The Castro dictatorship. Sixty-seven years of the same power structure in Cuba

When studying the political history of Cuba from 1959 to the present day, one conclusion is hard to ignore: there was never a true transition of power. What occurred was the continuation of the same political structure built by Fidel Castro, inherited by Raúl Castro and later maintained through leaders carefully selected by the system itself.

For decades, an image has been presented to the world of a 'revolution' that evolved institutionally, approved new constitutions, created legislative bodies, held regular elections, and renewed its leaders. However, behind that legal framework, the essential element of any dictatorship remained unchanged: the absolute concentration of power.

Since January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro began the gradual dismantling of existing republican institutions. Political parties disappeared, independent press was shut down, civil organizations were subordinated to the state, and the judiciary lost all autonomy.

In 1965, the Communist Party of Cuba was established as the sole party. From that moment, a principle was set that remains in effect: no political organization can legally compete for power.

The Constitution of 1976 consolidated that model. It explicitly recognized the Communist Party as the leading force of society and the State. With that provision, any possibility of political pluralism was nullified.

The elections held since then have never offered the possibility of choosing between different political projects. Citizens could only ratify candidates previously selected within the system itself.

In modern democracies, alternation is the essential mechanism to limit power. In Cuba, that possibility has never existed.

For forty-nine years, Fidel Castro simultaneously held the leadership of the Government, the direction of the Communist Party, the supreme command of the Armed Forces, and absolute control over national and international policy. No major decision was beyond his authority.

In 2006, a serious illness forced Fidel Castro to temporarily delegate his duties. Two years later, Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency. Many international analysts spoke of a transition at that time. However, events proved exactly the opposite.

Raúl Castro did not dismantle any of the structures established by his brother. He maintained the one-party system, the state monopoly on the media, the system of social control, the predominance of State Security, and the political supremacy of the Armed Forces.

He introduced some limited economic reforms, authorized small private businesses, and relaxed certain immigration regulations. However, none of these measures changed the essence of the regime. Real power remained concentrated where it had always been.

In 2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel was appointed president of the Republic. Many Western governments interpreted that event as the beginning of a new political generation. However, the constitutional reality was different.

Raúl Castro continued to serve as First Secretary of the Communist Party until 2021, a position that the 2019 Constitution defines as the foremost guiding force of the state and society. Even after formally stepping down from this responsibility, his influence within the political and military apparatus remained evident.

In other words, the government administrator changed, but the ownership of power did not. There is also an element that is often overlooked. The Revolutionary Armed Forces are not merely a military institution. For decades, they managed a significant portion of the strategic sectors of the national economy through business conglomerates linked to tourism, commerce, construction, transportation, and other services. This economic concentration further strengthened the political power of the regime.

Meanwhile, State Security improved one of the most efficient internal surveillance systems in Latin America through networks of informants, mass organizations, digital monitoring, and constant control over the opposition.

The nationwide protests of July 11, 2021 tested that structure. Thousands of citizens took to the streets peacefully, demanding freedom, food, medicine, and political changes. The response was immediate. Hundreds of arrests, swift trials, and long sentences confirmed that the State continued to use the same repressive mechanisms developed during the early decades of the 'revolution'.

In parallel, Cuba is currently facing its greatest economic crisis since the so-called Special Period. Inflation, the energy collapse, the deterioration of the healthcare system, shortages, and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Cubans reflect a deep structural exhaustion.

However, none of these crises have resulted in a significant political opening. The monopoly of the Communist Party remains intact. The press continues to be under state control. Independent organizations face constant restrictions. Free unions are still banned. Competitive elections do not exist. The separation of powers remains nonexistent.

Those who argue that Cuba has had different governments often focus solely on the names of the presidents. However, political science teaches us that a regime is not defined by the person in office, but by the rules that govern the exercise of power. As long as those rules remain unchanged, the system continues to be the same.

History provides numerous examples of dictatorships that survived the death or retirement of their founders without altering their nature. This exact situation occurred in Cuba. Fidel Castro established a highly centralized political model. Raúl Castro ensured its continuity. Subsequent leaders have managed that legacy without changing its essential foundations.

For that reason, it can be argued that Cuba has not experienced a democratic succession, but rather the extension of the same regime for almost seven decades. Names have changed. Discourses have too. Some economic reforms have come and gone. Constitutions have been amended. Positions have been replaced. But the core of the system has remained unchanged. Without political pluralism. Without free elections. Without judicial independence. Without press freedom. Without power alternation.

History shows that dictatorships do not survive solely because of a leader. They endure when institutions are designed to prevent power from being replaced by the free will of the citizens.

That has been, precisely, the most constant feature of the Cuban political system from 1959 to the present day.