An investigation by CiberCuba | Fourth and final installment
The first three installments of this research have shown that the independent Cuban civil society is not starting from scratch in the event of a potential change process.
There exists a corpus of proposals regarding the various paths towards a transition, another on how to govern it and rebuild the country, and at the same time, certain shortcomings in coordination, leadership, and executive capacity to translate that knowledge into a recognizable political alternative.
The question that concludes the series is what can the outside contribute.
The response does not begin today either. For decades, democratic governments, parliaments, universities, foundations, and human rights organizations have supported Cuban activists, documented repression, funded independent media and organizations, studied scenarios for change, and shared experiences from other transitions.
But there is an important difference between strengthening a civil society against an authoritarian regime and preparing the necessary capacities to govern a transition.
The question at present is whether the existing international framework is capable of taking that second step.
The idea of preparing for the transition is not new either
One of the most revealing backgrounds is the Prague Summit, held in 2004 with participation from former presidents, political leaders, academics, non-governmental organizations, and representatives of the Cuban opposition.
The so-called Memorandum of Prague proposed, among other things, to strengthen Cuban civil society, create international networks of NGOs and parliamentarians, and establish a commission of international experts to gather experiences from democratic transitions in Europe and Latin America to make them available to Cubans.
It also proposed improving coordination among opposition organizations and preparing them for a peaceful transition and the establishment of the rule of law.
The idea was particularly advanced for its time: the international community should not only condemn the regime; it could contribute to ensuring that Cubans were better prepared for a potential change.
Twenty-two years later, many of those layers still exist, albeit in a scattered manner.
Poland: Experience of a Post-Communist Transition
Poland has explicitly offered to share with the United States and the Cuban people its experience of the transition in 1989 and the Solidarity movement.
The chancellor Radosław Sikorski said in May that Warsaw is willing to advise on a peaceful transition to democracy and a market economy, and his Deputy Minister of Defense, Paweł Zalewski, confirmed that Sikorski had already discussed the matter with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
The initiative also includes a direct contact component with the Cuban opposition: in May, Sikorski received José Daniel Ferrer in Warsaw and expressed Poland's support for the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.
The Polish case offers something particularly valuable to the debate: practical experience of a negotiated transition from a communist regime to a democracy and a market economy.
That is precisely the type of comparative knowledge that could be useful for a potential Cuban transition, although the differences between the two countries prevent a mechanical transfer of the Polish model.
Czech Republic and Poland: Learning from Two Post-Communist Transitions
In March 2026, the Cuba Program of the Universidad Sergio Arboleda organized the seminar “Successful Experiences of Transition to Democracy: The Cases of the Czech Republic and Poland. Lessons for Cuba and Venezuela”, with the participation of diplomatic representatives from both countries.
The explicit objective was to examine what lessons from the transitions in Central Europe could be useful for the two Latin American countries.
The importance of this type of initiative lies not in mechanically importing a Czech or Polish model. A Cuban transition would have distinct historical and geopolitical conditions. Its value consists of providing Cuban actors with comparative experiences on political negotiation, institutional building, economic reform, and the transformation of societies emerging from communism.
That type of exchange is part of a longer tradition. CADAL has been documenting the cooperation and contacts between European diplomats and sectors of Cuban civil society for years, with participation from countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Not just Central Europe
International learning about Cuba has not been limited to the former communist countries.
CADAL argued as early as 2014 that Cuban democratic actors should expand their international support networks and was particularly seeking to involve Germany, Canada, France, Norway, and Chile, in addition to the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic.
The path of this cooperation is uneven among countries and has not always explicitly aimed at a transition. In many cases, it involved human rights diplomacy, support for activists, or engagement with civil society.
But that difference matters: the international framework is not a single structure nor does it respond to a common strategy regarding Cuba.
Cadal: Rights, Democracy, and Comparative Experiences
The Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL) has served for years as a bridge between Cuban actors and international experiences.
Its production includes analysis of transitions, democracy, human rights, and the relationship between diplomacy and civil society. The program Democratic Bridge also documented the actions of European and American diplomats who maintained contact with independent Cuban activists and turned that experience into part of a discussion on the role of foreign democracies.
In 2026, this tradition continues with studies on scenarios for democratization and discussions on the need to build a political representation capable of turning protest and civic resistance into a democratic alternative.
United States: decades of assistance to civil society
Washington also did not begin in 2026 to consider Cuba's preparation for the day after.
The documentation of American programs on Cuba demonstrates a long history of support for human rights, an independent civil society, access to information, media, training, and organizational capacities.
A strategic document from the State Department noted, for example, that the U.S. mission in Havana maintains regular contact with activists, dissidents, and members of civil society, and that it would continue to support independent media, access to information, and capacity building for independent organizations.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also reviewed U.S. assistance to democratic programs in Cuba and noted that its implementation faces significant security risks for beneficiaries and organizations, which necessitates the development of specific protection and risk management mechanisms.
The accumulated experience reveals, therefore, that a significant portion of international assistance has prioritized keeping civil society alive and resilient under authoritarianism.
The question that now arises is different: how to turn those capabilities into preparation for the moment that follows?
NED: from resistance to resilience
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is one of the international actors that best allows us to observe this evolution.
The organization explains that its support for Cuba is no longer limited to traditional dissidents, but now includes independent journalists, labor organizers, religious leaders, human rights defenders, farmers, and community organizations. Its recent reports also emphasize investment in digital resilience and protection for partners under pressure.
That work has an indirect importance for a transition: a civil society capable of organizing, documenting, communicating, and resisting is also a civil society with greater abilities to participate in a political opening.
But it does not yet equate to forming a government, preparing a public administration, or building a transition management system.
European foundations and think tanks
The role of European foundations is less visible, but significant.
The Friedrich Naumann Stiftung has supported research on scenarios for a Cuban transition and in 2026 collaborated with Ciudadanía y Libertad on a report that analyzes various possible paths for change and the risk that a transition may merely result in a substitution of elites.
The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung also has a history of publications on political, economic, and social alternatives for Cuba, including works dedicated to future scenarios, political consensus, and transition.
These actors serve a different role than diplomacy: to fund thinking, gather experts, produce documents, and connect Cubans with comparative experiences.
The universities: a less visible infrastructure
In this fourth dimension, universities and research centers also emerge.
Florida International University (FIU) organized the conference Cuba: The Day After Tomorrow in February 2026, bringing together scholars, experts, activists, and students in dozens of panels covering politics, economics, law, society, and institutions.
FIU has also embarked on a more ambitious initiative: bringing together specialists in governance, economics, medicine, public health, education, technology, infrastructure, engineering, security, and law to contribute to a future democratic Cuba.
It is a different form of support: to build knowledge and professionals capable of addressing specific problems of the State and reconstruction.
The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), the University of Miami, the University of Texas, and other U.S. institutions have developed similar research over the years in fields such as economics, energy, infrastructure, governance, and institutional transformation.
That academic component can be crucial if a transition requires, in a short time, hundreds of specialists capable of moving from research to management.
From aid to state capacity
International tracking allows for the distinction of various functions that are currently scattered.
There are organizations that protect activists and journalists. There are others that finance organizations and media. Others document violations and preserve evidence.
There are universities that produce knowledge. Foundations that finance thought and education. Governments that provide comparative experiences. Parliaments that grant international legitimacy. And organizations that can contribute humanitarian aid, emergency funding, and reconstruction.
The link that seems the least developed is precisely the one that appears in the third installment: integrating all those capabilities into a transitional architecture.
There is not yet, at least not visibly, an international equivalent of what could be a "public administration school for the Cuban transition", a transnational program to train officials, a coordinated mechanism to prepare emergency ministries, or a fund specifically designed to finance the institutional capacity that a transforming Cuba would require.
What support would a Cuban transition need?
The accumulated experience suggests that any eventual transition would require more than just humanitarian aid or sanctions.
I would need training for public officials and administrators; legal and constitutional assistance; electoral observation; mechanisms for transitional justice; support for media and civil society; protection for defenders; experts in energy, water, health, and agriculture; financial advisory; auditing systems; and access to credit and international financing.
I would also need comparative experiences that help avoid mistakes made in other transitions.
And, probably, it would require a very rapid international response capacity. The difference between planning a transition and responding to a real crisis can be measured in days.
But the leadership must remain Cuban
The conclusion of this research is not that the international community should design Cuba's transition. On the contrary, it is precisely the opposite.
International support will be more effective the more it helps Cubans to lead the process themselves.
This means supporting capabilities, not replacing them; funding institutions and professionals, not buying political representation; sharing experiences, not imposing models; and helping to build legitimacy, not granting it from the outside.
The European experience itself shows that there is no universal transition. The Polish one was not the Czech; the Czech was not the Spanish; and none would be mechanically reproducible in Cuba.
What can indeed be transferred is knowledge on how to manage regime changes, build institutions, reform economies, organize elections, professionalize administrations, and prevent a break from ending in a new authoritarianism.
The balance of the series
The four installments of this research present a less straightforward but also less pessimistic outlook than what typically dominates the discussion about Cuba's political future.
First: there is a vast corpus of thought regarding the pathways towards a transition: plebiscite, negotiation, rupture, a "from law to law" exit, provisional government, and constitutional processes.
Second: there is also a substantial volume of proposals on how to govern and rebuild the country: justice, security, economy, property, energy, infrastructure, health, education, and social protection.
Third: the significant deficit arises in the final stretch: shared leadership, coordination, selection of responsible parties, legitimacy, executive capacity, and control of coercive structures.
Room: International support also does not start from scratch. There are decades of assistance, documentation, training, research, comparative experience, and cooperation networks. But the pieces remain scattered.
The fundamental question is not, therefore, whether Cuba has ideas for a transition. It does. Nor is it whether there are experts capable of addressing its major issues. There are. Nor is it whether there is capital, knowledge, and potential international support. There is as well.
The challenge is another:
Will those resources —both Cuban and international— be able to converge before a potential power crisis forces a hasty improvisation of what has been considered separately for decades?
Because a democratic transition is not built solely on the day an authority changes.
It is built beforehand: with prepared individuals, well-thought-out institutions, agreed-upon rules, available resources, and a society capable of recognizing as its own the alternative that emerges.
And that may be the main finding of this research: Cuba does not start from scratch.
What still does not exist is an architecture that brings together everything that already exists.
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