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Venezuela transferred to Cuba the equivalent of $63.8 billion in oil subsidies, associated investments, and financial relief, according to the report Oil for Repression: The $63.8 Billion Audit of Cuba’s Intelligence Occupation in Venezuela, published by the Miranda Center for Democracy.
The document published this Wednesday states that this flow of resources was the primary payment mechanism for an exchange relationship in which Caracas supplied oil and financing while Havana provided services, advice, and political intelligence and control structure.
The report estimates the total cost of that scheme at 63.8 billion dollars in constant 2026 dollars.
According to their breakdown, of that amount, approximately 57.4 billion would correspond to the updated value of oil shipments from Venezuela to Cuba, while the remainder would come from investments linked to the Petrocaribe framework and debt relief operations.
The text emphasizes that this is a "conservative estimate" of the financial drain accumulated towards the island.
The research asserts that, in nominal terms, Venezuela would have transferred to Cuba 44.5 billion dollars, a figure that is later adjusted for inflation to bring it to 63.8 billion in constant 2026 dollars.
In that same vein, it states that the main component of the scheme was not cash payment, but rather an "energy mortgage" based on subsidized oil and favorable financial conditions for Havana.
An agreement from the turn of the century
According to the report, the origin of that architecture dates back to the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2000 between Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro.
Under that agreement, Venezuela began sending 53,000 barrels of crude oil daily to Cuba, with soft financing clauses, low interest rates, and long payment terms.
The document adds that in 2004 the agreement was renewed, maintaining that supply base and setting a guaranteed minimum price of 27 dollars per barrel to protect Cuba from international market fluctuations.
The report also states that between 2005 and 2012, shipments increased significantly, reaching a peak of 115,000 barrels per day in 2008 and averaging close to 105,000 barrels per day until 2012.
Starting in 2013, shipments began to decline due to the drop in PDVSA's production and the deterioration of the Venezuelan refining system.
The text indicates that in 2016 shipments averaged around 69,000 barrels per day, in 2017 about 55,000, and in 2024 the average was expected to be 32,000, with a recovery to 52,000 barrels per day in 2025.
To support these estimates, the report claims to have reconstructed the value of shipments based on historical data from the U.S. Cuba Trade and Economic Council, as well as information from OPEC, PDVSA, and specialized journalistic sources on exports, tanker movements, and trends in the oil market.
In the table included in the document, the nominal total of the shipments is shown as 40 billion dollars, with its updated value at 57.4 billion.
Investments under Petrocaribe
The study adds that the bill is higher when infrastructure projects and financial operations are included under the umbrella of Petrocaribe.
As an example, it mentions three projects reported in Cuba in 2009, in which Venezuela is said to have invested 3.759 billion nominal dollars, equivalent to 5.750 billion in constant dollars of 2026.
It also includes debt relief operations in 2005 and 2006, including the purchase of debts from Cuban refineries for over 80 million nominal dollars, which the report updates to over 130 million in current values.
Beyond the figures, the central political point of the report is that this exchange was not solely economic.
The document describes the model as “Oil for Repression” and asserts that Venezuelan oil financed an intelligence and security structure with Cuban influence within the state apparatus of Venezuela.
In particular, it assigns a central role to the so-called Coordination and Liaison Group, known as GRUCE, which it defines as a Cuban intelligence node embedded within the Venezuelan security architecture.
Cuban interference
According to the text, the turning point occurred between 2007 and 2008, after Chávez's defeat in the constitutional referendum.
The report states that in May 2008, confidential agreements were signed between the defense ministries of both countries, allowing Cuba to restructure segments of the Venezuelan National Bolivarian Armed Forces, train Venezuelan intelligence agents in Havana, redesign military intelligence missions, and formally establish the GRUCE with eight Cuban "military specialists."
The document also links that influence to institutional changes in Venezuelan intelligence services.
He asserts that the intelligence law of 2008, known by its critics as the "Sapo Law," aimed to merge civil, military, and social intelligence under direct political control, replicating elements of the Cuban surveillance model.
It adds that, although that regulation was suspended following objections from legal experts, media, and human rights organizations, many of its principles may have persisted in practice through institutional reorganization and the normalization of social surveillance.
In that same process, the report identifies the establishment of SEBIN in 2008 and the transformation of DIM into DGCIM in 2011 as part of a reengineering focused less on public security and more on the preservation of political power.
The report states that SEBIN has shifted its focus towards political intelligence and the preventive control of dissent, while DGCIM has redirected its mission towards internal surveillance of officials, infiltration of units, and the neutralization of conspiracies within the military establishment.
The research supports part of its argument regarding repression in reports from the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela.
It cites that SEBIN and DGCIM carried out illegal arrests, torture, and other cruel treatment against real or perceived opponents and their families. It also mentions more than 18,000 political arrests accumulated since 2014 and a spike of nearly 2,000 political detainees in 2024, according to references gathered in the report itself.
The report also dedicates several sections to describing patterns of torture, mechanisms of social control, and the impact of institutionalized fear on Venezuelan society.
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