The stability of the Cuban regime does not rest on the charisma of Fidel Castro, ideological exceptionalism, or on external factors such as the U.S. embargo, but rather on the cohesion of a highly institutionalized ruling elite. This is the central thesis of the analysis published on July 15 in CubaxCuba by Francisco Sánchez López, a tenured professor and director of the Institute of Ibero-America at the University of Salamanca, titled "Elites, Continuity, and Political Change in Cuba."
The Spanish academic begins with an observation that he considers insufficiently explained: the Cuban political system has survived the generational change, constitutional reforms, deep economic crises, and the physical disappearance of its historical leadership, without any of these factors altering the effective core of power.
For Sánchez López, the key question is not why Fidel Castro remained in power for so long, but a more revealing one: "The politically relevant question is not why Fidel was able to stay in power for so long, but why the system survived Fidel."
The response refers to three structural pillars: the Communist Party of Cuba, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and a technocratic bureaucracy that replaced the old revolutionary guard without causing internal fractures.
The party goes far beyond being an ideological organization. "Belonging to the political environment organized around the party is not merely an ideological affiliation. It also represents access to opportunities, administrative career paths, institutional recognition, and mobility within the state apparatus," the analysis points out. This function as a channel for social mobility makes it an extraordinarily effective mechanism of loyalty.
The FAR, for their part, are not just a coercive apparatus. Their role in the Cuban economy is decisive: "It is not merely about military control over the coercive apparatus but about an articulation between security, economy, and politics that enhances the adaptive capacity of the system." The military business conglomerate GAESA controls between 40% and 70% of the Cuban GDP and 95% of the country's currency transactions.
The third pillar is technocratic bureaucracy. Sánchez López describes how the regime transitioned from a group of revolutionary fighters to officials trained within the state apparatus itself, with "predictable trajectories of advancement and selection mechanisms that combine technical competence and political reliability." This generational renewal occurred without political opening or internal fracture.
This architecture also explains why the reforms announced by the regime do not imply real openness. "It is not about a lack of change, but rather controlled change," writes Sánchez López: in highly institutionalized regimes, reforms can reinforce control and redistribute responsibilities without altering the essential hierarchies. The 176 economic measures presented by Miguel Díaz-Canel in June 2026 respond, according to analysts, to this same logic.
The analysis also addresses the transformation of the regime's legitimacy. The revolutionary narrative and anti-imperialism that united previous generations have eroded, especially among those who did not live through 1959. However, this erosion has not destabilized the system because its foundation is no longer charismatic: "It is not a charismatic legitimacy; it is a bureaucratic legitimacy," concludes the researcher.
In this context, repression emerges as a structural component. The regime, Sánchez López notes, "has survived with reduced levels of active support thanks to institutional control, organizational capability, and the absence of effective political alternatives, the latter achieved through high levels of repression." The data supports this interpretation: as of the end of June 2026, Cuba reports a historical record of 1,306 political prisoners according to Prisoners Defenders, including 40 minors and 338 people imprisoned directly for the protests on July 11, 2021.
"Political systems do not necessarily change when their visible faces change. They change when the structures that support power are shattered," concludes Sánchez López, who warns, however, that "it is very easy to make mistakes when speaking about Cuba due to the lack of information and transparency characteristic of dictatorships."
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