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Cuba is facing its most severe crisis since the Special Period of the nineties in 2026, and an analysis published this week in War on the Rocks raises a question that more and more analysts are asking: Is the regime of Díaz-Canel on the brink of collapse, or will it withstand as Fidel Castro did three decades ago?
The analyst Charles Larratt-Smith argues that the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. special forces on January 3 was, in fact, the first link in a strategy intended to dismantle the Cuban regime. "The co-optation of the Venezuelan regime is a means to dismantle the regime in Cuba," he stated.
Although the data indicate an accelerated deterioration —energy crisis, economic collapse, and an increase in protests— the outcome is not definitive.
Unlike in the 1990s, the regime faces more coordinated external pressure and a more fatigued society, but it still retains key control tools, such as the repressive apparatus and GAESA's economic dominance.
The question is not whether Cuba is in crisis, but whether this crisis has surpassed the threshold that has historically allowed it to withstand the Castro regime. For now, the balance between pressure and control remains unresolved, without a definitive outcome.
The end of Venezuelan oil supply to Cuba
On the day of Maduro's capture, shipments of subsidized fuel from Venezuela to Cuba—between 26,000 and 35,000 barrels daily—vanished. Mexico also suspended its own shipments on January 29, when Trump signed Executive Order 14380, declaring a national emergency and imposing tariffs on any country supplying crude oil to the island.
The United States intercepted seven tankers and temporarily blocked Russian oil. The New York Times referred to the measure as the first effective blockade of Cuba since the Missile Crisis of 1962.
The outcome of the strategy on the electrical system has been devastating. The generation deficit reached 1,885 MW during peak hours on March 25, with blackouts exceeding 18 hours daily in several provinces. The Antonio Guiteras thermal power plant collapsed on March 5, and ten of the 16 thermal units in the country were out of service that same month.
The energy crisis has sparked an unprecedented wave of protests
In January, there were 953 protests and critical expressions recorded, with 395 direct challenges to the State, the highest monthly figure in history according to the Cuban Conflict Observatory.
Since March 7, protests and demonstrations have spread from Havana to Ciego de Ávila, Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, and Morón, where protesters damaged the headquarters of the Communist Party.
The economic situation is equally bleak in Cuba
The Cuban GDP has dropped by 23% since 2019, with a projected -7.2% for 2026. Tourism fell by 9.2% in January, with 24,255 fewer visitors than in the same month of 2025. More than 600,000 Cubans have left the island since 2022, depleting the country of a portion of its youngest and most active population.
The comparison with the Special Period reveals differences that make the current situation potentially more severe. In the 1990s, Cuba started from a relatively solid economic base and achieved a partial recovery within three years. Today, the crisis is compounded by three decades of ongoing deterioration.
The country currently produces much less than during the worst years of the Special Period, and the economic trend has been a steady decline since 2017. Furthermore, the regime no longer has the political capital or the "charisma" of Fidel Castro to sway international public opinion in its favor.
Some factors of resistance persist in Cuba
The state's repressive apparatus remains operational. GAESA, the business holding controlled by the Castro family, retains control over profitable economic sectors. Meanwhile, the political leadership has begun discreet negotiations with Washington.
The government of the United States confirmed that those conversations are ongoing, although more than 240 additional sanctions have already been imposed.
The architecture of the strategy to overthrow the Cuban regime is signed by Marco Rubio, Secretary of State and son of Cuban immigrants.
Larratt-Smith notes that Rubio "learned that the only way to weaken either of the two regimes was to cut the solid bilateral ties that guaranteed their collective survival." His condition for any normalization is categorical: "The system of government in Cuba must change."
Trump, for his part, has been more straightforward. "Cuba will fail very soon".
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