The Democratic victory in the legislative elections on November 3 does not guarantee a reduction in the pressure from Donald Trump against Cuba, nor does it rule out an escalation.
Thus warns the Cuban-American historian Michael J. Bustamante, a professor at the University of Miami, who believes that the new political landscape in the United States presents contradictory possibilities for the future of the island.
In a comprehensive analysis published on Wednesday on X, the academic examined the implications of the Democratic victory, which will grant that party control of both chambers of Congress starting January 3, 2027, according to projections from Associated Press.
Bustamante holds a Ph.D. in History from Yale University, and he is an associate professor and chair of the Emilio Bacardí Moreau Chair of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He is the author of Cuban Memory Wars: Retrospective Politics in Revolution and Exile (2021) and specializes in the history of relations between Cuba, the United States, and the exile community.
His assessments of the current situation in Cuba have been previously documented by CiberCuba. In May, he warned alongside analyst Ricardo Herrero that Havana needed to negotiate a way out of the crisis before U.S. pressure led to more severe consequences.
In August, he published an opinion piece in The New York Times warning that the Cuban people could not continue waiting indefinitely.
Now, in light of the new balance of power in Washington, it acknowledges that "the immediate implications are far from clear."
Can the Democratic Congress stop the sanctions?
One of the scenarios envisioned by Bustamante is that the new Congress subjects the maximum pressure policy against Cuba to greater scrutiny, holds hearings, and demands explanations regarding its humanitarian costs, especially in light of the lack of significant political concessions from the government of Miguel Díaz-Canel.
However, the scholar warns that the Democrats will have numerous legislative and policy priorities, including investigations into the Trump administration, which means that Cuba could be sidelined on their agenda.
The main limitation of that potential parliamentary oversight is that a significant portion of U.S. sanctions is administered by the Executive, through presidential orders and decisions made by agencies such as the Department of the Treasury.
The Congress retains essential powers in legislative, budgetary, and oversight matters, and laws such as Helms-Burton condition the comprehensive lifting of the embargo. However, Trump retains broad authority to intensify existing restrictions and implement new measures against entities and individuals linked to the Cuban regime.
Therefore, Bustamante believes that the maximum pressure policy could continue and even intensify during the last two years of Trump’s presidency.
The historian also introduces the dynamic of the so-called “lame duck”: a politically weakened president facing an adversarial Congress can focus their activity on foreign policy, where they have greater leeway to act without the need to pass new laws.
Rubio, the sanctions, and a possible escalation
The continuation of the pressure measures was evident just two days after the elections. On Thursday, November 5th, the Trump administration announced new sanctions against eight entities and two individuals linked to the Cuban economic and military apparatus, in addition to identifying five vessels as blocked assets.
The Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, stated that Washington would not stand idly by while the Cuban military elite continued to benefit from the country's economic resources.
Bustamante also examines Rubio's possible political aspirations and the opportunity that achieving concrete results in Cuba could represent for him before the end of his presidential term.
However, it warns that a larger-scale escalation would need to produce quick and decisive results to be politically favorable, something particularly challenging while the United States is involved in the war with Iran and managing the consequences of its military operation in Venezuela.
The electoral outcome, therefore, does not allow us to conclude that Washington will moderate its strategy, but neither does it suggest that a more forceful intervention is inevitable.
Havana is betting on waiting for Trump
From the perspective of the Cuban regime, a Democratic victory could reinforce a strategy that its leaders have championed for decades: to withstand external pressure until the political circumstances in the United States change.
The Chancellor Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla recently expressed this position in statements to The New York Times, asserting that Cuba would withstand the pressure for as long as necessary because, in his view, U.S. policy would eventually change.
The Cuban leadership bets on surviving politically against Trump, trusting that the wear and tear of his administration, international difficulties, and the new Congress will ultimately weaken the strategy of maximum pressure.
But Bustamante questions the cost of that wait for Cuban society.
Waiting may be a strategy for the Cuban government, but it offers little to the Cuban people. And there are still two years of sanctions under executive control. Cubans have already paid an enormous price, he noted.
In its assessment, the political obstacles facing Washington could lead to a scenario of stagnation rather than a decisive escalation. However, this paralysis would not necessarily mean relief for the population or a solution to the structural problems that Cuba has been dealing with.
The Democratic victory could provide the regime with a new argument to prolong its strategy of resistance, without implying any progress in internal reforms or in the living conditions of Cubans.
The historian summarizes the main danger of that scenario as follows: «The costs of simply waiting continue to accumulate».
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