The new U.S. Security Strategy: What scenarios does it propose for the Cuban regime?



The U.S. NSS 2025 prioritizes a hemispheric vision and American interests in the Western Hemisphere, complicating the situation for the Cuban regime. With an "America First" approach, the document aims to limit the influence of powers like China and Russia in the region.

Guantanamo Naval Base Fence (reference image)Photo © micubaporsiempre.wordpress.com

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The administration of Donald J. Trump has just released the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), a document that redefines the global priorities of the United States and, for the first time in decades, places the Western Hemisphere at the center of U.S. foreign and defense policy.

The text, presented by the White House in early December, marks a drastic shift from the globalist approaches of recent years and opens a new power dynamic with direct implications for Latin America — and especially for the Cuban regime.

"America First," hemispheric version

The new strategy is based on a simple and compelling idea: the United States must prioritize its own national interests and internal security over any international commitments.

In their own words: “Our goal is to protect the fundamental national interests of the United States. That is the sole focus of this strategy.”

The NSS 2025 describes this shift as a “welcome correction” after decades of “strategic errors” made by the U.S. political elites, who—according to the document—focused on distant wars and idealistic projects while neglecting their own hemisphere.

The document essentially revives an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine, which some analysts have referred to as the “Trump Corollary”: to prevent foreign powers —namely China, Russia, or Iran— from expanding their influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

A return to the "backyard"

The message is unmistakable: Washington is looking south once again. The NSS 2025 views the presence of extra-hemispheric powers in Latin America as a direct threat to U.S. national security, especially when these actors maintain ties with authoritarian or anti-American regimes.

This has obvious consequences for Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, the three regimes most closely tied to Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.

For the Island, which has survived for decades thanks to its strategic alliances with Russia and China, the new U.S. security doctrine is emerging as an increasing pressure that manifests itself on several interconnected fronts.

In the diplomatic and sanctions arena, Washington could toughen its stance towards Havana, reactivating mechanisms of financial, commercial, and political isolation that would return the regime to the international solitude of the nineties.

That pressure would not be only economic but also symbolic: a warning that the times of indulgence and lukewarm dialogue are behind us.

In the informational and influence domain, the strategy introduces a significant novelty by discussing "countering foreign propaganda operations and their echoes in the region."

This formulation paves the way for a communicational and technological offensive in the Caribbean, aimed at limiting the narrative of Castroism and its allies, and neutralizing the disinformation machinery that Moscow and Beijing have deployed from Havana to Latin America.

Lastly, the economic and logistical front directly targets the heart of the regime's international alliances. The new strategy prioritizes preventing foreign powers from controlling “strategic assets of the hemisphere”, a category that encompasses everything from ports and energy facilities to technological networks.

In this context, Chinese cooperation in port infrastructure, submarine cables, or biotechnology projects in Cuba could be subject to review, or even sanctions. The warning is clear: Washington will not allow the Island to continue acting as an extension of Beijing and Moscow's interests in the Caribbean.

In simple terms: the United States wants to expel global rivals from the American continent, and Cuba is a central piece on that board.

Russia and China: Adversaries, not total enemies

Unlike previous strategies —such as those from 2017 and 2022—, the NSS 2025 no longer positions Russia or China as universal threats in all scenarios. The new approach is more selective: Washington acknowledges competition but aims to avoid ongoing confrontation.

However, this does not imply tolerance. In the Indo-Pacific, deterrence against China remains a priority, while in the European sphere, the White House suggests a redistribution of responsibilities within NATO, reducing the American burden.

Analysts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Foundation for Peace (FPRI) agree that this "hemispheric realignment" could create opportunities for dialogue with Russia — for instance, on nuclear control issues — but it could also increase pressure on Moscow's Latin American allies.

For the regime in Havana, this signifies an indirect tightening: if Washington reduces its focus on Europe and the Middle East, it will have more political and operational leeway to concentrate on the Caribbean and Central America.

A world that is less global, more regional

The NSS 2025 breaks with the tradition of "world leadership" that has characterized U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Trump makes it clear: it's not about rebuilding foreign democracies, but about protecting the American republic from internal and regional threats.

The document emphasizes the need to "reduce military commitments in low-priority regions" and to strengthen the industrial, energy, and scientific power of the U.S. to maintain its supremacy. In other words, the country is retreating to reinforce itself from within — and to project power only where it is beneficial.

In Europe, this partial withdrawal has already raised alarms. The strategy warns of a supposed "civilizational loss" of the continent and demands that European allies take greater responsibility for their defense. In other words, NATO will continue to exist, but without the checkbook or military muscle of Washington as before.

Reactions and Critiques

The reactions have come swiftly. In Brussels and Berlin, the strategy has been interpreted as a warning of U.S. withdrawal and a challenge to the Atlantic order.

In Beijing and Moscow, the reading is different: they see the text as a confirmation of the decline of U.S. global hegemony. However, they acknowledge that its military and economic influence on the American continent remains undeniable.

For its part, in Tehran, the Iranian government denounced that the NSS 2025 "reinforces Israel's dominance in West Asia" and labeled the document as an "instrument of regional imperialism."

In the academic realm, experts from the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE) warn that the new policy may "fragment the international order and open a cycle of unstable multipolar competition" by weakening traditional cooperation mechanisms and replacing them with convenience-based alliances.

On its part, American think tanks such as the Atlantic Council warn that the so-called "Trump Corollary" could trigger tensions and political crises in Latin America, particularly in those countries where Chinese or Russian influence combines with populist or authoritarian governments.

In its reading, the reactivation of the Monroe Doctrine not only redefines Washington's foreign policy, but it could also spark a new phase of diplomatic confrontations, reciprocal sanctions, and geopolitical realignments that directly affect the stability of the region.

And Cuba? Three possible scenarios

On the horizon outlined by the new U.S. strategy, the future of the Cuban regime diverges into three possible paths that intertwine with the pulse of hemispheric geopolitics.

The first is the total pressure scenario, a situation in which Washington decides to tighten the screws: it expands sanctions, mobilizes diplomatic support in the region, and seeks to align regional governments in a common strategy to isolate Havana.

In this context, the goal would be to sever the financial, technological, and military ties that the Castro regime maintains with Beijing and Moscow, thereby reducing its maneuverability to the point of causing political and economic suffocation.

The second path is that of tense balance, a blend of coercion and pragmatism. In this scenario, the United States would combine sanctions with economic and political incentives, attempting to pressure the regime towards a controlled opening or even facilitate a leadership transition that would allow Washington to regain influence without causing a sudden collapse.

It would be a calculated pressure strategy, where each move aims to trigger internal transformations without igniting a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

And finally, there is the option of tense coexistence, in which the Cuban regime manages to maintain its support network with China and Russia, clinging to multipolarity as an ideological and financial lifeline.

In this scenario, Havana would become a point of symbolic resistance within the new hemispheric landscape, while the United States would reinforce its presence in the Caribbean through bases, investments, and alliances with like-minded governments.

It would be an unstable balance, a prolonged standoff where neither side would give in completely, but both would accept that direct confrontation no longer works: Cuba would continue to resist, while Washington would keep waiting for its natural wear and tear.

Any of the three scenarios presents increasing pressure on the Castro regime, which is also facing an unprecedented economic crisis, a collapse in tourism, migratory exodus, and a loss of internal legitimacy.

Conclusion

The National Security Strategy 2025 is not just a bureaucratic document: it is the roadmap for a profound geopolitical change.

Marks the return of the U.S. to the “backyard” that it had left in the hands of China, Russia, and their local partners for years.

And if there is one thing that is clear, it is that Cuba is returning to the center of Washington's strategic priorities, not as a military threat, but as a symbol of foreign influence on the American continent.

In a world that is becoming increasingly regional and competitive, the regime in Havana will have to move cautiously: it is no longer facing a distracted global adversary, but rather a powerful neighbor that has decided to look southward once again.

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CiberCuba Editorial Team

A team of journalists committed to reporting on Cuban current affairs and topics of global interest. At CiberCuba, we work to deliver truthful news and critical analysis.