The Washington Paradox: Why Trump Rejects María Corina Machado and Bets on Delcy Rodríguez

There are decisions in international politics that, viewed from the outside, seem contradictory. Washington's stance following Nicolás Maduro's capture is one of them. For many Venezuelans, and for a significant portion of international public opinion, it is difficult to understand why the United States appears to distance itself from figures like María Corina Machado while accepting a transition led by someone so closely associated with the regime as Delcy Rodríguez.

But perhaps the mistake lies in viewing this strategy through the wrong lens.

The rejection that is uncomfortable, but not surprising

When Donald Trump was asked about María Corina Machado, his response was cold and, for many, unfair. He did not question her bravery or her background, but he made it clear that he did not see her as the right figure to lead at this immediate moment.

I don't believe this is a judgment about her democratic legitimacy, which is real and solid, but rather about the type of leadership that Washington deems viable in an extremely fragile phase. This is not an ideological endorsement of Delcy Rodríguez, nor is it a denial of the opposition's effort; it is a bet on a transition without a sudden break.

Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, stated it this way: The United States will work with those who "do the right thing," but the emphasis is on institutional continuity. The military will continue to be led by Chavista generals (under U.S. pressure). PDVSA, the state oil company, will not be dismantled but "restructured in its leadership." The ministries will continue to operate with officials who understand the system.

Beneath all this narrative of cooperation with Delcy Rodríguez lies an implicit yet clear threat. U.S. officials have repeatedly hinted that if Rodríguez or the military do not cooperate, there will be a "second wave" of U.S. military attacks.

United States is not choosing an ideal model. It is choosing the one it considers the least risky.

The lesson that Washington does not want to repeat

The ghost of Iraq continues to weigh on every U.S. decision in the Middle East and Latin America. There, the complete destruction of the state apparatus did not bring democracy, but rather chaos, civil war, and radicalization.

In Iraq, the Bush administration made a fundamental strategic error: it dissolved the Iraqi army and instituted "De-Baathification," a massive purge of anyone linked to Saddam Hussein's party. The result was catastrophic. Hundreds of thousands of armed and unemployed soldiers joined the insurgency. The state collapsed. Essential services vanished. The insurgency evolved into ISIS.

In Venezuela, the approach seems to be the opposite: to change the vertex of power without collapsing the structure. To keep the military cohesive, preserve functioning ministries, and avoid a purge that would push thousands of armed men into hiding.

It is not a morally perfect strategy, but it is pragmatic. And in foreign policy, pragmatism often takes precedence.

Oil as a factor, not as a dogma

It would be naive to deny the importance of oil. Venezuela not only has vast reserves, but also a devastated infrastructure that requires years of investment and stability to return to large-scale production.

From Washington, the calculation is clear: without a minimum of institutional order, recovery is not possible. But that does not necessarily imply, I hope, an indefinite occupation or a rejection of democracy; rather, it suggests a prioritization: first stability, then political normalization.

The idea of future elections is not off the table; it’s just not immediate.

The dilemma of Maria Corina Machado

María Corina Machado represents something very powerful: legitimacy, a break, and justice. Precisely because of this, at this moment, she also represents uncertainty for those who fear a defensive reaction from the military establishment and the old Chavista structure.

It is not a personal disqualification, but a dilemma of timing. A transition led by her would require quick decisions regarding responsibilities, purges, and judgments. That may be fair, and probably necessary, but also explosive in the short term.

Washington seems to be betting that this moment will come later, not now.

A transition that cannot be eternal

That said, it is also clear that this formula only makes sense if it is temporary. A transition without an electoral horizon would quickly lose legitimacy, both inside and outside of Venezuela.

The difference with Iraq or Afghanistan is that here we are not talking about rebuilding a country from scratch, but rather about reorganizing it. International pressure, regional observation, and the reality in Venezuela make it difficult to imagine a provisional administration extending indefinitely without elections.

The transition will have to progress, and it will probably do so.

Conclusion: it is not a renunciation, it is a sequence

The U.S. strategy does not signify a renunciation of Venezuelan democracy, but rather a debatable yet understandable bet on order as a prerequisite. The United States is not selecting rulers; instead, it is trying to prevent a collapse that would make any future election impossible.

María Corina Machado is not dismissed; she is postponed. And that, although painful for many, does not equate to a definitive defeat.

The true test will not be who governs tomorrow, but whether Venezuela can reach free elections without igniting again along the way. That is where this strategy will have to prove whether it was prudence or merely interest.