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In recent weeks, a series of reports and political statements have brought to the forefront of the debate the export licenses that the United States government grants to companies in Miami to trade with Cuba. The narrative that has gained traction is alarming: that the Cuban State Council and its ministries are "direct beneficiaries" of these licenses, that companies linked to the hierarchy of the dictatorship are "making million-dollar purchases" in the U.S., and that all this is happening "in blatant violation" of federal regulations.
This narrative is supported by real documents from the Miami-Dade County Tax Collector's Office that show licenses with million-dollar amounts and names of Cuban state-owned companies as "ultimate beneficiaries." The documents exist, and the amounts are verifiable. However, the interpretation made of them—from political platforms and some media—reflects at least a profound misunderstanding of how legal trade between the US and Cuba operates.
This article explains, step by step, how that system operates, why Cuban state-owned enterprises appear on the licenses, what role they actually play, and who the final recipients of the goods are.
What are SCP licenses and why do they exist?
The United States has maintained an embargo on Cuba for over six decades. However, the federal government itself has created legal exceptions to allow certain trade, based on the premise that completely isolating the Cuban population does not serve the interests of U.S. foreign policy.
The main mechanism is the Support for the Cuban People Exception (Support for the Cuban People, SCP), regulated under the Section 740.21 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This exception, administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Department of Commerce, authorizes the export of uncontrolled items (classified as EAR99) to Cuba for specific purposes: to improve the living conditions of the Cuban people, support independent economic activity, strengthen civil society, and facilitate the free flow of information.
The typical conditions of these licenses state that the exported goods must be destined for the Cuban people, cannot be re-exported from Cuba, should not primarily generate income for the Cuban government, and cannot be sold directly to the government as such.
A crucial detail that is often overlooked in media coverage: the BIS's own regulations explicitly recognize that, in a country where most economic activity is state-run, goods can be consigned to or used by Cuban government entities, as long as the ultimate purpose is to benefit the Cuban people. In other words, the mere fact that a Cuban state enterprise appears as a recipient on a license does not, by itself, constitute a violation.
The Cuban monopoly on foreign trade: why state enterprises are the only possible recipients
To understand why companies like Consumimport, Alimpex, Frutas Selectas, Alcona, or Importadora Palco appear on U.S. export licenses, it's essential to grasp how foreign trade operates in Cuba.
On the island, the authority to import and export is granted exclusively by resolution of the Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX). No micro, small, or medium enterprises, cooperatives, or self-employed workers can directly import from abroad. Cuban regulations require them to hire the services of one of the authorized state-owned companies, which act as intermediaries. According to the Resolution 166/2024 of MINCEX and subsequent updates, including the authorization of new entities in 2025, there are currently about 58 entities with this authority.
This list is taken from the Directory of Authorized Entities to Provide Foreign Trade Services to Non-State Management Forms, originally published by MINCEX in 2020 and updated through successive resolutions in the Official Gazette. The companies listed in that directory are exactly the same as those listed as "end users" on U.S. export licenses. This is not a coincidence: they are the only entities legally authorized to receive imports in Cuba.
When the BIS of the U.S. grants a license, it requires the declaration of who will receive the goods at their destination. In Cuba, the only possible legal recipients are these state-owned enterprises with foreign trade authority. There is no other option. The BIS is aware of this, and licenses are issued in that format because that is how the system is designed.
Intermediaries, not beneficiaries: the difference that no one explains
Here is the central point that has been lost in the political and media noise: that a Cuban state company appears as the "end user" on a BIS license does not mean that it is the final beneficiary of the goods. It means that it is the mandatory channel through which the product enters Cuba.
Sources linked to the export sector to Cuba, who requested to remain anonymous, confirmed to CiberCuba a detail that sheds light on how this process works in practice: there are two distinct layers of documentation that should not be confused.
The federal BIS license: it is the document that authorizes the exportation. Here, Cuban state importers appear as "end users" because the format requires it and because they are the only ones legally authorized to receive imports in Cuba. This is the document that has been made public through the records of the Tax Collector of Miami-Dade.
Shipping documents: these are the documents that accompany each specific shipment. According to the consulted sources, in these documents the actual end recipient is a micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise or another player in the Cuban private sector. The state importer acts as an intermediary, which is its legal role.
Two independent sources from the sector confirmed to CiberCuba that, in the exports covered by these licenses, the actual recipient of the goods is always a small or medium-sized enterprise (mipyme) or a buyer from the Cuban private sector. The same American companies mentioned in the reports regularly sell to mipymes through these intermediaries, which aligns with the spirit of the SCP licenses, whose stated purpose is precisely to support independent economic activity.
The clearest analogy: presenting state importers as "beneficiaries" of these purchases is like labeling a logistics company as the "buyer" of all the goods that pass through its warehouses. Its name appears on the shipping documents, but the actual buyer is the end customer.
The role of the Tax Collector of Miami-Dade: what they can and cannot determine
Much of the recent alarm stems from actions taken by the Miami-Dade County Tax Collector, Dariel Fernández, who has been pushing for a review of businesses that trade with Cuba since September 2025. His office revoked local business licenses for more than 20 companies and published a transparency page with records of export licenses related to Cuba.
It is important to understand the limits of this office. The Tax Collector is a local and state authority that manages business taxes and driving licenses in the county. It does not have jurisdiction over the enforcement of federal export regulations. The agencies responsible for determining whether there is a violation of trade regulations with Cuba are the BIS (Department of Commerce) and the OFAC (Department of the Treasury). To date, neither has issued a statement declaring the operations that have been presented as scandalous to be illegal.
Specialists in sanctions have publicly questioned these actions. Attorney John Maxwell, quoted by WLRN, noted that federal authorizations to trade with Cuba are autonomous and do not require additional approval from state or local governments, and that federal laws take precedence over local provisions. Ricardo Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, described the actions of the Tax Collector as politically motivated.
Why talking about "open violation" is dangerous and unfounded
The most problematic logical leap in the narrative that has been constructed is this: taking the fact that Cuban state-owned companies appear as "end users" in the licenses and concluding that this constitutes a "violation" of federal regulations.
But if the licenses were granted by the BIS itself, if the declared "end users" are the importers that Cuban regulations require to be used, and if the actual recipient in the shipping documents is a small or medium-sized enterprise, then the system is functioning exactly as it was designed. Asserting otherwise implies, either explicitly or implicitly, that the entrepreneurs in Miami who received those licenses are potential federal criminals. Violating U.S. export regulations can lead to criminal penalties, fines of up to one million dollars per violation, and up to 20 years in prison.
There is a fundamental contradiction in the narrative: if the U.S. government issues a license with a specific format, approved recipients, and explicit conditions, how can it be a "violation" for the exporter to comply exactly with the terms of that license? Is the U.S. "violating itself" by issuing them? The answer, obviously, is no. The architecture of the SCP licenses was deliberately designed by Washington to function in this way.
Who loses if these channels are closed?
The political pressure to close these channels of legal trade has real consequences, and not precisely for the hierarchs of the Cuban dictatorship.
The SCP licenses and the export channels they cover are the means through which thousands of Cuban small and medium-sized enterprises access construction materials, tools, appliances, supplies, and basic products. If these licenses are revoked or pressure is applied to eliminate the exceptions to the embargo, the ones who will suffer are these private entrepreneurs—the very individuals that, according to the declared policy of the United States, are supposed to be supported—while the state apparatus of the dictatorship has its own supply routes that do not depend on SCP licenses.
There is a painful irony in all of this: some of the politicians and influencers who have reacted most quickly by calling for a hardline approach against these Miami companies claim to defend the interests of the Cuban people. However, by pushing to close the only legal channel through which Cuban small and medium-sized enterprises receive supplies from the U.S., they could be causing exactly the harm they claim to be fighting against.
What should indeed concern us
None of the above means that the system is perfect or that there aren’t legitimate questions to ask. There are, and they are important:
- Transparency: What margins and commissions do the state-run Cuban importers charge for mediating these operations? How much of the final product's cost is kept by the intermediary, and how much does the small and medium enterprise (mipyme) pay? This is indeed a legitimate criticism of the dictatorship: its monopoly on foreign trade increases product prices and extracts rents from the private sector.
- Access asymmetry: Do all MSMEs have equal access to these importers, or is there political favoritism? Do companies linked to GAESA or the military apparatus receive preferential treatment?
- Real destination: Although the consulted sources confirm that the documented final recipient is always a small or medium-sized enterprise, what percentage of the total volume imported through these licenses actually ends up in the hands of the private sector, and how much is retained or redirected by the state apparatus? That information is not public today.
Conclusion: real data, incorrect interpretation
Export licenses exist. The amounts are real. The Cuban state companies designated as "end users" do exist. All of this is verifiable. However, interpreting this data as evidence that "the State Council makes million-dollar purchases" or that there is "an open violation" of the regulations is fundamentally incorrect.
The state-owned companies listed in those licenses are authorized importers whose legal function—both according to Cuban regulations and the design of the U.S. licenses—is to act as a channel for goods to reach small and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes) and the private sector. Shipping documents, according to sources in the sector, confirm that this is indeed happening in practice.
The Cuban dictatorship deserves all the criticism it receives. Its monopoly on foreign trade is a tool for control and rent extraction that harms the private sector. However, criticism should be based on facts, not on misinterpretations of legal documents. Confusing intermediaries with beneficiaries, legal licenses with violations, and channels of support for the people with purchases by the Council of State does not help anyone—except for those seeking a sensational headline or an easily sellable political stance.
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