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When Nicolás Maduro fell into the hands of the United States on January 3, 2026, it was not a power vacuum that occurred in Venezuela, but rather a carefully managed internal reconfiguration.
The figure that emerged to occupy that space was Delcy Rodríguez: not as a charismatic leader or a legitimate president, but as an operator of the collapse, a manager of the "after" and a functional piece for Washington.
That Venezuelan precedent is now the mirror in which many see Cuba. The question is no longer who will be the next president of the island, but rather who will be able to fulfill the role that Delcy played for Chavismo: ensuring internal continuity, executing external concessions, and preventing a total collapse of the system.
Delcy Rodríguez: Anatomy of a Power Operator
However, Delcy Rodríguez's rise was not without its shadows.
Subsequent reports, including testimonies from former U.S. officials, indicated that the Rodríguez brothers may have actively collaborated with Washington in the downfall of Maduro, believing that the president's time was up and that they could preserve their own power by negotiating from within.
According to this version, Delcy would have underestimated a key factor: the lack of legitimacy that the United States attributed not only to Maduro but to the entire core of Chavismo.
Far from becoming an accepted heir, her role would have been to manage the dismantling of the regime, hand over strategic pieces, and meet demands under the threat of facing the same fate as Maduro himself.
In this regard, rather than a transitional president, Delcy would have acted as the architect of the collapse, a figure tolerated while executing the agenda imposed from outside.
The sequence of events in Venezuela is also revealing. Delcy Rodríguez sworn in as interim president on January 5, 2026, before a discredited chavista Assembly, in a ceremony full of symbolism, but with a clear message: power remained within the circle. Days later, the key gestures began that defined her true role.
First, direct dialogue with Washington, confirmed by high-level meetings and public warnings from figures like Marco Rubio. Then, the acknowledgment of the Armed Forces, an essential condition for any controlled transition.
Later came the measures that marked a break from classic Chavismo: amnesty for political prisoners, the opening of the oil sector to foreign capital, and a discourse focused on "political maturity" and reconciliation.
However, as voices from the Venezuelan opposition warned, Delcy did not represent a regime change but rather an administration of dismantling.
According to former U.S. officials, her role was to deliver pieces, meet demands, and prevent a chaotic scenario. She was not the architect of a democracy, but rather the director of the funeral home, in the words of a former DEA investigator.
That is the true meaning of "being Delcy": not to govern, but to negotiate from within the survival of an elite.
Cuba facing the same dilemma
In Havana, the context is different, but the tensions are similar. The economic crisis, the energy collapse, the loss of Venezuelan support, and the direct pressure from the administration of Donald Trump have placed the Cuban regime at a crossroads.
Historical leadership is exhausted, Miguel Díaz-Canel lacks legitimacy, and real power remains concentrated in opaque structures such as GAESA and the elites who manage the finances and corporate frameworks of the great "famiglia" Castro.
In that scenario, Cuba will need its own "Delcy": someone capable of engaging in dialogue with the United States, offering economic concessions, maintaining internal control, and ensuring that the system does not collapse uncontrollably.
The name that appears most often is Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga.
Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga: The suitable profile
Unlike the visible leaders of Castroism, Pérez-Oliva Fraga is practically unknown to the public. He has no social media presence, does not deliver ideological speeches, and his career has unfolded far from revolutionary epic. This invisibility is part of his strength.
An electronic engineer of 54 years, he is the great-nephew of Fidel and Raúl Castro, son of Mirsa Fraga Castro and grandson of Ángela Castro. The family connection ensures internal trust, but his career has not been built on repression or propaganda, but rather on the management of companies belonging to the so-called "dollarized economy" of the regime.
He has worked at Maquimport, been involved in Mariel projects, and today holds two strategic positions: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment.
From that position, it is assumed that the new "leadership" of the Castro regime maintains direct contact with GAESA, the military-business conglomerate that controls foreign exchange, tourism, ports, and foreign investment. In Cuba, that control is worth more than any political speech.
His recent appointment as a deputy to the National Assembly is not a minor detail. It is the essential legal step to aspire to the presidency according to the 2019 Constitution, a charter that limits terms but does not restrict the power of the Communist Party or the indirect nature of the election.
Not a leader, but an administrator
Analysts agree on one point: Pérez-Oliva Fraga is not a Fidel, nor does he aspire to be one. He lacks charisma, does not mobilize the masses, and does not embody an epic narrative. Precisely for that reason, he fits the mold of the "Cuban Delcy."
His technocratic profile makes him acceptable to external actors; his surname lends him trustworthiness with the elite; his economic role places him at the center of any real negotiation. He would not be the face of democratization, but rather the manager of minimal concessions aimed at buying time and breathing space.
The Venezuelan experience shows that Washington is not looking for charismatic leaders or recycled revolutionaries, but rather useful interlocutors. Delcy Rodríguez fit this role because she delivered, opened doors, and executed. Cuba, sooner or later, will have to offer something similar.
The invisible power
The comparison also includes a warning. In Venezuela, Delcy was only able to operate because she had military backing and because she controlled, directly or indirectly, the strategic economic flows.
In Cuba, that core is within GAESA. Therefore, beyond names, the real question is what structure will support the "Cuban Delcy."
If the Castro regime opts for a negotiated exit, it will not do so with an ideologue or a visible oppressor, but with someone capable of speaking the language of trade, investment, and stability.
Pérez-Oliva Fraga fits that pattern better than any other name currently circulating in Havana.
Are there other potential "Delcy" in Cuba?
Although Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga appears to be the profile most similar to the Venezuelan model, he is not the only name that comes up in the analyses.
Figures such as Carlos Fernández de Cossío, the vice-chancellor specialized in relations with the United States, or Johana Tablada de la Torre, a diplomat with extensive control over the discourse towards Washington, could be contenders due to their international visibility and well-demonstrated Machiavellianism.
However, the extent of control that both could exert over the economic and security levers that would define a real negotiation is unknown.
Other actors, such as Gerardo Hernández, at the head of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, concentrate internal power in terms of social control, but they do not come across as credible external interlocutors, and the regime knows that their supposed "popular legitimacy" is nothing more than a crude propaganda operation.
In the government sphere, Inés María Chapman Waugh, the First Vice Minister, holds a position of importance and has access to the executive core, although her power relies more on institutional coordination than on structural control.
Finally, there is a factor that is rarely mentioned in public: the leadership of GAESA, the military-business conglomerate that controls foreign currency and the strategic sectors of the country.
Although Brigadier General Ania Guillermina Lastres Morera lacks a visible political profile, this is where real power resides. Any viable "Cuban Delcy" would require, at the very least, the endorsement—or direct oversight—of that structure.
A transition without the people
As happened in Venezuela, any reconfiguration in Cuba will occur without direct voting and without citizen involvement. It will be a decision made by the leadership, guided by loyalties, fears, and survival calculations. The Cuban people, once again, will be left on the sidelines.
Therefore, the question is not whether there will be a "Delcy Rodríguez" in Cuba, but when and under what conditions. Everything suggests that the regime is already laying the groundwork. And when the moment arrives, it will not seek a leader to inspire hope, but rather an operator to negotiate.
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