protests.
Propaganda and disinformation: The narrative of the “blockade”
Whenever the crisis intensifies, the official discourse turns to political propaganda. Since 2023, both Minister De la O Levy and Díaz-Canel have insisted on blaming the "U.S. blockade" and the "external financial limitations."
"If the blockade is lifted, there are plenty of solutions here", stated in December 2023 the ruler appointed by Raúl Castro to "lead" the so-called "continuity" of the regime.
However, government reports themselves reveal that the scarcity is also due to poor internal management, a lack of investment in refining and transportation, and the state's inability to diversify import sources.
While officials promise transparency, the population lives in both literal and figurative darkness. Announcements of “planned rolling blackouts” are rarely fulfilled, and official information is provided late or lacks verifiable data.
In September 2023, the minister promised that the country "would not experience prolonged blackouts again", a statement contradicted by reality just weeks later. In 2024, he reiterated the “gradual recovery” speech, and now openly acknowledges that the country is once again running out of fuel.
Since the blame lies with the "blockade," no one takes responsibility for such a resounding economic failure, which causes so much suffering among the population.
October 2025: Between Exhaustion and Distrust
The recent statements from the minister confirm what the population has been perceiving for months: Cuba is trapped in a cycle of crisis with no visible way out.
The regime announces an "energy recovery plan" every year, yet the underlying issues —lack of investment, indebtedness, technological obsolescence, and dependence on imports— remain unchanged.
The fuel shortage, now once again acknowledged, not only affects electricity generation and transportation but also directly impacts household economies: reduced food transport, factory closures, shortages of liquefied gas, and an increase in social discontent.
Protests and pot-banging have been reported in neighborhoods of Havana, Holguín, and Santiago during the longest blackouts, reflecting the public's frustration with a State that promises solutions but only delivers excuses.
The measures of economic regulation did not solve the fuel problem; they turned it into a mechanism of exclusion and control.
Two years later, the country continues to rely on small shipments of imported hydrocarbons and “resisting with creativity” against empty official promises that are repeated cyclically, while the electrical system collapses and the economy contracts.
The government has turned every crisis into a propaganda tool, but the reality can no longer be upheld by speeches. Neither the prices in foreign currency, nor the new rotation schemes, nor appeals to the "blockade" have prevented Cuba from entering, once again, into another critical cycle of blackouts, scarcity, and widespread distrust.
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