With the "ordering," Cuba suffered the worst of neoliberalism but never reaped its benefits

When the Cuban government announced the so-called Ordering, it promised a “comprehensive” reorganization of the economy, monetary unification, and a path toward greater efficiency. Four years later, the balance is unmistakable: the government implemented only half of the package, and conveniently, the half that places the greatest burden on citizens.

Cuba adopted typical measures of a neoliberal adjustment, although it will never admit it: massive devaluation of the peso, removal of subsidies, increase in rates, partial price liberalization, and the creation of a currency market that brutally segments the population.

But it deliberately avoided the other pro-market measures that do generate growth and productivity in any country that implements them. The result is a country that endured the pain of reforms but did not receive any of their benefits.

The measures they did take: adjustment without growth

Since 2021, the government has implemented decisions with a distinct neoliberal stamp:

• Abrupt devaluation of the CUP.
• Increase in electricity, transportation, and basic services rates.
• Elimination of generalized subsidies.
• Liberalization of prices amid a collapsed supply.
• Limited wage autonomy in state-owned enterprises.
• Legalization of MIPYMES, but restricted and without real access to foreign currency.
• Creation of MLC stores that compel citizens to finance the state itself.

This is neoliberalism without a market, an oxymoron that only Cuba can produce: the State renounces its duty to protect the citizen, but does not relinquish control of the market.

The measures they did not take: the ones that could have pulled Cuba out of stagnation

For any reform to work, it is necessary to unleash productive forces, generate legal confidence, and allow real competition. Cuba did the opposite.

• They didn't truly unify the exchange rate. They maintained a fictitious official dollar while the country operates in the informal market.
• They did not create a legal foreign exchange market. Without transparent access to dollars, no company can grow or plan.
• Direct importation was not allowed. The MIPYMES depend on state-owned companies that increase costs, cause delays, and control everything.
• They did not reform agriculture. The land still does not fully belong to the farmer, and the State continues to impose collections.
• They did not liberalize wholesale and retail trade. There are no private cash & carry operations, no independent chains, and no real competition for GAESA.
• They did not provide guarantees for private property. Without legal security, no serious investor will enter, and local investors take a defensive approach.
• They did not deregulate GAESA. The largest corporation in the country remains untouchable, even though its efficiency is lacking and its influence is suffocating.
• They did not allow competition in banking, telecommunications, or energy. Three sectors that, in any country, are engines of immediate investment.

In summary: they avoided exactly what works.

The great strategic mistake: to do only what impoverishes people

In economics, the order of factors does affect the outcome. If you're going to eliminate subsidies, you must first increase supply, introduce competition, reorganize state-owned enterprises, create a functional foreign exchange market, and allow direct imports.

Cuba did the opposite:

• First, he removed subsidies.
• First, he raised prices.
• First, it devalued.
• First, it impoverished the people.

And he left for "later" -meaning, never- the reforms that involve relinquishing power.

Why didn't they do what works?

For a simple reason: The reforms that lift countries out of the hole are the same ones that reduce the political control of the State.

• Allowing competition weakens state monopolies.
• Guaranteeing private property limits arbitrary power.
• Having a transparent exchange market reduces discretionary margins.
• Dismantling GAESA involves touching upon sacred interests within the regime.
• The Cuban government preferred a destroyed economy rather than losing its control.

Cuba needed a market and rules, not improvisation

If the country had adopted a coherent market package—like Vietnam, China, or even European socialist countries before their transformation—it would today have more domestic production, contained inflation, significant foreign investment, a dynamic private sector, and a stable currency.

But without freeing the economy, without legal certainty, and without allowing competition, any attempt at reform will be a temporary fix that exacerbates the problem.

Conclusion: Cuba applied neoliberalism without growth, without investment, and without freedom

The Cuban government carried out the easy part of neoliberalism: the one that burdens the citizen. But it avoided the complex part: the one that requires the state to relinquish control and allow the country to produce, compete, and grow.

As long as the measures that truly liberate the economy are not taken, Cuba will remain trapped in a model that distributes misery and controls scarcity. The Ordenamiento did not fail due to "implementation errors"; it failed because it was designed to preserve power, not to save the country.