In April 2021, Miguel Díaz-Canel summarized in one phrase the true conception of the regime regarding private activity in Cuba: “The non-state sector is ours.”
It was not a slip. In that meeting with self-employed individuals, cooperativists, and representatives of state enterprises, the leader also stated that "the Revolution will not hand over the non-state sector to the enemy" and made it clear that private forms would only be tolerated as a "complement to the state economy".
Read today, that phrase helps to better understand the context of the recent measures taken by the Trump administration regarding certain financial channels linked to Cuban entrepreneurs. Washington does not appear to be acting against the existence of small private businesses, but against a model in which the regime has turned the "non-state" sector into a controlled extension of its system.
Díaz-Canel said it outright: that sector did not belong to the citizens, nor to a free market, nor to independent entrepreneurs. It was "ours." Meaning, it belonged to the political project that authorizes, limits, uses, and punishes it. In other words, to the so-called "revolution," or in other terms, to the regime.
Washington was the first to open
The official narrative presents the new measures from the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States (OFAC) as proof that Washington wants to "suffocate" the entire Cuban economy. However, this version omits the full sequence of events.
In May 2024, during the Biden administration, the Treasury Department expanded authorizations to support independent private Cuban entrepreneurs, including banking facilities and the use of payment platforms.
After Trump, channels were opened to export fuel, gas, and other petroleum products from the United States to eligible private entities in Cuba and individual consumers. CiberCuba reported this year on fuel shipments to the private sector and commercial operations formally directed at small and medium enterprises.
The initial logic was not to block entrepreneurship but to create a differentiated pathway, with one essential condition: that these resources would not end up benefiting the Cuban state, the Armed Forces, GAESA, CUPET, sanctioned entities, or intelligence and security structures.
The trap was in the internal control
The problem is that in Cuba, a small or medium-sized private enterprise can be registered as a private entity but operate within a state framework that controls the crucial points: licenses, banks, customs, ports, importers, storage, distribution, permits, oversight, and access to foreign currency.
The fuel is clearly illustrated. Although a private entity could potentially make the formal purchase, the operation within Cuba had to go through authorized importers, state infrastructure, CUPET, CIMEX, ports, and distribution channels controlled by the regime.
There appears the gray area that worries Washington: operations designed to support the private sector could end up generating commissions, logistical control, foreign currency, supplies, or indirect advantages for the state itself.
Suspicion does not arise from an abstract theory. In March 2026, the Department of Commerce had already suspended certain exemptions when they involved deposits of foreign funds in banks owned by Cuba, due to the risk of benefiting the Government, the military apparatus, or intelligence services.
Controlled opening, not economic freedom
The 176 economic and social measures announced by Havana in 2026 reinforce this interpretation.
The package included private banking, private currency exchange, private remittance operators, foreign investment in the non-state sector, greater leeway for imports and exports, removal of the limit of 100 workers, and formulas for private participation in structures previously reserved for the state.
The regime avoids calling it privatization. It refers to "selective opening," "new economic actors," "co-responsibility," or "necessary transformations." But the underlying reality is clear: it needs private capital, foreign currency, imports, logistics, and services that the State can no longer guarantee.
That does not contradict Díaz-Canel's statement in 2021. It updates it. The "non-state" sector is still "ours"; it’s just that now it is more necessary for importing, selling, collecting, paying, donating, financing propaganda, and filling social gaps.
Surnames, permissions, and propaganda
In recent years, independent media have documented cases illustrating how a segment of the more visible or favored private sector seems to be connected with powerful surnames, former officials, state institutions, or propaganda channels.
CiberCuba reported the case of Gaia Mercado, a food small and medium-sized enterprise attributed to Lisa Titolo Castro, daughter of Mariela Castro and granddaughter of Raúl Castro. The business operates in a sensitive sector—food—and receives payments from abroad for purchases intended for family members in Cuba.
CubaNet has investigated other businesses associated with descendants or relatives of the elite, as well as companies that transitioned from state structures or local projects to operate as small and medium-sized enterprises. This pattern does not prove that every entrepreneur is a frontman, but it does dismantle the image of a homogeneous sector that is independent and separate from power.
There are also SMEs used as the friendly face of propaganda. CiberCuba reported that Cubamodela paid for advertising in Cubadebate, an official media outlet subordinate to the Communist Party. Later, it was revealed that Ideas Multimedio, a conglomerate that includes Cubadebate and other official platforms, generated significant revenue from advertising paid by SMEs.
The relationship is revealing: the regime restricts, monitors, and distrusts the private sector, but accepts its money when it finances its communication apparatus.
Businessmen as showcases of the regime
Subordination is also expressed in the transformation of certain businesspeople into functional figures within the official discourse.
The case of Dofleini S.R.L. and its director, Carlos Miguel Pérez Reyes, has been highlighted by independent media for the intersection of private enterprise, political institutions, and alignment with the regime's campaigns. Díaz-Canel visited this technological micro, small, and medium enterprise (mipyme) and presented it as an example, while its executive is a deputy in the National Assembly of the People’s Power and has held positions within official structures.
The message to the rest of the sector is clear: it is possible to grow, gain visibility, and access official spaces, as long as the venture does not turn into autonomy.
From private business to social assistants
Control is not only economic or propagandistic. It is also social.
CiberCuba reported in 2024 that the regime was seeking to involve "new economic actors" in its social policies, particularly in areas such as caregiving, poverty, support for vulnerable groups, assistance for the elderly, and community aid.
The concept used by official officials was "co-responsibility". The word reveals the retreat of the State. After decades of promising that "no one would be left behind", the regime is trying to shift part of that burden to small and medium-sized enterprises, self-employed individuals, and private entrepreneurs.
In this way, the new economic actors are integrated into a logic of political utility: when the State needs foreign currency, it allows them to import; when it needs propaganda, it showcases them; when it needs to cover up the failures of its public policies, it calls upon them to be "co-responsible."
The bridge from Miami
The gray area is not limited to Cuba. It also extends to companies based in the United States, particularly in South Florida, which have operated as commercial, logistical, or financial bridges to the island.
In 2026, Miami-Dade initiated a comprehensive review of thousands of businesses that could be conducting operations related to Cuba without the required federal documentation. The action targeted a much broader ecosystem than just a few isolated operations.
Among the most notable cases are Katapulk Marketplace LLC and Maravana Cargo Inc., companies based in Miami linked to exports to Cuba. CiberCuba reported that federal licenses used to export vehicles were revoked or challenged due to violations of conditions.
The case of Vanguard Energy, based in Coral Gables, was even more illustrative. The company reached an agreement related to the shipment and sale of fuel in Cuba, but the operation involved storage facilities of CUPET, a sanctioned Cuban state enterprise. Miami-Dade ultimately revoked its local business license.
The revocation of the license for Lux Sky Cargo LLC was also reported, noted for alleged business ties with ENETEC S.A., a Cuban state entity sanctioned in the energy sector.
The pattern is the same: even when an operation appears to be geared towards the private sector, it often needs to go through state-owned companies, ports, energy infrastructure, importers, or intermediaries authorized by the regime.
Remittances and screens
The remittance front shows a similar mechanism.
When FINCIMEX, linked to GAESA, was placed under sanctions, Orbit S.A. emerged as the new money transfer processor to Cuba.
Journalistic investigations later indicated that Orbit was under the control of the GAESA network through CIMEX. The United States ended up sanctioning Orbit, and companies like Western Union and Cubamax suspended operations or were affected by that connection.
The scheme is well known: when one route is closed due to sanctions, another formally different structure arises to occupy the same space. The name changes, the façade changes, but the control remains.
That background helps to understand why Washington views certain operations linked to the Cuban private sector with skepticism. The experience of remittances showed that the regime can shift resources, replace sanctioned companies, and maintain control over foreign currency flows under a renewed façade.
OFAC targets indirect transactions
The OFAC measures, effective from September 30, 2026, specifically target that area of mediation.
Washington eliminated the authorization for U.S. banks to open or maintain accounts for independent private Cuban entrepreneurs, ordered the blocking of affected accounts unless a specific license is obtained, eliminated financial U-Turn operations related to Cuba, and expanded restrictions on indirect transactions with entities on Cuba's Restricted List.
The key word is "indirect". OFAC does not only consider whether a transfer explicitly names GAESA, CUPET, FINCIMEX, CIMEX, or a military company. It also looks at whether the ultimate benefit could reach those entities through intermediaries, private businesses, operators in third countries, banks, payment platforms, or companies authorized by Havana.
Therefore, the measure cannot be seen merely as a punishment for entrepreneurship. It is a course correction in a model where the regime has shown the ability to use the private sector as a façade.
The false argument of the "people"
The official response was immediate. Díaz-Canel, Bruno Rodríguez, officials from MINREX, state media, and aligned accounts attempted to convey the same message: the United States is not against the Government, but against the Cuban people.
The propaganda operation is evident. The regime portrays small and medium-sized enterprises as synonymous with the population, even though in daily life, most Cubans do not have access to those businesses as a stable solution to their basic needs.
Micro, small, and medium enterprises sell products that often do not appear in the state market, but at prices that are unaffordable for salaries and pensions. A large part of the population views this circuit from the outside, relying on remittances to make purchases there or simply unable to enter.
The population does not control imports, does not sign contracts with CUPET, does not open businesses in Miami, does not process remittances through structures authorized by the Central Bank, does not buy advertising in state-run media, and does not decide which private actors can thrive.
The people are the emotional argument of the regime, not the main beneficiaries of the model.
Not all micro, small, and medium enterprises are part of the regime
The conclusion should not be simplistic. Not all small and medium enterprises are part of the regime. Not all entrepreneurs are front men. There are thousands of Cubans trying to survive and work under blackouts, inflation, taxes, inspectors, legal insecurity, restrictions, and state arbitrariness.
But the opposing narrative cannot be accepted either: that the Cuban private sector is a free, autonomous space separate from power.
In Cuba, any private actor that reaches a certain scale, handles foreign currency, imports goods, accesses fuel, operates with banks, uses ports, negotiates with state entities, or connects with foreign companies depends on permits, structures, and decisions made by the regime.
That dependency is the heart of the problem.
When Díaz-Canel said "the non-state sector is ours", he described a design of control. The subsequent reforms, the cases of mipymes linked to the power, the official propaganda, the social "co-responsibility", the businesses from Miami, and the financial screens have only confirmed this.
The new measures of the Trump administration do not stem from an abstract hostility towards private entrepreneurship. They arise from a political and practical observation: in Cuba, the private sector can be utilized by the regime as economic oxygen, a commercial façade, a financial channel, a propaganda tool, and a mechanism for evading sanctions.
That’s why Havana insists on saying that Washington is attacking the people. Because the real discussion puts it in a worse position: if the non-state sector is “theirs,” as Díaz-Canel said, then it cannot suddenly be presented as a completely independent space when sanctions arrive.
The phrase of 2021 has turned into an involuntary confession. The regime wants the world to treat the Cuban private sector as autonomous from Washington, but within Cuba, it controls it as part of its political project.
That is the point that helps to understand OFAC's shift: not to punish the small entrepreneur, but to close the channels through which the Cuban totalitarian power could continue to disguise as private what it never stopped considering "ours."
Related videos:
Filed under: